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Abstract
As computers reach more aspects of our everyday life, so too do the passwords that 
keep them secure. Coping with these passwords can be a problem for many 
individuals and organisations who have to deal with the consequences of passwords 
being forgotten, yet little is known of this issue. This thesis considers the effectiveness 
of password authentication systems for three groups of stakeholders including users, 
support staff, and system owners. The initial problem of how to create memorable but 
secure passwords is reconceptualised as how to improve password system 
effectiveness. Interview, questionnaire, and system log studies in BT, and experiments 
at UCL-CS confirm some basic hypotheses about key variables impacting 
performance, and show that other variables than the memorability of password content 
are also important which have hitherto not figured in security research and practice. 
Interventions based on these findings are proposed. Empirical evaluation suggests 
that the interventions proposed that ‘redesign’ the user but exclude other parts of the 
system would fail. Reason’s (1990) Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS) is used 
as a basis for modelling password system performance at the level of individual users. 
GEMS and the Basic Elements of Production are used generalise these findings, and 
for the first time to model information security. This new model, “Elevation”, is 
validated by expert review, and a modified version is presented.
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Introduction
1.1 The problem and thesis scope
Many people have a password story to tell. More often than not, it is an enthusiastic 
description of the clever way that person has found of coping with them. This shows 
two things: that password systems (defined in section 3.1) affect many people in their 
day to day lives, and that this effect is problematic (else why would it need special 
coping strategies?). This is especially noticeable in the places where these problems 
all come together - computer helpdesks, where the individual users’ password 
problems are shared by their organisation that must divert resources to sort them out. 
The extent of the problems, and their effect on individuals and organisations raise a 
number of research questions:
Research Question A. What is the performance of password systems in actual use?
Research Question B. How can the performance of password systems be
measured?
Research Question C. What are the causes of good or bad performance? And
ultimately
Research Question D. What interventions can be made to improve the performance
of password systems?
These questions will begin to be addressed in this thesis.
This thesis is aimed at helping large organisations such as universities and 
corporations and the people they are composed of who are using passwords in the 
pursuit of the organisations’ work (“users”). It is not aimed at solving the password 
problems of the organisations’ customers, other private individuals, nor the personal 
(rather than work related) password problems of users in large organisations; though 
all these people will benefit from the research. By helping users, it is also possible to 
aid helpdesk workers / system administrators, and the high-level managers / owners of 
the organisation. This thesis aims to address needs of all these stakeholders. Should 
these stakeholders’ needs conflict, it will prioritise the needs of the users.
The discipline of Human Computer Interaction (HCI) has several indices of work 
system performance, for example: users’ satisfaction, learnability, fun, users’ stress, 
cognitive workload, etc. This thesis employs the indices time and errors (see section 
2.2.3), with errors frequently operationalised in this thesis as users’ calls to a computer 
helpdesk to get a password reset, or users’ requests for a password reminder. There 
are other valid foci for password performance research which are not pursued in this 
thesis: important issues relating to users mental models of computer security and
C h a p te r 1 introduction
passwords, and related issues of perceived risks, corporate culture and social 
dynamics. However, the particular quantitative focus of this thesis has the benefit of 
simpler collection, analysis, and interpretation while maintaining the ability to deliver 
significant contributions.
In line with the goals of HCI (see section 2.2.2), the 4 research questions are 
reconceptualised as being part of an effort to:
Research Problem 1. Reduce the costs of password authentication systems to
stakeholders, and to improve the quality with which 
password systems carry out the authentication task. And 
further to
Research Problem 2. Start model building that may eventually enable the findings
of this research to be generalised and validated, so that they 
may be re-used for other classes and scales of work system 
in the domain of information security.
1.2 The research approach
The empirical research in this thesis amounts to a summative and a formative 
evaluation (see section 2.2.4) of password authentication with data from BT (the 
corporation sponsoring this PhD) and UCL. Part 1 of the research problem (see 
previous section) is addressed by measuring password system performance in BT and 
UCL, discovering the underlying causes, and then proposing interventions that would 
improve performance (see section 9.4): reducing stakeholder costs and/or improving 
task quality.
The problem was addressed using a range of standard Human-Computer Interaction 
evaluation techniques. Analytic techniques were employed, for example by analysing 
documentation such as recommendations of best practice for password mechanism 
configuration and use, and security policy documents. These techniques informed and 
directed the use of empirical methods: users’ and system administrators’ experiences 
were captured via interview and questionnaire, and their use of password mechanisms 
were observed through the use of system logs and diaries. This allowed the effects of 
different components of password best practice/received wisdom to be tested 
empirically.
This research has been done with participants from two different kinds of large 
organisations - each of interest on its own and complimentary. Corporate populations 
are likely to face a greater security and password problem, as corporate users will
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more often process data belonging to and about other people. However, commercial 
necessity constrains both the availability of users for research in a corporate 
population, and the techniques that can be employed with them (for example, it was not 
possible to instrument a live business computer system to record performance data). 
Students are users in the comparatively flexible university environment. They are likely 
to be more easily available, and a wider set of techniques may be deployed with them. 
They exist in a different security context - as they process (and so defend) mostly their 
own data.
The thesis addresses part 2 of the research problem (see section 1.1) by presenting a 
model that abstracts from the particulars of password authentication in BT and UCL so 
that the findings can start to be applied more widely in the domain of information 
security to password problems in other organisations (see Chapter 11).
1.3 The thesis overview
A map of the thesis is given in Figure 1. Chapters 6,7, and 8 present the empirical 
findings, which tackle research problems a) and b) and collect the data for c). These 
Chapters perform a summative evaluation of password mechanisms in BT and UCL, 
and begin the process of formative evaluation. Chapter 9 tackles research problems c) 
and d), bringing together the results from the previous Chapters to diagnose the 
ineffectiveness of password mechanisms at BT and UCL, and suggest interventions 
that could improve performance. Chapters 6 through 9 can therefore be seen as 
answering Research Problem 1 (reducing the costs and improving the quality in 
password system performance). The final Chapters of the thesis are devoted to 
Research Problem 2 (modelling and validation). Chapter 10 begins to validate a 
subset of the interventions. Chapter 11 abstracts the findings of this thesis into a 
model intended to enable reuse of the findings in other large organisations.
The individual chapters are outlined below:
Chapter 2 introduces the academic disciplines that inform this thesis: Computer 
Security and Human Computer Interaction (HCI). The goals, fundamental principles, 
measures and techniques of these disciplines are outlined. The application of HCI's 
principal techniques to the research problems are briefly discussed.
Chapter 3 outlines the relevant properties and working of password authentication
systems, including both its human and computer components. Outlines are given of
how password strength is measured, the vulnerabilities of password systems, and
common administrative responses to these vulnerabilities. Outlines are also given of
the psychology of memory and human performance. It is noted that human error is of
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great importance to computer security, and that the discipline of human computer 
interaction is ideally placed to study it. This chapter sets the scene, and gives the PhD 
its focus upon time and errors.
Ch4.- RGs a) b} c) 
Literature review - performance 
of password mechanisms
CM. - RGs a) b) c) 
Literature review - working of 
password mechanisms
CM.- RQ d)
Generation of interventions. 
Estimate of pwd. system costs.
Cf>7.- RQs a) b) c) 
Questionnaire studies of BT 
population
C liff. - Modelling 
of password findings to 
diagnose of pwd system perf.
Ch10. -Validation 
of interventions
CM.- RQs a) b) c) 
System log studies of 
UCL and BT populations
CM.- RQs a) b) c)
Diary & system log combined 
method - close focus on a 
small sample of UCL 
population
Research Goal 2
Research Goal 1
Figure 1 - Map of the thesis
Chapter 4 summarises what is already known about the performance of password 
authentication systems. An obvious intervention to improve authentication is to replace 
poor performing password mechanisms with rival technologies. Chapter 4 also outlines 
some of these alternative mechanisms. This review concludes that rival technologies 
achieve the same level of security by using more memorable content. However, the 
chapter also shows that with some modification, traditional passwords can also use 
more memorable content and achieve good security, and that passwords have 
significant strengths. The chapter ends by re-examining this PhD's initial problem (as 
given by the PhD's sponsor) in the light of the preceding chapters, and re-specifies it to 
be the one presented in section 1.1. This chapter sets the scope and direction of the 
work in the following chapters.
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Chapter 5 is the methods chapter. A summary is given of the goals and methods of the 
studies described in the following chapters.
Chapter 6 begins to estimate the basic parameters of password use and performance 
in a real world setting. The number and type of password errors are estimated for six 
people with diverse roles in UCL (undergraduate, PhD student, staff member). This 
estimated performance is given context by data collection about the number of 
passwords owned by the participants, their password construction, and frequency of 
password use. The combination methodology is found to be powerful but too 
expensive, and improvements are suggested.
Chapter 7 pursues a methodology-questionnaire surveys-which enables data to be 
collected from the difficult to reach population of BT users. This data goes beyond the 
data collected from the UCL sample, allowing the beginnings of a diagnosis of 
performance. This data gives evidence that several of the management techniques 
employed to improve security actually reduce password system performance, and in so 
doing result in poorer security. However, the data does not allow the performance of 
passwords in the BT sample to be estimated.
Chapter 8 takes up this challenge, using system logs as the data source. Password 
performance is calculated for a UCL sample and three different BT information 
systems, thereby achieving one of this thesis’ main objectives (answering Research 
Question A). Evidence is presented that BT has a greater problem with passwords 
than UCL. Several different analyses of these logs are made, that give further 
evidence that some of the management techniques employed to improve security 
actually reduce it (helping to answer Research Question C).
Chapter 9 brings together findings about the causes of password performance to 
suggest interventions for improving it (referring to a model presented in Chapter 11). 
Password costs are split into three categories, and estimates given for each type of 
cost in BT (similar data could not be collected for UCL). The aspect of performance 
primarily affected by each intervention is predicted (task quality or one of the three 
costs).
Chapter 10 puts together a hypothetical package of interventions from Chapter 9 that 
could be implemented in BT’s economic and internal political circumstances: 
interventions which are aimed at changing the users behaviour rather than reallocating 
function to technology or changing management practices. This package of 
interventions is put through the beginnings of a validation process using focus groups 
from two different areas of the organisation. Evidence is collected that the 
interventions would work if used, but that a significant minority made up of relatively
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powerful members of the organisation would not conform to the behaviour changes 
proposed in the package, and that the interventions would fail unless accompanied by 
changes to infrastructure and other aspects of security management.
Chapter 11 abstracts the thesis’ findings about the causes of password problems. It 
presents a model that ties these findings to existing psychological theory-Reason’s 
(1990) conception of human error.
Chapter 12 summarises the thesis, suggests further work and begins it, by starting 
development of a higher level model relating human error to wider aspects of computer 
security and highlighting initial directions for its development. This higher level model 
focusses on the management of organisations and is an interpretation of a model that 
has been successfully used in the domain of industrial safety. This new model begins 
to explain how the situation modelled in Chapter 11 could have developed, and how 
interventions based on this model could have been found to be relevant but not 
acceptable by BT users in Chapter 10.
1.4 The research contributions
This thesis will have two main substantive contributions:
• A body of empirical data measuring password system performance, collected from 
one corporate and one academic environment. This gives a starting place for 
comparisons between and within the organisations, and can serve as a foundation 
for model building and theorising. This data reveals unintended negative effects of 
security policies upon password system performance
• The presentation of a model (Chapters 10,11) which is a first pass at explaining 
the data outlined above. This can be used as a starting place for further research 
which may lead to more general models (see 12.5.5 in Chapter 12), upon which 
proactive security review, retrospective investigation techniques, and security 
design methods can be based.
Parts of the research reported in this thesis have been published. The results in 
Chapter 7 were published as part of a journal article and book chapter (Sasse, Brostoff, 
& Weirich, 2001; Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2002). Chapter 8 contains work that has 
previously been published in peer-reviewed conferences (e.g. Brostoff & Sasse, 2000, 
2003), and the model in Chapter 12 has also been published in proceedings of a peer- 
reviewed conference (Brostoff & Sasse, 2001).
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This chapter will outline the fundamentals of the two disciplines that contain the 
background material to this PhD: Computer Security and Human-Computer Interaction 
(HCI). We will begin with computer security, outlining its goals, then its general 
techniques, followed by a more focussed description of the techniques used for 
authenticating users (including passwords and their major alternatives). Following that 
is an overview of how different attacks affect the problem of securing computers. The 
section on computer security concludes that the human factor in computer security 
needs to be considered to improve effectivenss of security systems.
The second half of the chapter will outline the fundamentals of HCI, a discipline 
considering the human and technology components of systems and optimising the 
interaction between them. The nature and concepts of HCI will first be outlined, then 
the discipline’s goals, scope and measures. Finally, the techniques used in HCI and 
their application to researching computer passwords will be discussed.
2.1 Security
2.1.1 The problem  o f secu rity
The fundamental concepts and models used to describe the security process are set 
down in international standards (BSI, 1996). These concepts will be referred to in the 
thesis, and are outlined here. Any organisation faces security threats (theft, fraud, etc) 
against their assets (customer data, secret product plans, reputation, etc.) which if 
realised will have a negative impact (destruction or permanent removal of the assets, 
etc.). Vulnerabilities to particular threats increase their opportunity for causing impacts 
- vulnerabilities increase the risk that impacts will occur. Safeguards are put into place 
to protect against impacts, and so reduce risks. IT security policies are rules, directives 
and practices that govern how assets are managed, protected (i.e. with safeguards) 
and distributed within an organisation. Risk of threats occuring, vulnerability to and 
impact of realised threats are all independent variables in security equation, which 
seeks to minimise risks by applying safeguards. However, safeguards have their own 
impact (initial cost and maintenance, inconvenience, etc.), and there is no sense in 
having them if the treatment is worse than the disease. Organisations therefore seek 
to minimise the impact of both security breaches and safeguards.
2.1.2 G oals  (access  contro l)
According to Garfinkel and Spafford (1996), computer security has several major 
principles that it strives to uphold:
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1. Confidentiality Protecting information from being read or copied by peopie who 
are not authorised by the information's owner to read or copy it. This includes 
pieces of information from which the confidential information can be inferred.
2. Data integrity Protecting information including programs, backup tapes, file 
creation times, documentation, etc. from being deleted or altered without the 
permission of the information's owner.
3. Availability Ensuring that the computer services are not degraded or made 
unavailable without authorisation.
Garfinkel and Spafford note that a formal definition of computer security would require 
detailed explanations of risk assessment, asset valuation, policy formation, and a 
number of other topics beyond the scope of this thesis.
2.1.3 Techn iques fo r security
The principles of information security are upheld using 3 main techniques, which are 
(Schneier, 2000):
Prevention. Stopping a security breach from happening, often by identifying 
vulnerabilities in a system and putting in safeguards. Examples of this technique 
include access control (passwords), firewalls, encryption. It is often impossible to 
completely prevent security breaches (Schneier, 2000).
Detection. Discovering that a security breach has occurred or is occurring (detection), 
identifying the nature of the attack (localisation), the identity and whereabouts 
(identification) and nature of the perpetrators (assessment). Examples of this 
technique include: intrusion detection systems, system logs, digital watermarking. 
Detection allows Response.
Response. Mitigating the consequences of the security breach, or deterring attacks - 
usually by punishment. Examples include: insurance and prosecution.
These three techniques are marshalled in a process of risk analysis, where threats and 
vulnerabilities are identified, and risks and impacts evaluated to decide on appropriate 
safeguards. Risk analysis is difficult and costly, and in practice often requires cursory 
analysis and blanket imposition of safeguards, when deeper analysis would allow 
tailored solutions (Cho & Ciechanowicz, 2001).
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2.1.4 Techn iques fo r authentication
The bedrock on which the principles and techniques are built is the ability to distinguish 
between authorised and unauthorised users. The process by which this occurs is 
called user authentication.
A person first declares her identity as a bona fide user, for example with a user name. 
There are 3 avenues that may be then taken to verify or authenticate her declared 
identity. They are: knowledge based authentication, where the user reveals a secret or 
secrets to the computer such as a password that only the real user should know; token 
based authentication, where the user presents some physical or digital object to the 
computer that should only be in the possession of the real user; and biometric 
authentication, where the user presents herself to the computer for examination, so it 
may recognise a characteristic of her phenotype or behaviour that is unique to herself. 
These avenues will be discussed in more depth below.
Knowledge-based authentication
The workings of different knowledge based authentication mechanims is described in 
sections 3.2.2 and 4.2. They all have in common the advantage that they usually do 
not require extra hardware than exists at every computer workstation, where the other 
authentication paradigms do. The objects of authentication are also more easily and 
cheaply changed if they are compromised than in the other paradigms. The most 
common type of user authentication system is the password.
Token-based authentication
In token based authentication, a physical or digital object is submitted to the computer 
for examination. The computer generally requires additional hardware and software to 
conduct the examination, which is extra cost not incurred in knowledge-based 
authentication. Tokens are designed to be unique and difficult to forge. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that it is impossible or economically infeasible to do so 
(Svigals, 1994). Moreover, because the tokens are so easy to pass on, take away, or 
mislay, they are usually used in combination with one of the other authentication 
paradigms. For example, a smart card may have a picture of its owner imprinted or 
stored in it or may require the use of a password. The use of token-based 
authentication may therefore increase the number of passwords, instead of decreasing 
them. Many token-based authentication systems therefore still involve password 
problems.
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Biometric authentication
Biometrics are often heralded as the ultimate replacement of passwords (e.g. Murrer,
1999). However, biometrics technology is still relatively immature, and biometric 
authentication suffers from a number of weaknesses.
There are two kinds of biometric authentication devices: those that focus on the 
physical structures of the user such as retina scanning, hand geometry, face 
recognition, fingerprint reading, etc.; and those that focus on the behaviours of the user 
such as signature, voice print, keystroke dynamics, mousing dynamics, etc.
In general, structural biometric devices are expensive compared to passwords (Kim,
1995), while behavioural biometrics are unpopular with users because of their potential 
abuse as work monitoring devices (Deane, Barrelle, Henderson, & Mahar, 1995). For 
example, a mechanism that identified users by their keystroke dynamics could be used 
illicitly to monitor their productivity.
Another weakness in both structural and behaviourally based mechanisms is that the 
biometric presented to the device may appear to be different at each use due to 
environmental conditions, wear and tear on the device, or human factors - thus 
increasing the probability that legitimate users are denied access while imposters are 
let through. These two risks are related, so decreasing one increases the other, and 
different situations will call for one or the other to be minimised. Maintaining these 
devices (for example clearing grease and grime from fingerprint readers) adds to their 
operational expense.
Structural biometrics are based upon the user’s physical characteristics.
Consequently, one way for attackers to gain access is to use a copy of a legitimate 
user’s characteristics. For example, copies may be left on the biometric reader as a 
result of login attempts. Some commodity fingerprint readers have been defeated by 
placing a bag of warm water on or breathing over the sensor to activate the most 
recently used fingerprint (Thalheim, Krissler, & Ziegler, 2002). People leave behind 
them many copies of their biometrics in much less defended places than biometric 
devices, for example, fingerprints left on a glass. This may be copied and used by 
attackers to pose as a legitimate user. While this may seem far-fetched at the moment, 
criminals will have much greater motivation to start dusting glasses for prints should 
structural biometrics become the norm rather than a rarity.
Another way for attackers to gain access is to steal a legitimate user’s characteristics. 
Biometrics therefore lead to a greater threat of mutilation against the user (Garfinkel,
2000). Manufacturers attempt to reduce this threat technologically by building in “signs 
of life” detection, such as vascular throb (which also safeguard against copied
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biometrics). However, these technologies have appeared to be fairly simple to defeat 
(Schneier, 2002). Moreover, the technical accuracy of this technology is irrelevant. 
Even if it were completely accurate, users would still have a legitimate fear because 
they would still face attack if the criminals did not know or did not believe that the 
technology was effective.
2.1.5 Nature of the attacker
An aspect of password security that is of prime importance is the nature of the attacker. 
It is intimately related with the utility of strong passwords (Figure 2), and so is directly 
related to the effectiveness of password policy (see section 3.1.3, p.45), and the 
password recommendations given to users.
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Figure 2 - Properties of different kinds of attacker and their relation to the utility
of strong passwords
The people who attempt to break password security differ in important ways (Figure 2), 
including: their motivation, their abilities/skills, their resources and methods, and their 
number. These combine in predictable ways, and alter the frequency and power of 
attacks made against password mechanisms. Figure 2 is based on the computer 
security institute/FBI 2002 crime survey (Power, 2002), and shows different classes of
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attacker, and how their characteristics vary and the implications for password based 
security.
At the bottom of the figure attackers may be characterised as: extremely numerous 
(millions worldwide, significant percentages of the constituents of any organisation), 
risk averse with little motivation (unwilling to tolerate much risk to their reputation or 
wallet) and so keen to avoid detection, unskilled, with almost no resources-budget of a 
few pounds, with little access to computerised tools. Their attacks are unlikely to be 
successful against password security, and if they were successful, would be unlikely to 
cause much damage. At this level, strong password policies could be relatively 
effective.
At the top end of the figure, the attackers are relatively few-merely hundreds to 
thousands of them worldwide. They are highly motivated, being professionals or 
zealots, and while they may not wish it to happen, they may be prepared to lay down 
their life or liberty for the success of the attack. They may have years of training and 
experience in breaking security, and are likely to have the wealth of whole nation's 
funding them, having at their disposal the most sophisticated tools and assistance that 
can be devised. The strength of passwords is likely to be of little consequence to such 
attackers, and so in this context it is inappropriate to rely on strong password policies.
2.1.6 A  call fo r HCI invo lvem ent
In many environments, the demands that different safeguards place on users have 
become unattainable, or conflict with other elements of users' jobs (Adams & Sasse, 
1999; Zurko & Simon, 1996). Furthermore, many users receive little or no training or 
support on security. These issues facilitate security breaches; yet, they are not 
addressed by many current security models. Researchers (e.g. Whitten & Tygar,
1999) and practitioners (e.g. Zurko & Simon, 1996) are calling with increasing 
frequency for the human factor to be considered in the design and review of security in 
the IT system life-cycle. A discipline exists which already considers the human aspects 
of computing - Human Computer Interaction (HCI), and the following section will review 
what HCI can contribute to improve password security.
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2.2 HCI
2.2.1 N ature and concepts
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Figure 3 - Diagram of an interactive Work System
HCI is concerned with optimising the performance of interactive work-systems. 
Interactive work-systems (henceforth termed as systems) are composed of users 
(people who operate computers) and technology (computers, mechanical or electronic 
components) that interact with each other to achieve a goal or do work, by performing 
certain tasks. The concern of the discipline is sometimes widened to consider 
stakeholders instead of users. There are three types of stakeholder:
• Primary stakeholders will be refered to as users - they operate computer
components,
• Secondary stakeholders manage and maintain the system,
• Tertiary stakeholders own the system.
2.2.2 Goals & scope
The goal of the discipline is to reach an optimal balance between two criteria of 
system performance: the quality of the task performed - task quality (how good the 
product is, how fast it is achieved, etc.), and the cost of achieving that quality (to the 
user or other stakeholders, and the computer parts of the system) - stakeholder costs 
and technology costs. The balance between the cost and quality of work is 
described as the system’s effectiveness, with high quality and low costs being 
effective (Dowell & Long, 1998).
It has been argued that in its research aspect, HCI should seek to build validated 
theory and models that can make knowledge gained through practice more easy to re-
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use, and give a better probability of successful design (cf. Dowell & Long, 1998).
Dowell and Long (1998) advocate the generation of validated knowledge as 
engineering principles, which may be expressed in symbolic generalisations that 
function both as laws and definitions of solutions (p. 128). The research in this thesis 
will be informed by Dowell and Long’s (1998) conception, and begin the path to 
generalisation.
2.2.3 P erform ance ind ices
This section will justify the use of time and errors in this research as subjects of 
measurement. International standards (e.g. BSI, 1998) measure usability summatively 
(see section 2.2.5) in terms of the effectiveness, efficiency and satisfaction with which 
computing goals are achieved in a specific context of use. Dowell and Long’s (1990) 
conception of effectiveness encompasses the international standard’s conceptions of 
both effectiveness and efficiency, and can be extended to include satisfaction (if a 
purpose of the work system is identified as being to transform users from unsatisfied to 
satisfied).
In all HCI research and practice these measurements need to be described at a lower 
level before they can be made. One such description will be taken as an example: the 
MUSiC project (Macleod, Bowden, Bevan, & I., 1997). This description contains the 
following indices:
1. Task Effectiveness p(Quantity pQuality)/100 %
2. User Efficiency pEffectiveness/TaskTime
3. Human Efficiency pEffectiveness/Effort
4. Productive Time = Task Time remaining after unproductive periods have been 
removed - time a user spends progressing towards the task goals, irrespective of 
whether the goals are eventually achieved.
5. Productive Period = Productive Time expressed as a percentage of the Task Time.
Three of these five metrics involve time - showing that time is a core HCI measure of 
performance. Task effectiveness does not map easily into password system 
performance. The quality of authentication and password systems requires careful 
definition. On each use of a password mechanism a valid user may either be accepted 
as entirely valid or rejected as an impostor, which is an error by the system. Similarly, 
an impostor may be either accepted as a valid user (an error) or rejected. Errors are 
therefore intrinsic to Task Effectiveness.
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The last two performance indices in the list above are defined using the action types 
listed below:
1. Unproductive actions = Help Actions, Search Actions, Snag Actions
2. Help Action = The user obtains information about the system, for example by 
telephoning the helpdesk.
3. Search Action = The user explores the structure of the system - displaying parts 
that are not currently accessed - without activating any of the parts that are 
presented.
4. Snag Action = The user or system performs an action that does not contribute 
directly or indirectly to the task output, and that cannot be categorised as a help or 
search action. There are three types of snag action - negating actions, cancelled 
actions, and rejected actions.
5. Negating Actions = User actions that completely cancel or negate previous user or 
technology actions. They always cause cancelled actions.
6. Cancelled Actions = User or technology actions that are completely negated by the 
user or the technology.
7. Rejected Actions = User actions that are rejected or ‘ignored’ by the technology, 
and that consequently have no effect.
Here the use of help facilities is explicitly defined as a performance index. Moreover, 
helpdesk uses are more likely to be logged and available to researchers than any of 
the other unproductive actions (see section 5.2.7). Hence the use of password 
helpdesks is a valid concern of HCI and this thesis.
Snag actions imply error - these actions are negated, cancelled or rejected because 
the actions themselves or the actions leading to them are wrong. Diagnosis of 
password system performance (which answers Research Question D) requires that the 
causes of these incorrect actions be identified, i.e what errors were made. Examining 
password systems’ errors is therefore important to diagnose their performance, and is 
a valid concern of this thesis.
2.2.4 W h y  HCI and not In form ation  S ystem s approach?
Researchers in the author’s discipline have tended to study password system 
effectiveness in a purely technical manner, as detailed in section 4.1.2. While this is 
undoubtedly useful and important information, collecting it has not solved the problem 
of "poor" password system performance in operational environments. Researchers 
whose interests lie outside the narrow technical performance of password mechanisms
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have become interested in the problem of computer security, and even researchers 
within the HCI & Computer Science tradition have begun to view password based 
security from a perspective that encompasses more than password content and 
memorability (e.g. Adams, Sasse, & Lunt, 1997).
However, a recent review concluded that there is little work that melds technical 
security issues with a wider perspective (Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001), particularly in the 
areas of key principles, theories and frameworks. Most of the research published to 
date has come from the information systems community, and has had little impact for 
practitioners (Dhillon & Backhouse, 1997). Information systems security research has 
also had little penetration into the traditional HCI community. Information systems 
research tends to employ theories and terminology from sociology and philosophy, 
leading to complex and holistic explanations quite different to the well-defined and 
pragmatic approach taken by the HCI community. It is also noted for its lack of a 
prescriptive knowledge (Dhillon & Backhouse, 1997), which makes it very difficult to 
apply. The combination of lack of applicability and its complexity has reduced its 
audience to “a small niche of academic researchers” (Dhillon & Backhouse, 1997).
This thesis will therefore be concentrated on the HCI and Computer Science 
communities' efforts, will maintain a strong interest in a sociotechnical perspective of 
the problem, and aim to generate prescriptive knowledge.
2.2.5 HCI techn iques and th e ir app lication  to  the  
passw ord problem
HCI practice has two main pursuits: evaluation, and design/intervention. These will be 
outlined below.
Evaluation
Evaluation is the prerequisite for design. There are two types: summative and 
formative. Summative evaluation is the measurement of a work system’s 
effectiveness - enumeration of the system’s task quality, and user and technology costs 
(see section 2.2.2). An example summative evaluation is: too many employees in BT 
are calling the helpdesk to have their passwords reset. Formative evaluation is the 
diagnosis of ineffectiveness - it uncovers the causes of poor system performance. An 
example formative evaluation is: there are so many password resets in the organisation 
because people forget their passwords.
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Design /  intervention techniques
Design/intervention is the specification of the interaction between the user and 
technology parts of the system, and extends to specifications of the users and 
technology themselves. Below aspects of design/intervention will be outlined and 
related to the problem of password system performance.
Aliocation of function
Work is made up of tasks, which can be broken down into sub-tasks, and so on. 
Allocation of function is the part of HCI design/intervention where tasks are allocated to 
either the human or technology parts of the work system. For example, in a standard 
password authentication mechanism, the long-term storage of the users password is 
allocated to the user, though the user may sometimes choose to store it elsewhere.
The task allocation can have significant consequences for work system performance. 
For example: if the user allocates long-term storage of her password to a sticky note, it 
is likely that she will be unable to gain access to much-needed computer resources if 
her sticky note should fail, for example by falling off the screen overnight and being 
removed by cleaners. Moreover, because of the properties of sticky notes (they can be 
read by anyone if they are on prominent display) by allocating long-term storage to a 
sticky note, she is greatly increasing the risk that someone would find out her 
password. The user is trading increased organisational risks of confidentiality and 
integrity breaches (for example against customer data - which will likely impact the 
organisation more than her) against a reduced personal risk of denial of service (for 
example forgetting her password when she needs to use the computer - which if 
realised would likely impact her more than the organisation). Allocation of function can 
therefore have profound consequences on system performance in general, and 
password system performance in particular. The theme of allocation of function will 
recur throughout this thesis.
Training
Training is a powerful intervention in the armoury of HCI. Through using training it is 
possible to enhance the human components of work systems, by equipping them with 
new behaviours and cognitive structures. Using this technique, it is possible to 
facilitate the allocation of functions to the human parts of work systems that are not well 
performed by the technology parts of the system. Training is therefore intimately 
related to allocation of function, and must be carefully balanced against the additional 
load that it implicitly places upon the user. There is a danger that the user is made to 
fit the technology at personal cost, when a change in the technology would achieve the
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same results. For example, a common reaction to the problem of password 
memorability is to suggest users be given training in mnemonics so that they may 
better remember all their passwords (that the system allocates them to remember). 
Should users be burdened with using techniques that researchers describe as effortful 
and difficult to maintain (e.g.Schacter, 2001)? This thesis will argue that the answer is 
no, and that the current allocation of function within the system should be reconsidered.
Selection
Selection is also intimately related to allocation of function, where the properties of 
work system components are specified. When applied to password authentication 
systems, it is the specification of technology components that is the most relevant part 
of selection. It seems improbable that the problem of password memorability would be 
resolved by selection of personnel, for example with unusually powerful abilities of 
recall.
2.3 Summary
The goals of computer security (confidentiality, data integrity, availability) are upheld by 
technologies that distinguish authorised from unauthorised users. Complementing 
these safeguards are techniques used to detect and react to breaches so that their 
recurrence is lessened. Foremost among the safeguards is the password mechanism. 
While there are alternatives to passwords, it is concluded that they will remain 
important for many years.
People who attack computer systems have widely varying motivations, risk aversion, 
skill and resources, and that computer passwords can protect against the majority of 
these people, though not the few backed by powerful organisations. The discussion of 
security was concluded by noting that a call had gone out for more research about its 
human aspects.
The chapter continued by introducing the discipline of Human-Computer Interaction 
(HCI). Selection, training, and allocation of function are primary activities in HCI 
design/intervention. The main activities involved in design have been identified and 
related to password system performance and a conclusion made that selection is not 
approriate. Since this thesis is primarily an evaluation and diagnosis of password 
system performance, the discussion of HCI design shall be limited to this brief 
overview.
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This chapter has three main sections, the first defines a password system. The second 
deals with the main technology component of the system: the password mechanism. 
The third section deals with the password system’s human component.
In the second section, the history of the UNIX password mechanism is described, then 
its workings. The offline dictionary attack process is then described, which is usually 
considered to be the primary threat facing password mechanisms. Definitions are then 
given for the strength of passwords. Administrative policies are outlined that 
complement password mechanisms. Other attacks against password mechanisms are 
outlined, arguing that a focus on offline dictionary attacks may be detrimental to 
password system performance. Finally, a number of enhanced encryption password 
mechanisms are outlined.
In the third section of the chapter an overview is given of human memory and skilled 
performance. Different routes to accessing human memory are discussed. Theories of 
forgetting are presented with principles found to improve learning. A brief overview is 
given of the learning processes in human motor control that occur when a password is 
frequently used. Next is an outline of Reason's (1990) model of human error, using it 
to predict the amounts and types of errors that will occur in password use. The section 
closes with an assertion that human error is of great importance to computer security, 
and that the application of the HCI perspective and techniques is the most promising 
for improving the performance of the password authentication work system.
3.1 The password interactive worksystem
The interactive work system model (section 2.2.1) is applied to to password 
authentication in Figure 4, to provide a working definition of password systems. The 
goal of the password system is to transform users from not being authenticated to 
being authenticated. A subgoal of the work system is to transform users from a state 
where they cannot be authenticated to a state where they can be authenticated.
The password system is more than just the mechanism that assesses login attempts.
It also contains the users the make the login attempts, who can make errors (see 
section 3.3.5 for a definition) during attempts and so affect the performance of the 
system. Also included are secondary stakeholders and the technology required to 
enable users to be authenticated by the password mechanism. For example-users 
cannot login until they have been enrolled with a password mechanism and had a 
password delivered to them through a secure channel. Finally, tertiary stakeholders 
and their technologies are included in the password system - they control the operating 
parameters of the system through policies and budgets.
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Figure 4 - The password interactive worksystem
The tasks performed by a password system include:
Enrolment/registration
1. Registering users with the password system support service - which may be 
automated or involve interacting with secondary stakeholders. From this point 
forwards the system support service will be called a helpdesk.
2. Generating credentials for the user to authenticate with a helpdesk.
3. The helpdesk storing these credentials.
4. Registering users with a password mechanism
5. Generating a user ID and password for the user to authenticate with the 
password mechanism
6. Distributing the user ID and password to the user in a secure fashion
7. Distributing the helpdesk credentials to the user
8. The user receiving the user ID and password, and helpdesk credentials
9. The user storing the user ID and password, and helpdesk credentials (in 
memory or elsewhere).
10. The user locating the login facility of the password mechanism
11. The user retrieving the correct username,
12. The user retrieving the correct password,
13. The user entering the correct username correctly into the password mechanism
14. The user entering the correct password correctly into the password mechanism
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15. The user operating the facility to change their password on its first use
16. The user selecting a new password (in accordance with security policies - see 
section 3.2.7)
17. The user storing the new password (either in memory or elsewhere)
In normal use the user will have to:
1. Locate the login facility of the password mechanism
2. Retrieve the correct username,
3. Retrieve the correct password,
4. Enter the correct username correctly into the password mechanism
5. Enter the correct password correctly into the password mechanism
6. (if necessary store the user ID and password)
At regular intervals the user may have to:
1. Locate the password changing facility of the password system
2. Continue as from point 11 of Enrolment
If retrieval or entering of the correct user ID and password fail, then
1. The user must identify and contact the helpdesk
2. The user must retrieve helpdesk credentials to authenticate herself to the 
helpdesk.
3. The helpdesk must authenticate the user
4. The helpdesk must generate a new password for the user to authenticate with a 
password mechanism
5. Register the new password with the password mechanism
6. Distribute the new passwords to the user in a secure fashion
7. Continue as from point 8 of Enrolment.
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3.2 The password mechanism
3.2.1 The U nix passw ord
When UNIX was introduced in 1969/70, its original encryption algorithm was based on 
a version of the World War II Enigma device (Leong & Tham, 1991). However, its 
password mechanism was soon considered obsolete and replaced. In 1975, the PDP 
11/70 came into service as a high-end computer that was state-of-the-art (cf. Microsoft, 
1998). This computer took 1.2 milliseconds to encrypt a password (approximately 800 
passwords a second; Leong & Tham, 1991). This was considered too quick at the time 
as it would make it too easy to use a computer to guess a password (see section 
3.2.3). The new Data Encryption Standard algorithm (DES) was adopted circa 1977 
(Leong & Tham, 1991). Using the new DES powered mechanism it took more than 
one second to encrypt a password on a PDP 11/70, and this was considered safe 
(Leong & Tham, 1991).
In 1988, the combination of Moore's Law and advances in algorithmics meant that 
passwords were being encrypted at the same speed that caused password 
mechanisms to be considered obsolete in 1977. In 1998 therefore the UNIX password 
mechanism became obsolete for the second time (cf. Leong & Tham, 1991).
The password mechanism of mainstream UNIX has not been changed since its second 
obsolescence, and during this time (according to Moore's Law - Intel, 2003), standard 
processors have increased in power a thousand times, have become massively more 
affordable and widely available. A cheap second hand personal computer (PC) with a 
low-end Pentium III processor can encrypt 50,000 UNIX passwords per second 
(Semjanov, 2002) - more than 60 times the speed that caused UNIX password 
mechanisms to turn obsolete for the first time.
3.2.2 H ow  passw ords w o rk  - the U N IX  passw ord  
m echanism
In general, passwords stored on computers are kept encrypted. This adds a layer of 
protection by helping to keep user’s password secret in case an attacker gains limited 
access to the computer system. While the details of password authentication 
mechanisms (such as file names, hashing or encryption algorithms, etc.) vary in 
different application software and operating systems, they are broadly similar. The 
UNIX password mechanism will be examined to illustrate the workings of password 
systems more generally. Current version of Microsoft Windows (2000 Pro, XP home
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and XP Pro) work in a similar way. Though the details of file names and locations, 
algorithms used, password length etc. are different, the principles are the same.
UNIX passwords are encrypted using the DES algorithm, 25 times in a row to produce 
coded password data. In UNIX a permutation is added during the process of 
encryption (Belgers, 1993), which is not present in Microsoft Windows (Shaffer, 2001). 
This permutation makes two people with the same password have different coded 
password data. Its function is to improve security by making it more difficult to compile 
a database which could be used to look up a person’s password from its password file 
entry. There are 4,096 possible permutations, and one is chosen randomly for the 
user. This makes it 4,096 times as difficult to make the database - both in terms of 
time taken and storage space required. The chosen permutation is coded into two 
bytes called a salt.
In a shadow password system, the coded password data is replaced with * in the file 
available to normal users (Belgers, 1993); users with sufficient privileges (systems 
administrators) have access to the shadowfile - a second password file which contains 
the coded password data. This raises the bar for people trying to break the system’s 
security, as they must gain administrator privileges to access the coded password data, 
and there are safeguards to prevent this.
It would take an unfeasible time to decrypt the password data using current technology; 
so much so that this decryption has been described as impossible (Belgers, 1993). 
Given the impossibility of decrypting the password file, how can a user log in? The 
user types her password, which is encrypted using the method outlined above (using 
the salt as it is found in her password file). If the output of the process matches the 
coded password data in the shadowfile, then she is considered to be authenticated and 
is given access to the system.
3.2.3 W h at is passw ord  cracking?
Most advice given to users about the construction of passwords is geared towards a 
very particular threat, the threat of an offline dictionary attack (which will be treated 
functionally equivalent to the related brute force attack). This threat has very significant 
consequences for the user, in that (all other things being equal) it requires password 
content that is likely to be difficult to remember.
An offline dictionary attack requires that the attacker has access to the target system’s 
coded password data. This attack is said to be “offline” because it avoids interacting 
directly with the password authentication mechanism, instead acting on the information 
used by the authentication mechanism.
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In essence, the attack is automated high-speed guessing. A dictionary attack tool has 
two parts. The first part is a substitute password mechanism, optimised for speed.
The second part is a list of guesses, sometimes organised with the most probably 
successful guesses first. Since it became known that users frequently choose 
dictionary words as their passwords, this list of guesses has contained entire 
dictionaries. This part of the attack tool is known as the dictionary file, and has given 
its name to the attack. The attack can be extended by altering the dictionary words in 
ways that a user might (reversing them, appending digits or other characters, 
substituting numbers for visually similar letters, etc.) - a hybrid attack. This is slower as 
there are many alterations possible for each word in the dictionary. Slowest and giving 
the best guarantee of success (if the attacker can wait that long) is the brute force 
attack - where every possible combination of characters is tried as the password.
These will all be referred to as dictionary attacks.
The speed with which guesses can be processed depends (1) on the characteristics of 
the password mechanism being attacked and (2) the calculating power of the computer 
used in the attack. Different password mechanisms, for example those of UNIX and 
Windows XP, have properties that result in dramatic difference in the speed with which 
coded password data can be created. The consequence is that different password 
mechanisms may require their users to have dramatically more or less complex 
passwords to achieve the same level of security.
A hypothetical strong password - that limits dictionary attacker to one guess per second 
- would force an attacker to expend 13.8 hours to run through a 50,000 word dictionary. 
The user of a hypothetical weaker password mechanism - that executes 50,000 
guesses per second - would require users to remember passwords made of two words 
from the 50,000 word dictionary, to achieve the same level of security.
Having to recall two dictionary words as a password does not seem to be a heavy 
burden to place upon an user. However, the strength of the passwords used in the 
example are considered to be woefully inadequate by prominent security practitioners, 
who recommend baseline password strengths that can be measured in time-to-crack 
periods lasting millenia, rather than hours (e.g. Viega & McGraw, 2001). These 
recommendations are not usually well matched to the security required by the user or 
other stakeholders (e.g. Viega & McGraw, 2001). What impact do these requirements 
have on the complexity of password content?
For a normal password, this might entail an increase in complexity of approximately 
two orders of magnitude. For a strong password, an increase of five orders of 
magnitude might be required.
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Desktop computers currently can make dictionary attacks on UNIX passwords at 
approximately single digit multiples of the rate given in the weaker password example 
above. However, much more powerful general-purpose computers exist in the world, 
which could be used in realistic scenarios (e.g. by large companies) to speed up 
dictionary attacks by orders of magnitude. It is also possible to design and construct 
computers specifically for the purpose of running the dictionary attacks. While this is 
unlikely in the majority of cases, it is considered realistic for organisations such as 
national intelligence agencies (Kedem & Ishihara, 1999). Such machines may further 
increase the rate at which passwords are cracked by orders of magnitude over large 
general-purpose computers. Kedem (1999) predicts that a $100,000 custom built 
computer could check 24,576,000,000 UNIX passwords a second.
An online dictionary attack submits guesses to the authentication mechanism and is 
less powerful than the offline attack, because it operates at the relatively slow pace of 
the authentication mechanism itself (although with multi-user systems this may still be 
several thousand attempts a second). Moreover, the mechanism can log unsuccessful 
attempts, and potentially raise an alert or contribute forensic evidence to subsequent 
investigations. Many password authentication mechanisms may also be configured to 
limit the number of guesses that can be made, for example in a three strikes policy.
If it is assumed that all illicit attempts to guess the password are online and that 
suitable safeguards are in place, then the feasibility of successful guessing of any 
particular password is very small, unless the cracker is in possession of detailed 
knowledge about the target user. Under this assumption, dictionary words can be 
considered to be safe password content, therefore the user may be permitted to select 
more memorable passwords, and so the password burden of the user is greatly 
reduced.
3.2.4 The payoffs of password cracking
How likely is a password cracking attack? One recent industry survey said that 21 
percent of respondents suffered "attacks related to insecure passwords" (the least 
common of 7 attack types listed) (Briney, 2001). However, the proportion of dictionary 
attacks in this is not recorded.
Offline dictionary attacks are only possible in particular circumstances that are unlikely 
to prevail in a well-configured computer system (e.g. where the password file is 
restricted to access by system administrators), or in circumstances where the computer 
system would already have been thoroughly compromised by an attacker.
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Let us assume that the attacker has gained administrator status on the victim’s 
computer (by using a buffer overflow exploit for example), and so is able to read or 
write any data or execute any code on it. He already has the ability to destroy 
confidentiality, integrity, availability on the system with impunity, and therefore has no 
immediate need to break users’ passwords to do these things.
Mandatory strong password content makes it more difficult for the cracker to 
impersonate any particular legitimate user. Impersonation gives the cracker the benefit 
of greater stealth, and the ability of "framing" someone "more convincingly" for illegal 
activities on the system than if he had not cracked the user’s account.
The assumption that a dictionary attack is the key that lays bare a computer system is 
not warranted. The recommendations based on that assumption therefore offer only a 
slight improvement in security of the system on which they are enforced. Against this, 
we have to balance (1) the cost of the demands made on users in terms of mental and 
physical workload and anxiety, and (2) the cost of lost working time and running 
support mechanisms for the organisation.
3.2.5 C ryptograph ic  s trength  o f passw ords
Many password policies state that users should choose strong passwords - though it 
may be phrased differently. This section will explore what is meant by strong 
password.
There is a general agreement that password strength is something to do with its 
resistance to attack, which in most cases will be a form of guessing. However, the 
notion is operationalised in different ways, with different consequences. When 
measuring password strength, it is usually assumed that a dictionary attack is being 
carried out.
Time to crack. The advantage of this metric is that it uses familiar units (hours, 
minutes, days, etc.) that are intuitive to a wide range of people - and it has most 
practical relevance. The units are easy to compare in a meaningful way, for example 
contrast a password that has a strength often minutes to one with a strength often 
weeks. However, in practice it is difficult to generate a valid prediction with this metric. 
The time taken to crack a password depends on the speed that a computer can make 
guesses, so a valid time to crack prediction requires specification of the attacker’s 
capability. As time progresses, computers get faster, and so password strength will 
diminish. Moreover, cracking time will depend on the organisation of the dictionary, 
which cannot be known in advance. For example: if a dictionary is organised 
alphabetically, then the password Apple will be cracked sooner than the password
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Zebra. Dictionary items are often organised according to frequency of use as 
passwords and this will on average crack passwords faster than a dictionary that is 
organised alphabetically. However, a perfectly optimised dictionary will have the target 
password as the first item. Time-to-crack prediction therefore also needs a definition of 
dictionary content and ordering, which is difficult to predict accurately.
Character set. This has the advantage that it is also fairly easy to understand: the 
more character sets a password is made of (such as lowercase letters, uppercase 
letters, numbers, punctuation marks, or other symbols), the harder it will be to guess. 
However, users may circumvent password restrictions in regular ways, which can then 
be used to optimise attack dictionaries. One could therefore end up with a weaker 
password made out of numbers and letters than one made of numbers alone, thereby 
making this metric misleading. For example, there are relatively few male first names. 
Adding a number on the end to one (ie johnl) might plausibly lead to a weaker 
password than one of equal length composed purely of numbers (ie 53207). There are 
about 50,000 possible passwords using the former technique (5000 male first names 
times ten numbers), and 100,000 using the latter (ten multiplied by itself five times).
Password length. This measure of password strength is founded on the principle that 
longer length will tend to lead to more alternatives. For example, there are very few 
words which contain only one letter, while there are many more which contain five 
letters. A longer password is therefore more difficult to guess, and therefore more 
secure. Password length is however more often discussed with reference to random 
combinations of letters, under the assumption of dictionary attack. Computer systems 
are often configured to enforce a minimum length for passwords.
Computer systems that enforce a minimum length are also likely to enforce a ban on 
dictionary words as password content. This leads to allowable passwords being able 
to contain only random combinations of letters-nonsense strings, perhaps not even 
pronounceable. Such combinations of letters have classically been considered so 
unmemorable that they are used to measure the performance of human memory, for 
example by using the Ebbinghaus paradigm (see Figure 6 on page 61).
Password entropy is the most complex measure of password strength. It is a
combination of character set and password length - and its use implies a time-to-crack
calculation. It is an attempt to measure exactly the amount of uncertainty in a
password, or the number of possible combinations of characters that could make it. In
the style of cryptography, the uncertainty of a password is quoted as the number of
binary digits, or bits, required to write out of the possible number of combinations of
characters in the password. For example, a one-letter password has 26 possible
combinations, and 26 written in binary notation has five binary digits (“11010”). A one-
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letter password therefore has 5 bits of uncertainty. Password entropy is useful for 
comparing the relative resistance of different passwords to dictionary attack, because it 
measures the number of possible guesses. However, it retains the problems of the 
time-to-crack measure of password strength - a better dictionary or even luck could 
greatly reduce the time taken to actually break a password even if it has high entropy. 
Moreover, in practice it would be difficult to calculate the entropy of a particular 
password-because this depends on what the attacker already knows about it, which is 
difficult for us to judge. Password restrictions are therefore usually set so that what 
attackers know about the password from examining the policy or mechanism still forces 
them to make a very large number of guesses.
Another weakness of password entropy is that it contains little information about the 
memorability of the password and the load it places upon its user and other 
stakeholders. It is therefore not useful for comparing the impact of different password 
system configurations on any of the stakeholders. It focuses on a narrow definition of 
resistance to guessing, whilst ignoring other important goals of security, such as 
resource availability.
So what is a strong password, and what does this mean to the research? The perfect 
password is one that is as random as possible, and as long as possible. An 
assumption that the password will be used on UNIX implies that it can be a maximum 
length of eight characters (larger passwords can be chosen, but only the first eight 
characters are registered). Using a character set of all 95 printable characters the 
strongest password has about 53 bits. At a rate of 100,000 attempts per second 
(which is the assumed speed of a Pentium III computer running at 866 MHz), a 
dictionary attack programme would take approximately two millennia to run through all 
possible combinations. Security practitioners do not consider this to be a strong 
password however. McGraw (2001) recommends at least 10 characters (64 bits), and 
states that 20 characters (approximately 128 bits),
“should provide adequate security for any use” (Viega & McGraw, 2001, p.631).
At a rate of 100,000 attempts per second, it would take 1025 millennia to run through 
all possible combinations of this strength of password.
3.2.6 R e-a llocation  o f function: B etter encryption  fo r  
passw ords
There are two related areas where improving encryption in password mechanisms will 
ultimately allow users to choose simpler passwords, and so should improve
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authentication system performance: resisting a precomputed dictionary attack, and 
resisting an online dictionary attack.
A precomputed dictionary attack requires the attacker to first create a database of all 
possible passwords along with their encryptions. To carry out the attack, the attacker 
must steal the password file, and then can simply look up the password by matching its 
encrypted version to an entry in his database (Oechslin, 2003). To defeat this attack, it 
is necessary to make it infeasible to calculate all possible password encryptions. The 
original UNIX password 12 bit salt was designed with this intention, by forcing the 
attacker to compute several thousand encryptions per password, instead of only one 
(Oechslin, 2003). When UNIX password authentication was redesigned circa 1977, it 
took more than 1 second to encrypt a single password using computer hardware of the 
day (e.g. a PDP-11/70 mainframe computer Leong & Tham, 1991). On this type of 
machine a precomputed dictionary attack would not only have taken too long, but it 
would have been too expensive to store all the resulting data (Viega & McGraw, 2001). 
Since then, computing power has increased, and storage costs diminished by orders of 
magnitude (see section 3.2.1), making it feasible to precompute all UNIX passwords 
and store them in a database. The principle of password salt is still valid, however, and 
has been updated. UNIX now has the BIGCRYPT program (Garfinkel & Spafford, 
1996), and FreeBSD has MD5crypt (Provos & Mazieres, 1999), both of which have far 
larger salts, which make it infeasible to store all possible password encryptions. 
However, traditional UNIX does not use BIGCRYPT by default: FreeBSD is a minority 
operating system, and Windows, which the huge majority of stakeholders work with, 
does not employ any kind of salt at all (Shaffer, 2001).
There are two further approaches, which also protect against both online and offline 
dictionary attacks. These approaches are: the pepper approach (e.g. Kedem & 
Ishihara, 1999; Manber, 1996 another way of forcing the attacker to perform more 
encryptions per login), and the computationally harder encryption approach (e.g.
Provos & Mazieres, 1999). The latter will be outlined below.
Computationally harder encryption
This technique is already being employed in FreeBSD, which uses the MD5 hashing 
algorithm, for a double-digit slowdown compared to the standard UNIX password 
mechanism (see Table 1). The OpenBSD operating system uses a modified version of 
the Blowfish algorithm in the BCRYPT program to make password encryption arbitrarily 
time consuming (Provos & Mazieres, 1999), and so tunable while also avoiding the 
false positives drawback of Manber (1996) and Kedem & Ishihara’s (1999) schemes 
(Provos & Mazieres, 1999).
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In a previous section, it was suggested that 100,000 guesses per second was 
reasonable for an online dictionary attack - in fact it is exceeded by the modest 
computer this thesis is being written on. Consider if BCRYPT had been used in the 
password mechanism instead: the guesses could be restricted to one per second. This 
is an instant 100,000 times improvement in security, which can be used to simplify a 
stakeholder's password 100,000 times. A dictionary word with a digit appended might 
take six days to crack instead of six seconds. Two words concatenated might take 32 
years to crack, rather than three hours. Two words and two symbols would now be as 
strong as the strongest possible UNIX password: a stakeholder could use the 
password no-joy! where before she would have to use K;8l=dT&. This mechanism has 
the advantage that it can be used to keep up with conventional increases in computing 
power-by configuring it regularly to take longer to encrypt passwords. Over the course 
of a workstation's life, this may only require relatively small increases in login times 
(e.g. from one second to five seconds), while ensuring that simple passwords can be 
chosen.
Table 1 - Approximate encryption speed for different password encryption types. 
Speed tested on a Pentium III 866 MHz, using John the Ripper 1.6 MMX dictionary
attack software.
Windows NT 
Ian manager
UNIX DES FREE BSD 
MD5
Passwords 781,000 102,000 2,000
encrypted per
second
Relative 0.13 1 50
computational
effort
3.2.7 Security policy standards
Security policy documents describe what security should do, and some of the general 
ways it should be accomplished. Guidance exists about information security policy 
best practice in the form of various national and international standards. Two of them 
are ISO 17799 (BSI, 2001), a recent international standard; and FIPS 112 (FIPS,
1985), which is primarily of historical interest. They are both partly general security 
policy documents, and partly guidance on how to make a specific security policy for the 
reader's own organisation and information systems. Their password recommendations 
are outlined in Table 2. Section 3.2.8 will describe the policy families that these
46
Chapter 3 The Authentication interactive Worksystem
individual policy statements derive from, describing their function and assumptions. 
UCL’s password policy is given in Table 2. It has not been possible to reproduce BT’s 
security policy for comparison, as permission could not be obtained. However, Section 
7.3 will summarise users' reports of some of these policies.
Table 2 - Local and international standards for password use
UCL ISO 17799 FIPS 112 medium 
security
FIPS 112 high 
security
Ownership
o Individual o Use unique user 
IDs so that users 
can be linked to 
and made 
responsible for 
their actions, 
o The use of group 
IDs should only be 
permitted where 
they are suitable 
for the work 
carried out;
o Individual o Individual
Disclosure
o Not mentioned in 
policy.
o Group passwords 
should not be 
made known to 
users outside the 
group, 
o Individual 
passwords should 
not be revealed to 
other individuals, 
o Passwords should 
be written down 
only if these 
records are 
securely stored, 
o Where 
appropriate, paper 
and computer 
media should be 
stored in suitable 
locked cabinets 
and/or other forms 
of security 
furniture when not 
in use, 
o Passwords should 
never be stored 
on computer 
system in an 
unprotected form
o If passwords must 
be written, they 
should be protected 
in a manner that is 
consistent with the 
damage that could 
be caused by their 
compromise.
o If passwords must be 
written, they should 
be protected in a 
manner that is 
consistent with the 
damage that could be 
caused by their 
compromise.
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UCL ISO 17799 FIPS 112 medium 
security
FIPS 112 high 
security
Content
oAt least 7 
characters long 
o at least three of the 
following different 
types of 
characters: 
lowercase, 
uppercase, 
numbers, symbols 
i.e.! % A * ( )  + - 
= | \ 
@ $ &[ ] { }  but
NOTE 
o Don’t base your 
password on a 
dictionary word, 
proper name, 
personal details 
such as address, 
post code, phone 
number or 
department name 
o Don’t use foreign 
language words 
o Don’t use names of 
bands, asteroids, 
cartoons, movies, 
TV programs, 
swear words, 
Shakespearean or 
Monty Python 
characters, or 
science fiction 
jargon 
o Don’t use any of 
the above with I’s, 
L’s and O’s 
transposed with 
ones and zeros 
o Don’t merely 
disguise a word by 
using repetition or 
reversal or by 
adding a number to 
the beginning or 
end of it 
o Don’t use anybody 
else’s user name 
or userid as a 
password
o Source: User 
selected where 
appropriate 
o Passwords should 
have a minimum 
of six characters, 
o Passwords should 
contain no 
consecutive 
identical 
characters, 
o Passwords should 
not contain only 
letters or only 
numbers 
o Passwords should 
be easy to 
remember 
o Passwords should 
not be easy to 
guess or based on 
easy to discover 
personal 
information
o Source: System 
generated and user 
selected 
o Length Range: 4-8 
o Content: U.C. 
Letters (A-Z), L.C. 
Letters (a-z), and 
digits (0-9)
o Source: Automated 
password generator 
within the
authentication system 
o Length Range: 6-8 
o Content: Full 95 
character set
Compartmentalisation
o At user’s discretion o Passwords should 
not be reused 
within a 
twelvemonth, 
o If a user must use 
more than one
o classified passwords 
must not be used on 
terminals that are 
not authorized for 
data at the level of 
the password
o classified passwords 
must not be used on 
terminals that are not 
authorized for data at 
the level of the 
password
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UCL ISO 17799 FIPS 112 medium 
security
FIPS 112 high 
security
password 
protected system, 
then the user 
should be allowed 
to use one single 
but high-quality 
password
o The presence of 
both single-level and 
multilevel terminals 
on a system may 
indicate the need for 
passwords at each 
security level.
o The presence of both 
single-level and 
multilevel terminals 
on a system may 
indicate the need for 
passwords at each 
security level.
Three strikes
o Drop connection 
after 3 strikes
o It is recommended 
that login attempts 
should be limited 
to three, 
o Consider 
recording 
unsuccessful 
attempts; 
o Consider forcing a 
time delay before 
further log-on 
attempts are 
allowed or 
rejecting any 
further attempts 
without specific 
authorization; 
o Consider 
disconnecting 
data link 
connections;
o In some instances, it 
may be desirable to 
count the number of 
unsuccessful login 
attempts for each 
user ID and to base 
password expiration 
and user ID locking 
on the actual 
number of failed 
attempts. (Changing 
a password would 
reset the count for 
that user ID to zero.) 
o For example, the 
password could be 
identified as expired 
after 100 failed login 
attempts, and the 
user ID locked after 
500.
o In some instances, it 
may be desirable to 
count the number of 
unsuccessful login 
attempts for each 
user ID and to base 
password expiration 
and user ID locking 
on the actual number 
of failed attempts. 
(Changing a 
password would reset 
the count for that 
user ID to zero.) 
o For example, the 
password could be 
identified as expired 
after 100 failed login 
attempts, and the 
user ID locked after 
500.
Access rights reviewing / Password expiry / Password lifetime
o Lifetime: 4 months o Users' access 
rights should be 
reviewed and six- 
month periods, 
and every three 
months for users 
with privileged 
access rights.
o Lifetime: 6 months o Lifetime: One month
Distribution
o Via paper slip from 
the helpdesk on 
presentation of ID 
card.
o The use of third 
parties or 
unprotected (clear 
text) electronic 
mail messages 
should be 
avoided, 
o Users should 
acknowledge 
receipt of 
passwords.
o Terminal and special 
mailer
o Registered mail, 
receipt required; 
personal delivery, 
affidavit required
Time outs / screen locking
o Not mentioned o The policy should 
take into account 
the information 
security
o 10 minutes of 
terminal inactivity.
o 5 minutes of terminal 
inactivity.
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UCL ISO 17799 FIPS 112 medium 
security
FIPS 112 high 
security
classifications, the 
corresponding 
risks and cultural 
aspects of the 
organisation, 
o Personal 
computers and 
computer 
terminals should 
not be left logged 
on when 
unattended and 
should be 
protected by key 
locks, passwords 
or other controls 
when not in use. 
o Limit the 
maximum and 
minimum time 
allowed for the 
log-on procedure. 
If exceeded, the 
system should 
terminate the log­
on;
Login feedback
o Not display 
passwords on the 
screen when being 
entered; 
o Not provide help 
messages during 
the log-on 
procedure that 
would aid an 
unauthorized user; 
o If an error condition 
arises, the system 
should not indicate 
which part of the 
data is correct or 
incorrect
o Not display 
passwords on the 
screen when 
being entered; 
o Not display 
system or 
application 
identifiers until the 
log-on process 
has been 
successfully 
completed; 
o Not provide help 
messages during 
the log-on 
procedure that 
would aid an 
unauthorized user; 
o If an error 
condition arises, 
the system should 
not indicate which 
part of the data is 
correct or 
incorrect
o Non-printing 
keyboard and 
masked-printing 
keyboard
• Non-printing 
keyboards
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3.2.8 Policies that harden password mechanisms
Though alternative and improved authentication technologies are available (see 
Sections 3.1.6, 4.2 and 4.3), they are not frequently employed. In their place, 
organisations prefer to mandate strict password policies. This allocates the security 
function away from the technology and onto the user. Individual password policies 
(such as ISO 17799's listed in section 3.2.7) can be grouped into families. Some of the 
policy families are as follows:
1. Ownership
2. No disclosure / no writing down
3. Strong password content
4. Compartmentalisation of passwords
5. Three strikes
6. Password expiry / access rights reviewing
7. Distribution
8. Time outs
9. Login feedback
Ownership
Most security policies mandate individual ownership of passwords as opposed to group 
ownership of passwords , mainly because in theory this creates an audit trail that can 
be tied to the individual user, and so makes her more accountable. Individiual 
passwords make it easier to detect and react to wrongdoing, or other security related 
events.
In practice, the effects of this policy may be less beneficial. Ownership of passwords 
has been found to have a significant negative effect on the acceptibility of security 
policy among users, and their compliance to it. Adams et al. (1997) found that when 
group passwords were applied in a situation where users believed individual 
passwords were appropriate, for example group passwords for individual e-mail, then 
users would try to subvert the safeguard. This was also true if individual passwords 
were applied in situations in which users believed group working was more appropriate.
In theory, a policy mandating group ownership of passwords has the effect of trading 
off two security goals against each other: improving availability at the expense of audit. 
Where there are group passwords, individuals within the group can help each other if a 
password is forgotten or confused and reduces the frequency with which helpdesk 
support is required compared to individual passwords. The effects of group versus 
individual password ownership on availability has not been systematically studied.
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No Disclosure
Disclosure policies are designed to limit knowledge of passwords to the password's 
owner, i.e. the user. Only under special circumstances are people allowed to know 
passwords they do not own, such as when an administrator gives an account to a new 
user, or gives a new password on an existing account. Under these conditions, the 
passwords known to both parties are temporary, and must be changed by users on 
their first use.
Policies that forbid the writing down of passwords by users may be classed as 
disclosure policies, as writing a password on a post it note attached to your workstation 
is a clear example of disclosure. An outright ban risks being infeasible, as users may 
feel they are unable to comply and also do the work they are required to, as there is no 
backup store of the password for the user if her memory fails. If an outright ban is 
imposed, then users will have no alternative when they forget passwords but to use a 
helpdesk. Allowing the writing down of passwords should therefore reduce helpdesk 
use, but adds the risk that these passwords are available to an attacker.
Allowing passwords to be written down if they are securely stored should reduce 
helpdesk costs but requires an organisation to provide infrastructure suitable for secure 
storage. In the short term, this may cost more to implement than the savings received. 
Moreover, users may view the secure storage policy as unreasonable if they do not 
believe there is significant risk of attack or punishment. Adams & Sasse (1999) argue 
that negative perceptions of any particular security policy may weaken the user's 
respect for others, and result in a generally lower level of security conscious behaviour 
than is desirable.
Content
These policies require the user to choose a minimum strength of password content to 
make up for poor encryption and password mechanisms (see Sections 3.1.1 and 
3.1.6). This policy has the disadvantage that stakeholders are required to choose 
difficult to remember password content.
This policy assumes that an identity theft will occur through the use of a dictionary
attack. This implies that the attacker is willing to commit months of time to an attack
(when other techniques are far quicker), and that he has access to the target system's
password file. Access to this file implies access to files on the target computer
system, and if the system employs shadow password files it implies the attacker
already has the highest level of access to the system and the data it contains. If the
attacker already has the highest level of privilege on a system their only major benefit
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in cracking passwords is that they may be used to access other systems if there is 
weak compartmentalisation of passwords.
Compartmentalisation of passwords
Compartmentalisation of passwords comes in two forms. Concurrent 
compartmentalisation of passwords (the author’s term) requires users to have different 
passwords on different systems, so that the compromise of a password on a particular 
system will not lead to the compromise of other systems.
This policy assumes that attackers will want to break into several computer systems in 
an organisation rather than target individual systems. It assumes that users will tend to 
use the same password on several systems if allowed to do so, and so a password 
used on a badly defended system could be stolen to allow entry into a better defended 
system. Furthermore, it assumes that the additional burden placed on users and the 
system more widely of having separate passwords is outweighed by the benefit of 
limiting the damage of a successful password-related attack.
Concurrent compartmentalisation of passwords is sometimes dovetailed with password 
expiry to become historical compartmentalisation of passwords, preventing users from 
having the same or a similar password to one they have had previously on that system. 
To enforce this, the authentication mechanism must record a password history, which 
acts as a blacklist. The list is usually of a fixed length, for example banning the last 6 
passwords chosen for a system (but not the 7th). On a system with this policy, if a user 
is determined to keep the same password after it expires she can do so by changing 
the password so many times that the password she wants drops out of the blacklist.
This policy is based on several assumptions that are questionable. It assumes that 
users recycle passwords - which is reasonable. However, it further assumes that the 
computer system's historical password store is defended as well as its current 
password store is. It further assumes that users would prefer to spend the effort of 
thinking of a new password over the effort of flushing out the password history so that 
they can pick the same password, or to having a repertoire of passwords that is slightly 
larger than is checked by the password history mechanism. It further assumes that the 
benefits of the additional security outweighs the extra costs to the user (and the 
password authenticationsystem, and the organisation) of the user's behavioural 
response to the password history mechanism. For example, if a user responds by 
keeping a password repertoire then she will have to expend more effort managing 
passwords than previously. This policy assumes there will be a net increase in 
security, as the users' behavioural response to the mechanism is not expected to lower
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the overall security achieved. For example, it is assumed that users will not start to 
write down passwords in a diary so they can keep track of their new password 
repertoire. If users already keep a personal password repository, it is assumed that 
increasing the size of the repository to accommodate the repertoires will not make the 
users' repositories more vulnerable to attack.
Both types of compartmentalisation of passwords can help prevent attackers compiling 
lists of functioning passwords, but have the disadvantage of multiplying the amount of 
password content users have to remember.
Three strikes
The three strikes policy limits the number of online attempts at authentication, after 
which time some penalty is imposed. This may be a short delay before the next 
authentication can be attempted, but is more usually the locking of the account. The 
number of attempts is often set to three per session (hence the baseball metaphor - 
three strikes and you're out) though some security specialists recommend five per 
session, or more complicated arrangements (Viega & McGraw, 2001). This has the 
disadvantage that stakeholders are given few chances to correctly recall their 
unmemorable passwords with a penalty for failure ranging from minutes to hours of lost 
productivity as the users arrange to have their newly suspended computer accounts 
reinstated.
This policy also makes a number of questionable assumptions. It assumes that an 
identity theft will occur through an online password guessing attack. It assumes 
therefore that the account protected by the policy has a weak password, as it is 
extremely unlikely that online guessing could break a strong password in reasonable 
time. However, accounts protected by a three strikes policy are likely to have 
compulsory strong passwords as well, as both these policies are seen as necessary for 
high security. It is also assumed that authorised users can remember their passwords 
within 3 attempts whilst conforming to all password policies, or otherwise that the 
additional burden of dealing with cases of valid users being denied access to 
necessary resources is less than the burden of dealing with a successful password 
related security breach. It further assumes that the security surrounding password 
resetting at the helpdesk is equivalent to the security offered by the password 
mechanism itself. However, this may not be the case as: users will probably be 
authenticated at the helpdesk by a password, and users are more likely to keep their 
helpdesk password written down and available (and so available to attackers) than any 
of their other passwords because it is the only one they really depend on. The policy 
also assumes that prevention (of attacks) is better than detection and punishment (of
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attackers), and that helpdesks are the best place to decide the authenticity of users. 
The people being authenticated are often far removed from the people who work in 
helpdesks, whereas more local managers and colleagues are in a much better position 
to detect an identity theft in progress.
Access rights reviewing
Access rights reviewing protects against ghosting; where people who have left or 
moved within an organisation can freely roam its networks using their old accounts 
which have not yet been suspended (Hook, 2002). It is effected in two ways: manually 
by administrative personnel, and through automated techniques. The automated form 
suspends or deletes an account if it has not been used after a certain amount of time (3 
months is recommended for high security by ISO 17799), forcing the account holder to 
seek authorisation to regain access to it.
The automated checks can reduce the frequency with which the costly manual check is 
required, or replace it entirely. If the automated check is relied upon, this assumes 
that, for example, 3 months of access is a good compromise between preventing 
attacks and incorrectly locking out current and authorised users. A more complex 
automated system tied into personnel department processes could drastically reduce 
these risks, but would also be more expensive to purchase and may have increased 
maintenance costs. It further assumes that the burden of proving an account is or is 
not still needed should be placed upon the users, as opposed to their managers, 
system administrators or the personnel department.
Password expiry
Password expiry/Password lifetime sets a time limit on the validity of a password.
When this time has expired, the user must select a new password. This protects 
stakeholders against the undetected compromise of a user's password (FIPS, 1985), 
and the abuse of ghost accounts - accounts which give access to users who are no 
longer authorised to have access. This is usually because the users have left the 
organisation, but their accounts have not yet been deactivated. It is a particularly high 
risk when users are sacked, as they are likely to bare a grudge.
Early versions of the policy (e.g. FIPS, 1985) based the password lifetime on an 
equation relating the speed with which guesses could be made, the password's search 
space (see password entropy in section 3.2.5), and the level of risk that could be 
accepted for the password being broken during the password's lifetime.
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More recent versions of this policy (e.g. ISO 17799 - BSI, 2001) do not advocate the 
calculation of password lifetime, but instead recommend baseline lifetimes according to 
the security required. Strong versions of the Password expiry policy require passwords 
to be changed every month or sometimes more frequently. Medium strength 
applications require three-month intervals, and the weakest versions require password 
changing at one-year intervals. The disadvantage of this policy is that it multiplies the 
number of password stakeholders are required to remember, and so adds to the 
administrative costs of password ownership.
Time-outs and screen locking
Time-outs and screen locks prevent unauthorised use of computing resources when 
authorised users are away from their computers, by activating some mechanism that 
renders the computer temporarily inoperable. In some circumstances, it may be 
suitable to rely on users activating the mechanism manually. In other circumstances 
policy can mandate automatic activation of this mechanism after periods of mouse and 
keyboard inactivity. Care must be taken when setting the trigger interval - too long and 
the attacker is given the opportunity he needs, whilst if it is too short then the 
mechanism will trigger whilst users are actually present and doing work (but not using 
the keyboard or mouse). As trigger intervals shorten password use increases. With 
this increase so too does the risk that users will find the policy more of a hinderance 
than a help, and so become disinclined behave securely (cf. Adams & Sasse, 1999).
Distribution
Password distribution policies improve security by reducing the opportunity of attackers 
to intercept passwords as new or replacement passwords are being distributed to 
users. Distribution policies can have profound effects on the costs of password 
problems, as the solution to most of these is a password reset, which requires 
password distribution. For example, the distribution policy that allows new passwords 
to be distributed over the phone will allow much speedier recovery from password 
problems than a policy that requires distribution by registered post-which may take 
days. Onerous distribution policies may dramatically impact users' compliance to 
password related policies, particularly if these increase the likelihood of a password 
reset (and distribution) being required.
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Login feedback
This family of security policies make it more difficult for an attacker to gain useful 
information when faced with a login prompt, or when observing someone else using a 
login prompt. These policies trade reduced availability for increased confidentiality:
The less information that is displayed during login the less information there is available 
to authorised users that may help them to prevent and recover from password errors. 
For example, fips 112 requires a non-printing keyboard for high security situations (see 
Table 2). This means that users will not get any visual feedback whilst typing the 
password, and so will not even be able to tell if they have typed enough characters.
This policy is often used as a baseline safeguard, i.e. may be used where it is not 
beneficial compared to more tailored safeguards (Cho & Ciechanowicz, 2001).
3.2.9 O ther attacks
Password security can be breached in other ways, which are summarised in Table 3. 
These methods for breaching password security have been put into four groups, most 
of which are methods for avoiding the password mechanism.
The first group of attacks relies on the password or information that the password is 
protecting being made directly available to the attacker in some way. The second 
group involves different kinds of observation of systems in use. The third group 
deploys software by the attacker that is specially designed to breach security. The 
third group of attacks exploits weaknesses in the design of computer software, which 
may be done manually or using malware. In some cases, an attack may fit into more 
than one group. Examination of these attacks is beyond the scope of the thesis. 
However, it should be noted that of the 26 attacks listed, only one is prevented by 
strong password policy (dictionary attack/password crackers); the three strikes policy is 
even tighter in its effect-online dictionary attack/password crackers. These two 
safeguards are ineffective against the other risks.
3.2.10 S um m ary
Recommendations about general password content (low security - 4-6 digits; medium 
security - 4-8 of upper and lower case letters and digits; high security - 6-8 of all the 95 
printable characters; FIPS, 1985) are usually designed under the assumption of an off­
line dictionary attack by a government agency on the output of a standard UNIX 
password mechanism. Given these assumptions, the user is allocated the task of 
choosing a password that will resist brute force cracking by several of the world’s
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Table 3 - Other means of breaching password security
Disclosure Shoulder surfing /  observation
• Writing down • Unaided
• Sharing • Cameras
• Authentication logs • Keystroke logging
• Social engineering • Inference
• Bribery • Man in the middle
• Blackmail/coercion • Signals intelligence
• Publicity material • Interception
• Desk surfing • Wire tap
• Theft • War driving
• Promiscuous mode ethernet card
• Own a router
• Tempest
• Traffic analysis
Malware Exploits
• Trojans • Buffer overflows
• Viruses • Windows messaging flaws
• Worms • Backdoors
• Security scanners • Core dump
• War diallers
• Privilege escalation aps
• Password crackers/ dictionary-
attacks/ guessing
• Packet editors
fastest supercomputers for several thousand millennia. It would seem more effective 
and efficient to allocate this task to a computer.
However, of 26 types of attack against computer security listed in Table 3, these 
password recommendations would only protect against one (see section 3.2.9). Many 
of these 25 other attacks are far easier to mount, cheaper and more quickly successful 
than an off-line dictionary attack of the type assumed. These other attacks are 
therefore more likely to occur (cf. Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Schneier, 2000; Winkler, 
1997).
On the whole, risks are managed with questionable assumptions and inappropriate 
technology (sections 3.2.1 and 3.1.8) to protect against attacks which are unlikely (cf. 
Mitnick & Simon, 2002; Schneier, 2000; Winkler, 1997). The result is that users are 
forced to chose unnecessarily complicated passwords (see section 3.2.5), have too 
many of them, and change them too often.
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3.3 Human memory & skilled performance
Password systems require users to memorise passwords and recall them when logging 
on. Human memory is therefore the most important user characteristic on the human 
side of the authentication worksystem if the user is honestly trying. There is a huge 
body of research on human memory, but the most important issues related to 
passwords can be summarised as follows (Schacter, 2001):
• . Recognition of a familiar item is easier than unaided recall,
• People cannot ‘forget on demand’ — items will linger in memory even then they 
are no longer needed,
• Memory decays over time — this means people may not recall an item, or not 
recall it 100% correctly,
• . Frequently recalled items are easier to remember than infrequently used ones,
and retrieval of very frequently recalled items becomes ‘automatic’,
• . Items that are meaningful (such as words) are easier to recall than non­
meaningful ones (sequences of letters and numbers that have no particular 
meaning),
• . Distinct items can be associated with each other to facilitate recall — however,
similar items compete against each other on recall.
The sections that follow will go over these in more detail. Firstly, the differing power of 
recognition, recall, and other routes to memory will be outlined (section 3.3.1). The 
next section (3.3.2) will outline the interference theory of forgetting. Following this will 
be an outline of practice effects (section 3.3.3). Section 3.3.4 will note that the strength 
of memory depends on what is being remembered. Section 3.3.5 brings together the 
work of the previous sections to outline the practical issue of human error, and shows 
what role human error has in computer security.
3.3.1 Recall and Forgetting
The accuracy of human memory varies widely with the circumstances of recall and the 
type of remembering used. This may be exploited by the developers of authentication 
by knowledge systems, who can choose the most appropriate type of remembering for 
their design. A partial list of the different types of recall includes:
• Unaided recall
• Cued recall
• Recognition
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• Fragment & stem completion
• Matching
Unaided recall is used in traditional password mechanisms. Users are asked to 
retrieve an item (password) from memory that was either shown to them in the past, or 
that they had chosen themselves. Unaided recall is one of the least accurate types of 
memory - its accuracy decays rapidly with time compared to the other forms.
Cued recall is used in associative and cognitive password mechanisms (section 4.2.2 & 
4.2.3). Users are shown prompts which are associated with the password or 
passwords, that users are then required to recall. Cued recall can retain its accuracy 
better with the passage of time than unaided recall.
Recognition is used in authentication mechanisms such as Passfaces™ (RealUser, 
2004). Users are shown a selection of items, and are required to pick the correct item 
or items to login. The accuracy of recognition surpasses cued recall with the passage 
of time.
Fragment completion has been used in the personal entropy mechanism (Ellison, Hall, 
Milbert, & Schneier, 2000). Fragment completion is similar to the game of hangman, 
where the password/phrase/sentence is displayed with parts missing throughout.
Users would be required to complete the parts that were missing. Stem completion 
has also been used in the personal entropy mechanism, where the first part of a 
password is presented, and the user has to supply the ending. These two forms of 
remembering can show retention of information better than recognition.
Matching is not currently used in any authentication mechanisms. The user would be 
shown a series of two stimuli, and asked to remember the relationship between them.
25 i
Cued Recall RecognitionRecall
Figure 5 - Ratio of number of items correctly remembered using different
measures of memory
The general effect of type of remembering on retention rates (how many target stimuli 
or how much of a stimulus is remembered after a particular interval) is displayed in
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Figure 5 above (adapted from Parkin, 1993 p.74). Unaided recall returns the fewest 
correct responses, and recognition gives the most. The size and direction of these 
ratios is not fixed, but depends on the circumstances of the remembering, including the 
nature and number of the target and distractor stimuli. Authentication mechanisms 
therefore have to be implemented appropriately to the form of remembering employed 
to achieve optimum accuracy. For instance, unaided recall can be made more 
accurate than recognition if the targets and distractors are very similar (Baddeley, 
1997); therefore in a recognition based mechanism targets and distractors should be 
made very different otherwise the benefits of recognition over recall will not be 
achieved. A psychological mechanism for this phenomenon will be discussed in the 
Human error section (3.3.5) below.
Unaided Recall
In his paradigm-creating work, Ebbinghaus (1885, cited in Parkin 1993) described a 
forgetting curve for lists of nonsense syllables. Because they were nonsense, what 
was revealed was a genuine property of the memory system, uncontaminated by 
previously held knowledge, frequency of words in language, or other extraneous 
variables. Ebbinghaus studied himself as a subject using the savings method, and 
produced the following curve - Figure 6 below (adapted from Parkin, 1993 p.4)
100
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Figure 6 - Mean percentage savings made with nonsense syllable lists
The curve shows that memory for nonsense syllables decays quickly at first and tends 
towards an asymtote. After 8 hours, approximately only 40% savings are made - 60% 
of the effort of original learning must be expended to reach the same accuracy of recall.
Ebbinghaus was recalling lists of 13 items, while passwords are individual targets. His 
experiment demonstrates that memory for nonsense material quickly becomes less
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accurate when not practiced. The target stimuli are reasonable approximations of 
passwords. If the user learns a random-character (i.e. strong) password and then does 
not practice it, this study suggests she will be liable to forget it. If she does practice, 
the study has no direct relevance.
Cued Recall
The amount of improvement in memorability offered by cued recall over unaided recall 
depends on the strength of the association between the cue and the response. Strong 
associations lead to better recall (Parkin, 1993).
Population stereotyped word association pairs would not make good challenge- 
responses (such as “leak”, “beak” used in the strong condition of Parkin’s (1981) 
experiment), because any attacker would be liable to guess them. However, similar 
effects have been demonstrated with semantic relatedness (Reason, 1990). This 
leaves the way open for user selected challenge-response items which are memorable 
because of some personal semantic relatedness, but hard for an attacker to guess 
without intimate knowledge of the victim. On the other hand, a spouse, family member 
or close friend might share all or some of that knowledge. This personal and difficult to 
guess knowledge has been termed personal entropy (Ellison et al., 2000).
Recognition
Recognition is the distinguishing of targets from distractors. Recognition accuracy 
depends on the nature and number of target and distractor stimuli. If there are many 
targets and few distractors, successful recognition may not be distinguished from plain 
guessing. This ratio would not be useful in a challenge-response system, because it 
would allow impostors to successfully log into a system by guessing. A high ratio of 
distractors to targets would reduce this risk. However, the accuracy of recognition 
steadily decreases as the ratio of distractors to targets increases (Baddeley, 1997). A 
balance must be struck between the risks of letting attackers in and denying access to 
valid users.
The accuracy of recognition also decreases with increasing similarity between target 
and distractor stimuli (Baddeley, 1997). This finding suggests that recognition-based 
authentication systems should have targets and distractors that are not similar, and so 
easily distinguishable by the authorised user.
Implicit versus Explicit
Human memory can be divided into two separate kinds according to the way in which it 
is tested (Parkin, 1993). So far, only explicit memory has been discussed.
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Explicit memory can be defined as a task which requires the subject to recollect a 
previous learning event such as the presentation of a word list. Implicit memory, 
however, refers to any memory task in which a subject’s memory for a learning event is 
tested without specific reference to that event. Implicit memory can be tested 
several different ways:
1. Electrodermal response, changes in skin conductance for a target stimulus 
relative to previously unseen distractor items.
2. Fragment completion, a procedure where the subject must fill in the blanks in a 
word, similar to a partially completed hangman puzzle.
3. Stem completion, the first few letters of a word are presented, and subjects asked 
to complete a word from it.
4. Picture completion priming, completing a partially drawn picture to resemble a 
previously presented target?
5. Decisions about stimuli, subjects are required to answer questions about stimuli, 
with something about their answers revealing whether or not they have 
remembered the target information.
6. Perceptual identification, subjects show increased accuracy in identifying 
previously seen target stimuli compared with new stimuli.
It has been repeatedly demonstrated that implicit memory is far more resilient than 
explicit memory (Parkin, 1993). For example, in the following study fragment 
completion is relatively unaffected by the passage of time, whereas recognition drops 
off substantially. Implicit memory tests might therefore form the basis of authentication- 
by-knowledge mechanisms that have the best retention of the target ‘secret’ over 
extended periods.
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Figure 7 - Accuracy (frequency of correct response) of memory for words in a 
word list task. From Tulving et al., 1982, page 339
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A related phenomenon is known as implicit learning: learning that occurs without the 
subject being able to explain how. Artificial grammar learning is one of two techniques 
that has been employed to investigate this type of learning. Subjects are asked to 
learn strings of letters generated by synthetic grammar which defines what letters are 
permissible and the sequences between them. Next they are told that the strings of 
letters are bound by rules, and are required to categorise new strings of letters as 
grammatical or ungrammatical. There are many demonstrations that subjects can 
learn to do tasks such as this even though they cannot explain the rules they are using 
(Berry & Dienes, 1993; Reber, 1989), and are still able to do than two years after the 
experiment (Allen & Reber, 1980).
Implicit learning exhibits the same durability as implicit memory, and offers the potential 
extra security benefit of not being easily divulged to a second party. However, implicit 
learning could only be used for authentication in unusual circumstances, as it would 
require extensive effort and time for the user to enrol (undergo implicit learning), and 
would be appropriate only for very high security or very high retention periods. It is 
likely that both these could better be served by biometric or token-based solutions.
The only circumstance where implicit learning would be better would be where 
divulging cannot be tolerated.
3.3.2 Theories of Forgetting
Why does forgetting occur? There is much conflicting evidence (Baddeley, 1997). The 
rival hypotheses have been called trace decay theory and interference theory. Trace 
decay theory postulates that memories are eroded by the passage of time (Baddeley, 
1997), whilst interference theory states that earlier memories become obscured by later 
ones.
Interference
There are two types of interference: retroactive and proactive interference (Baddeley,
1997). Proactive interference occurs when previously learned material interferes with 
the recall of later material (Baddeley, 1997). It will be discussed in detail in section 
3.3.5 on human error
Retroactive interference is produced by later learning (Baddeley, 1997). Typically, the 
experimental group learns list 1, then list 2, and then is tested on list 1. Decreased 
performance is displayed in recalling list 1 compared to a control group that rested 
instead of learning list 2 (Baddeley, 1997).
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Figure 8 below shows this effect on the recall of sentences (adapted from Slamenka, 
1960). The number of interpolated lists is shown on the x-axis, and the mean 
percentage of words correctly recalled on the y-axis.
This experiment lacks ecological validity for the majority of password users, many of 
whom would not learn 4 or 8 passwords in a row. However, it does support the model 
proposed by Reason (1990), where similar targets interfere with each other, and the 
greater their number the greater the interference (more interpolated lists = worse 
memorability). It also shows that frequency of use increases a target’s propensity to 
come to consciousness (more training trials = better memorability).
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Figure 8 - Effect of retroactive interference on the retention of prose.
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Figure 9 - The effect of retroactive interference on the recall of categorised word
lists
Challenge-response systems use lists of target stimuli. There is therefore a risk that
users of several different challenge-response systems would suffer reduced
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memorability of their target pairs. This risk can be lessened. Figure 9 above (adapted 
from Tulving & Psotka, 1971) shows a retroactive interference experiment, where each 
list of words was based on a separate category. The number of interpolated lists 
between target list learning and testing are on x-axis, and percent recalled on y-axis. 
Participants showed the expected reduction in recall accuracy with increased numbers 
of interpolated lists when asked to recall either the categories or words of the lists. 
However, when cued with the categories, the participants were well able to recall the 
items in the lists.
This result suggests that associative password systems should use pools of target 
pairs that fall naturally under categories, and the systems should prompt users with the 
category when asking for a response. This effect has been replicated in studies of 
challenge-response authentication (Zviran & Haga, 1993).
3.3.3 Learning and Practice
While a single experience may lead to learning, the acquisition of new information 
usually requires practice (Baddeley, 1997). There are two general principles of 
practice (Baddeley, 1997):
• the total time hypothesis
• the distribution of practice principle.
The total time hypothesis states that the more time spent practising, the better the 
subsequent learning. The distribution of practice hypothesis is that it is generally better 
to spread out the practice over time, instead of doing it en masse (Baddeley, 1997). 
This second hypothesis holds true even for the inter-item repetition interval - the time 
taken between practising the same item. Combined with the retrieval practice effect - 
that successfully recalling something increases the likelihood of it being remembered 
beyond the simple effect of practice - these hypotheses show that password use tends 
to follow the ideal schedule of practice. Using passwords is likely to improve their 
memorability considerably. This means that regular users of passwords should 
experience far fewer recall problems than the participants in the experiments of 
conventional, associative and cognitive passwords (e.g. Bunnell, Podd, Henderson, 
Napier, & Kennedy-Moffat, 1997; Zviran & Haga, 1990, 1993), and that their results 
should be generalised with caution.
The total time hypothesis only holds true if the learner is attending to the stimulus; 
Baddeley, 1997). However, the learner does not have to actively intend to commit the 
item to memory, as long as it is processed sufficiently. The levels of processing theory 
(Craik & Lockhart, 1972 cited in Baddeley, 1997) describes a very robust phenomenon
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where categorising the visual characteristics of target words leads to poorer retention 
than a deeper and more elaborate semantic processing of the words.
In password use, little or no learning will result from merely copying the passwords 
from paper into the screen. The passwords must be processed by the user at a deeper 
level, i.e. their meaning must be attended to. This is a problem for strong passwords 
(see section 3.2.5 for a definition) - they are meaningless. Inherently meaningless 
targets can be imbued with meaning (and activation - see section 3.3.5) through 
mnemonic techniques that associate targets with more intrinsicly memorable items; 
usually accompanied by deep processing of the new group of items. For example, 
creating a story from the characters in a strong password, and invoking all the senses 
in imaging it - hearing the sounds, seeing the colours and details, smelling the smells, 
feeling the textures and emotions, etc. Mnemonics are effortful, and require strong 
motivation which many subjects find difficult to sustain (Schacter, 2001). Here is where 
challenge-response systems have a theoretical advantage:they use word-associations 
(section 4.2.2) or autobiographical memory items (section 4.2.3) as targets, which 
already have high activation (section 3.3.5), are more meaningful, and lend themselves 
to processing at deep levels and learning.
3.3.4 Specialised memory systems
This section notes that there is evidence that different things are remembered by 
different, highly specialist cognitive systems (Cohen, 1996). These different memory 
systems have individual properties that distinguish them from the others. Some of 
these properties might be exploited to produce an authentication system with fewer or 
different memorability problems than passwords. This might allow side-stepping of the 
central dilemma of passwords: the mutual exclusiveness of memorability and 
crackability.
Authentication mechanisms have been created that rely on memory for pictures 
(Jermyn, Mayer, Monrose, Reiter, & Rubin, 1999) and faces (RealUser, 2004). The 
author defines these as out of the thesis scope.
3.3.5 Human Error
Reason (1990) unified the literatures of skill acquisition and use, memory, and human 
reliability in a treatment of human error. This treatment is widely respected and taught 
and has been successfully applied to accident prevention programs (Groeneweg, 
2002). It offers a potential framework to explain and predict password system 
performance, and has thus been chosen to form one of the major theoretical 
underpinnings of this thesis.
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In Reason's (1990) Generic Error Modelling System (GEMS), mental operations can 
happen under one of two conditions: attentional or schematic control modes.
The attentional control mode is related to consciousness and working memory. It is 
slow, limited, effortful and difficult to maintain for more than a short time. This control 
mode is used for setting future goals, selecting the means to achieve them, monitoring 
progress towards the goals and detecting and recovering from errors. When a user 
has to think what her password was, or try and reconstruct it, she is using this mode of 
control.
The schemata of schematic control mode are specialised processors (like software 
daemons) that are expert on some useful regularity of the world. The schematic 
control mode processes familiar information quickly, in parallel and without conscious 
effort. No limit has been found to the number of schemata that may be stored, or for 
the length of time of their retention. When you are in “automatic pilot”, you are under 
schematic control.
Activation of schemata
Schemata are triggered when they reach a certain level of activation. The activation 
can be from two groups of sources (see Figure 10 below): general and specific 
activators (Reason, 1990).
Specific activators are usually required before any schemata can be put into action. 
The most important activator is the intention to do something. A plan is the description 
of intended action. Each of the described actions call up and activate a schema, which 
activates its subordinate schemata, etc. With repetition of the intended activity, the 
descriptions get chunked into higher-level schemata, and so the plan becomes a 
smaller list of descriptions of actions. As the number of repetitions gets larger, so does 
the process of abstraction and implementation of the intended action becomes 
increasingly automatic.
Most of the time this is advantageous. However, to change an established routine 
requires attentional intervention. If the attentional control mode is distracted or 
preoccupied at the critical moment, an absent minded slip occurs, and a user could 
type the wrong password.
While specific activators may push a schema to “critical mass”, general activators 
provide a “background radiation” which lower the amount of specific activation needed 
for a schema to “ignite”. In Reason’s model, increased memorability would be 
described as giving a general activation to a password schema, which reduces the 
amount of specific activation required to trigger it.
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Schema
Specific Activators
• Current intention
• Present context
•  Related schemata
General Activators
•  Recency
• Frequency
• Shared elements
• Affective charge
Schema Outputs
• Actions
• Words
• Images
• Percepts
• Feelings
Figure 10- How schemata are brought into play
Of the general activators, frequency of prior use is probably the most potent (Reason, 
1990). Its effect is so strong, that only contextual cues may be required to trigger 
schemata, particularly in very familiar environments.
Error Forms
These are varieties of failure that exhibit themselves at all levels of problem solving and 
goal directed behaviour, and their ubiquity is evidence that they are universal 
processes in cognitive activities. Similarity matching and frequency gambling are 
automatic retrieval processes by which knowledge structures are located and their 
products delivered to consciousness (thoughts, words images, etc.) or to the outside 
world (action, speech or gesture). These two retrieval processes are what cause the 
error to happen. The actual sequence of events that lead to the error, and the error's 
effect are termed error types and will be discussed later. The effect of the two 
processes can be summarised as:
“When cognitive operations are underspecified, they tend to default to contextually 
appropriate, high-frequency responses.” (Reason, 1990, p.91).
In the domain of passwords, the intent to use an infrequently used password (see 
section 6.3.1 for a definition) is likely to be subverted, and a high-frequency use 
password entered instead.
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Error Types
Reason (1990) posits three levels of behaviour that may be used to distinguish the 
different types of error. Skill-based behaviour happens under schematic control - it is 
automatic and unconscious. Errors at this level are slips (unintended actions), or 
lapses (unsuccessfully completed intended actions). When this level of behaviour fails, 
the following two levels of control are applied until the failure is repaired: rule based 
control and knowledge based control.
Rule-based behaviour selects and applies previously stored rules to the data. This is 
an automatic, largely unconscious process that interacts with skill-based or rule-based 
activities in the following way: if (state), then (schema, motor program, rule), etc. 
Knowledge-based behaviour is by attentional control, and goes from first principles. 
Failure at either of these two levels results in mistakes: actions completed successfully 
or unsuccessfully where the intention is wrong. For example, having typed in the 
wrong password, it would be a mistake to put your foot through the monitor, as this 
would not achieve your goal of logging in.
Password use in general does not require much problem solving, so there is little scope 
for rule and knowledge based errors. The majority of errors will be skill-based. These 
error types will be outlined in the next section, whereas the reader is directed to 
Reason (1990) for descriptions of rule- and knowledge-based error types. However, 
two rule-based errors are plausible in password use: rigidity and redundancy.
Rigidity characterises the intrinsic “cognitive conservatism” of rule usage (Reason, 
1990). There is a strong and remarkably stubborn tendency to use the same familiar 
but cumbersome solution when a more elegant one is available (cf. the Jars Test - 
Luchins & Luchins, 1950 cited in Reason, 1990). This would be revealed in repeated 
attempts to re-type the password information when another solution - perhaps using a 
different password - would mean success.
Redundancy refers to the nature of signs and problems. Some signs are more 
diagnostic than others, and will be attended to more than redundant information as the 
problem solver’s skill and experience increases. This bias will favour previously useful 
signs, and tend to dismiss rare counter-signs. This might happen when the user 
makes a typo when entering her username. When trying to trouble-shoot the login 
failure, she might not attend to the username she typed in, and so might fail to 
diagnose the problem.
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Skill-based errors
These can be grouped under two headings (Table 4): inattention and over-attention 
errors.
Table 4 - Skill-based errors
Inattention Over-attention
Double capture Omissions
slips
Omissions Repetitions
following
interruptions
Reduced Reversals
intentionality
Perceptual
confusions
Interference errors
Inattention errors occur when attentional monitoring is omitted at a critical check on the 
progress of an action. This is particularly likely to happen if the intention is to deviate 
from a well-established action sequence - for example, when logging in with the newly 
changed password. It is predicted that interference between passwords will be a 
significant and prevalent problem.
Double-capture slips are one of the most common results of an omitted check. There 
are two kinds of capture involved. The attention is captured by some internal or 
external event, just when the attentional control mode is required to set the action 
along the intended path; from that point, the most activated schema captures control 
and leads on to the completion of an unintended activity.
Generally, the result is a strong habit intrusion. This would be the case after a forced 
change of a password, where the old password was used instead of the new one. 
Another subcategory is the branching error, where a common root action sequence 
leads to different outcomes, but a check is omitted at the vital choice point. This would 
be the case when two commonly used passwords have the same account name, for 
instance: intending to type your password A but using password B instead.
The necessary conditions for the occurrence of these errors are:
1. The performance of a well practised activity in familiar surroundings.
2. An intention to depart from custom.
71
C hapte r 3 The Authentication Interactive Worksystem
3. A point where the activation of particular action schemata are very different.
4. Failure to make an attentional check
Omissions following interruptions are the same as double-capture slips, only the first 
capture is caused by an external event, not an internal one. A subclass of this error is 
the program counter failure. The steps take to deal with the external event are counted 
in as part of the action sequence. The action is restarted, but at a place further down 
the sequence than it should be. For instance, the user enters her username and goes 
to the password field; the phone rings, she deals with the phone call, then presses 
RETURN, having neglected to type in her password.
Reduced intentionality errors are a failure of prospective memory, where some delay 
occurs between the formulation of an intention to act and the committing of the act.
The intention is not maintained by the necessary attentional checks, and a slip or lapse 
happens. Subclasses are: detached intentions (intending to log into one system but 
logging into another instead), environmental capture (going to a PC intending to log in 
but instead starting up Minesweeper), multiple side-steps (the user intends to log in, 
goes to the kitchen to make a cup of tea, then she needs to remember what she 
wanted to do). There are also the two lapse states, "What am I doing here?” and 7 
know I should be doing something but I can’t remember what".
Perceptual confusions arise when objects that are in the expected place, or look similar 
or perform a similar operation are taken to be the target object. An example would be 
mistaking the login prompt of one system for the one that you intended to log into.
Interference errors are blends or behavioural spoonerisms. Two highly activated 
schemata try to gain control of the user’s actions. For instance, the user might type in 
the username of one account, and the password for another. (Though this type of error 
would be difficult to distinguish by observation from a branching error.) Behavioural 
spoonerisms are the result of transposing elements in the sequence of actions. For 
example, typing in the password instead of the username, and the username instead of 
the password. This could lead to your password being disclosed on screen, sent in 
plain text across the network, stored in a plain text log file.
Over-attention errors happen when attentional monitoring occurs at an inappropriate 
moment. These errors particularly occur in test-wait-test-exit type tasks, where a 
sequence of automatic tasks need be completed in order, but are punctuated by 
waiting. This might be case when logging into a machine by telnet. A mis-timed check 
can result in believing oneself to be earlier on or later in the sequence than is the case. 
Repetition or omission of elements may occur, for instance typing in the username
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twice, or forgetting to type it in. The latter case would require user reports to 
distinguish it from an omission after interruption error.
Human Error and Computer Security
Recently computer security researchers have begun focusing on Human Error, 
producing statistics showing it to be a large component of problems in computer 
security: McCauley-Bell (1999) cites NIST (1992)where 65% of the economic loss 
attributed to information security breaches were caused by human error, whereas only 
3% of the loss was attributed to malicious outsiders; Spruit & Looijen (1996) find that 
41 % of security incidents are caused by human error, whereas only 9% are due to 
wilful crime.
Figure 11 - Percentage of economic loss due to information security breach 
categories, adapted from NIST, 1992.
HCI provides a suitable basis for explaining human error during computer use, and 
identifying interventions that might prevent them. Indeed, number of errors before task 
completion is a primary measure employed in usability. Some security equipment has 
such severe usability problems that the most appropriate measure is not how many 
errors were made before the task was completed, but whether the task was completed 
at all (e.g. PGP 5.0 - Whitten & Tygar, 1999).
3.3.6 Summary
The accuracy of human memory varies with the method used to access it. This feature 
of human memory can be exploited by developers of authentication systems. Cued 
recall can be twice as accurate over the same period as unaided recall (Figure 5),
Violations
22%
Sabotage
1 •  3% malicious
outsiders
•  13% dishonest 
employees
•  6% disgruntled 
employees
Errors
65%
Slips and Lapses
•  Skill based 
errors
Mistakes
•  Rule based 
errors
•  Knowledge 
based error;
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depending on the strength of the association between the cue and the response 
(Parkin, 1993). Recognition can be twice as accurate as cued recall, though the 
accuracy of recognition steadily decreases as the ratio of distractors to targets 
increases and with increasing similarity between target and distractor stimuli 
(Baddeley, 1997). Unaided and cued recall and recognition are all accesses to explicit 
memory.
It has been repeatedly demonstrated that tests of implicit memory are far less affected 
by time than measures of explicit memory (Parkin, 1993). Fragment completion, for 
example can retain accuracy when even recognition has faded (Figure 7), though the 
absolute level of accuracy is small. Tests of implicit memory may therefore not be 
appropriate for authentication mechanisms, though implicit learning may be appropriate 
if disclosure of authentication knowledge is intolerable.
Several principles have been proposed that can be used to enhance the learning of 
passwords, or other secrets used in authentication mechanisms:
1. The more time spent using a password, the better the subsequent ability to 
remember the password.
2. It is better to spread out the practice over time, instead of doing it en masse.
3. It is better to give deeper and more elaborate semantic processing to the 
password than to its visual or acoustic features.
4. Images are more memorable than words.
There are two theories as to why forgetting occurs. One is that memories are eroded 
by the passage of time. The other is that memories are interfered with by the presence 
of other memories. This can be in two ways: proactive interference occurs when 
previously learned material interferes with the recall of later material (Baddeley, 1997), 
while retroactive interference is the interference on learned material produced by later 
learning (Baddeley, 1997).
Reason’s (1990) model of human error has been introduced, and used to predict that 
interference will be an important source of error in password use, with frequently used 
passwords intruding on infrequently used ones. Human error is a major issue for 
computer security: 41% of security incidents are caused by it (Spruit & Looijen, 1996). 
The discipline of HCI is put forward as a solution to human error in computer security.
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This chapter consists of three main sections. Section 4.1 deals with the performance 
of traditional password mechanisms, and discusses different approaches to the 
measurement and meaning of performance. Section 4.2 describes the working and 
performance of text based alternative mechanisms for authentication. Section 4.3 
brings together the literature review so far to redefine this PhD’s research question.
4.1 Existing password mechanisms
4.1.1 Sociotechnical performance
Adams et al’s (1997) study was the first instance of HCI research into the wider human 
factors of authentication. Its main finding was that the organisation investigated made 
choices in the implementation of its password mechanisms that encouraged their users 
to circumvent security. The finding led to a paradigm shift from the prevailing 
conception in password security: that tighter restrictions mean better security. Some 
aspects of this finding were modelled in the paper, and concrete operational 
recommendations were made for better practice. However, this did not supply a 
framework for designing or assessing the security of a system.
Adams et al.’s (1997) user research found four factors that influenced effective 
password usage:
1. Multiple passwords
2. Password content
3. Users perceptions of security
4. Information sensitivity
Multiple passwords - users were given passwords for different applications by the 
organisation and had to change them frequently because of password expiry 
mechanisms. The high number of passwords reduced memorability and thereby 
increased writing down and choosing poor passwords, including passwords with 
incremented suffixes.
Users did not how to create strong passwords content-for example choosing one's 
wife's Christian name because a complete stranger would not be able to guess it. The 
organisation had not educated them about what made a strong password, or how to 
create one.
Security perceptions - users’ perceptions of security levels and potential threats was a 
key element in motivating their work practices, but because the organisation had not
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supplied them with effective versions, users made their own incorrect risk models. For 
example, not publicising security breaches led to feeling that hacking was not a 
problem, and thus there was no threat.
Information sensitivity - users correctly categorised systems according to whether the 
information, they contained were sensitive enough to be worthy or not of secure 
password practices. However, whilst using the right principle they often came to the 
wrong conclusion. In the absence of guidance from the organisation, users concluded 
that confidential information about individuals such as personal files and e-mail was 
sensitive, but that commercially sensitive information such as customer records and 
financial data were not.
Adams et al.'s study found other examples where choices made by the organisation 
resulted in situations where users subverted safeguards. This research provides 
important insights - into the causes of usability problems with password authentication, 
and highlighting the organisation's role in these problems. This research reported in 
this thesis carries forward these two themes.
4.1.2 Technical performance
Resistance to attack and memorability are two sides to the performance of password 
systems that have been most widely researched - the first is a measure of task quality, 
and the second is of stakeholder cost. Passwords selected by users tend to be weak 
(Petrie, 2002), and laboratory studies show worse memorability than naturalistic 
observations.
This section will first discuss the resistance of passwords to attack, and will go on to 
examine their memorability.
Real-world password strength
In real-world settings, the overwhelming majority of passwords chosen by users are 
weak (see section 3.2.5 above for definitions of cryptographic strength): 90% of 1,200 
users reported choosing passwords that were dictionary words or names (Petrie,
2002), with 47% of the sample choosing their own name or nickname or the names of 
their partners, children or pets (the Family group of Petrie’s taxonomy); 32% choosing 
the name of sports stars, cartoon characters, pop stars, favourite teams or film stars 
the Fan group of Petrie’s taxonomy); and the Fantasist group (11 %) who pick words 
like 'Sexy', 'Stud', 'Goddess' and 'Slapper1. These three kinds of passwords are among 
the weakest that can be chosen. Only 9% of this sample reported choosing strong 
passwords (the Cryptic group of Petrie’s taxonomy). Even in environments where
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users are asked to select strong passwords, large numbers of users do not comply: 
32% of university student’s passwords in one study were cracked with a short running 
dictionary attack (cf. Yan, Blackwell, Anderson, & Grant, 2000). Similar proportions are 
found in studies run in business environments (Belgers, 1993; Klein, 1990).
Password memorability
Studies concentrating on memorability of passwords give cause for optimism. Medium- 
strength passwords can come close in their memorability to weak passwords (e.g. see 
Zviran & Haga, 1990,1993 in Table 5)- showing that improvements in resistance to 
attack can in some circumstances be without the cost of huge increases in helpdesk 
use. The password memorability results and external validity of several laboratory 
studies are discussed below.
Zviran and Haga (1993) gathered 103 graduate students for a comparative study of the 
memorability of secrets in 3 different authentication-by-knowledge systems. The 
average age of the student participants was 33, ranging between 25 and 42. The sex 
ratio of participants was 85% male to 15% female.
These participants were experienced computer users, with an average self-reported 
experience of 5 years. 80% of the sample reported previous use of PCs, while 56% of 
the sample reported experience of mainframes.
In this questionnaire study, different types of passwords were generated and then their 
recall rates measured after an interval of 3 months. The password types were:
• System generated - alphanumeric - strong
• System generated - pronounceable - weak to medium
• User generated - free choice - (weak)
The recall rate of strong passwords was 13% (none of those successfully recalled had 
been reported from memory, but instead had been “remembered” by writing them 
down). In an earlier study using a similar participant sample (106 information 
management graduate students; mean age 32; age range 25 to 41; 76% male / 24% 
female; average 4 years computer use), the recall rate of strong passwords was 23%, 
of which 34% had been reproduced from memory, and the rest written down (Zviran & 
Haga, 1990). This averages to about 18% recall of system generated alphanumeric 
passwords after a 3-month interval. If this were a real system, it would be equivalent to 
a failure of availability for 82% of users.
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Table 5 - Summary of password memorability studies, ordered by password type
Researchers Year Password
Type
Pwd
chosen
by
Study
duration
Accuracy 
of Recall
N. Policies Study
design
Zviran & 
Haga
1993 Strong CPU 3 months 13% 103 3 strikes Enrol/gap/test
Zviran & 
Haga
1990 Strong CPU 3 months 23% 106 3 strikes Enrol/gap/test
Zviran & 
Haga
1993 Strong
(sayable)
CPU 3 months 37% 103 3 strikes Enrol/gap/test
Bunnell et al. 1997 Strong
(sayable)
User 2 weeks 77% 86 3 strikes Enrol/gap/test
Spector & 
Ginzberg
1994 Strong User 1 year 0% 15 - Enrol/gap/test
Spector & 
Ginzberg
1994 Strong User 6 months 0% 15 - Enrol/gap/test
Yan et al. 2000 Strong User 3 months 99% 96 - Pwd in
everyday
use
Spector & 
Ginzberg
1994 Strong User 1 month 0% 15 - Enrol/gap/test
Spector & 
Ginzberg
1994 Strong User 2 weeks 33% 15 - Enrol/gap/test
Yan et al. 2000 Pass-
phrase
User 3 months 97% 97 - Pwd in
everyday
use
Spector & 
Ginzberg
1994 Free
choice
User 1 year 26% 15 - Enrol/gap/test
Spector & 
Ginzberg
1994 Free
choice
User 6 months 26% 15 - Enrol/gap/test
Zviran & 
Haga
1993 Free
choice
User 3 months 27% 103 3 strikes Enrol/gap/test
Zviran & 
Haga
1990 Free
choice
User 3 months 35% 106 3 strikes Enrol/gap/test
Spector & 
Ginzberg
1994 Free
choice
User 1 month 60% 15 - Enrol/gap/test
Spector & 
Ginzberg
1994 Free
choice
User 2 weeks 73% 15 - Enrol/gap/test
Dhamija & 
Perrig
2000 Free
choice
User 1 week 65% 20 - Enrol/gap/test
Dhamija & 
Perrig
2000 Free
choice
User Minutes 95% 20 - Enrol/gap/test
System-generated pronounceable alphanumeric passwords are designed to be a
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compromise between password memorability and strength. It is assumed that by 
making a nonsense sequence of characters sound like a word, it will become more 
memorable. Making the sequence sound like a word cuts out those combinations that 
do not, thereby decreasing the search space and weakening the content of the 
password. However, the assumption of better recall is upheld: 37% were recalled 
successfully (83% of which were reproduced from memory). The difference between 
alphanumeric and pronounceable passwords in the 1993 study was significant (chi 
squared = 7.898, p = 0.005). The results of this study are that pronounceable 
passwords have a retention rate more than twice that of random alphanumeric 
passwords (combining the strong password results of Zviran & Haga, 1990,1993). It is 
equivalent to an availability failure for only 63% of hypothetical new users with a 3- 
month retention interval.
In a recent study of pronounceable passwords (Bunnell et al., 1997), the passwords 
consisted of two lower-case real English words (one with 3 letters, the other with 4), 
concatenated with a single digit (0 to 9). The retention interval was a two-week period 
between password generation and recall. The recall rates were better than those 
described above (77% recalled).
Self-generated free-choice passwords are expected to have the weakest content and 
be most memorable. These passwords were successfully recalled by 27.2% of the 
participants, with 42.9% reporting using their memory only and 7.1% reporting writing it 
down. 93% of recalled self-generated passwords contained only letters (Chi 
squared=7.324, p=0.022, significant) - more evidence that self-generated passwords 
contain “weak” content. In the earlier (1990) study, a retention rate of 35% was found, 
with 86 % reporting they were recalled from memory and 14% writing them down. 
Averaged, these figures are 31% recall, 64% of which from memory and 10% writing 
them down. These results are better than those obtained for random alphanumeric 
passwords and similar (if slightly worse) than those obtained for pronounceable 
alphanumerics. This suggests that pronounceable alphanumerics may be a sweet spot 
for password content.
The experimental situation above represents almost a worst-case scenario: generating 
a password and then not using it for 3 months. This situation also goes some way to 
representing the demands faced by users of several passwords which then compete 
for memory resources: participants in the study were asked to recall 3 passwords (and 
a pass-phrase, and tens of Challenge-Response pairs). The participants would still 
have to remember the passwords they use in the real world.
It cannot be decided from the published details how well Zviran and Haga’s (1990,
1993) experimental situation mimics the situation of remembering an infrequently used
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password, because it was not recorded how many passwords were owned by the 
participants, the similarity of their content, how frequently they were used, nor the effect 
of different contexts of recall. However, it is possible that the fit was good: the 
relatively large size of the participant sample (103) will have given a diversity of 
numbers of passwords owned and frequencies of use. This argument will gain more 
force as more participants are considered from similar experiments, yet to come.
Bunnell et al. (1997) performed an experiment similar to Zviran and Haga’s in most 
respects (sample size 86, mean age 29.8, age range 19 to 53, enrolled on university 
course), bar the retention interval. Bunnell et al.’s participants were tested after only 2 
weeks (a sixth of the time). The resulting recall rate was 77%, more than twice that of 
Zviran and Haga’s combined studies. Bunnell et al. note this and the well-known decay 
of memory for alphanumeric material over time (Postman, 1985), though their recall 
accuracy is far larger than would be expected from the Ebbinghaus curve (Figure 6). 
They also note the larger numbers of their participants who wrote down their 
passwords (22% versus 10% for self-generated and 45% versus 17% for 
pronounceable. This is evidence of a powerfully beneficial effect of writing passwords 
down, and may be useful for cost/benefit analyses of disclosure policies.
Zviran and Haga's 3-month retention interval is unlikely to reflect the situation faced by 
people in the majority of their password use: the recall of frequently used passwords 
(see section 6.3.1 for a definition). This is very rarely studied. A priori, frequently used 
passwords are more likely to be confused or blended and forgotten- unless it is a 
frequently used password that has just been changed (forced by expiry policies for 
example). Dhamija and Perrig (2000) asked 20 participants to generate a password 
(with no constraints on the choice), then recall it only minutes afterwards. Only 95% of 
participants were able to recall the password. If this finding is extrapolated, it 
represents a 5% failure rate for password changes. This is a conservative 
generalisation, as in password changing there is the additional possibility of 
interference from the obsolete password (see section 3.3.5). This generalisation 
suggests that password changing might be a particularly sensitive period; and that a 
policy of password expiry could be a significant source of costs: lost productivity for 
users, and a large source of additional workload for secondary stakeholders (help-desk 
staff).
Methodological and substantive difficulties
With the exception of Yan et al. (2000), the password memorability research described 
above have been lab studies. The ecological validity of these lab studies is difficult to 
judge and the naturalistic observations are difficult to generalise.
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Lab studies enrol the participant with a password, force an interval of known duration 
during which time the password is not used, then ask for the password to simulate 
login. It is difficult to judge the ecological validity of these designs as data describing 
real-world intervals between enrolment and first use are not published. Obtaining this 
data should become part of the research agenda. Moreover, it is difficult to model the 
effect of interference between passwords because the number, type and frequency of 
use of other passwords the user has is not known. Obtaining this should also form part 
of the research agenda. Lab studies so far have not attempted to study the effect of 
security policies on password memorability and behaviour - this is a major omission.
Naturalistic observation studies record real-world password use, and have high 
ecological validity. They specify their participants in less depth than lab studies, and 
have no descriptions of frequency of use and intervals following enrolment, nor do they 
specify the policy environment, importance of availability, onerousness of password 
distribution procedures, or other details that would aid comparisons. There is a 
particular practical need to support generalisations from student populations (who are 
easily available to researcher) to corporate populations (who are difficult to study).
4.2 Alternatives to traditional password 
mechanisms: text-based alternatives
Improving the encryption in passwords requires similar process in practice to installing 
an entirely new mechanism, and so will be discussed here with other alternatives to 
traditional passwords.
4.2.1 Better encryption for passwords
This allows pronounceable alphanumeric passwords to have the same strength as 
UNIX password with much more random content (see section 3.2.5). Its effect is to 
increase the security offered by any passwords given to or chosen by a user.
Though greatly improved mechanisms such as BCRYPT are freely available, they are 
incorporated in only the tiniest fraction of systems. Instead of allocating the task of 
encryption to technology, which is well placed to take the load, it is in effect allocated to 
users who are much less well suited to perform it.
4.2.2 Associative Passwords
Sidney Smith first proposed Associative Password systems in a 1987 paper with 
startling findings that suggested an end to the problem of forgetting passwords (Smith,
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1987). Four participants were each asked to generate a list of 20 cue words and 
associated responses. They were not told that they would later be tested on them. 
Participants were, however, then tested, twice and unannounced. The results are 
shown in Table 6.
The rate of successful recall of cued responses far exceeds the successful recall rates 
of any of the passwords yet studied. After the initial 6-month interval (twice the interval 
used in the password studies reviewed in section 4.1.2) an average success rate of 
94% for associative passwords and only 37% for the most memorable class of 
passwords. After another year of interval, the success rate for associative passwords 
averaged 86% - still more than twice the best rate achieved with conventional 
passwords, and over an interval 4 times as long.
Table 6 - Percentage recall of "Responses" when shown the list of 20 
"Challenges" (adapted from Smith, 1987)
Respondent 1 2 3 4 Average
After 6 months
Correct 
Wrong 
No response
Correct 
Wrong 
No response
However, Smith’s (1987) results must be treated with caution. The sample sizes used 
were very small. The participants were not described - they could have been world 
memory champions, or have no other passwords to remember and so interfere with 
their performance. The memorability of associative passwords have been tested in two 
other lab-based questionnaire studies: Zviran and Haga (1993) and Pond et al. (2000).
Zviran and Haga (1993) directed their participants to choose both challenge and 
response words according to a theme, to form 20 CR pairs each. It is not known how 
many of the participants used a theme. The participants were tested after 3 months, 
and correctly recalled 69% of their responses upon being cued with the challenges.
Pond et al. (2000) supplied participants with challenges that had been chosen because 
they provoked a wide range of responses across individuals (Palermo & Jenkins,
1964), because it was predicted to reduce vulnerability to guessing as well as being
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instructed to pick some with a theme. After 2 weeks, the participants were able to 
recall only 39% of their 20 responses, with a standard deviation of 15% and a range 
from 10% to 90%.
Participants were able to correctly recall 66% of their 20 word associations with a 
standard deviation of 20 % (Pond et al., 2000). A summary of findings about 
associative passwords’ memorability is given in Table 7.
Table 7 - Memorability of associative passwords
Authors Year Recall
interval
Type of word 
assoc, selection
Recall
rate
No. of items 
in pool
No. of 
participants
Smith 1987 1 Year Themed 86% 20 4
Smith 1987 6 months Themed 94% 20 4
Zviran & Haga 1993 3 months Themed 69% 20 103
Pond et al. 2000 2 weeks Themed 73% 20 20
Pond et al. 2000 2 weeks Unthemed 65% 20 18
Pond et al. 2000 2 weeks Given random 
cue words
61% 20 19
It appears that the ability to generate both challenge and response is necessary for 
good memorability. In both Smith’s (1987), Zviran and Haga’s (1993) and Pond et al.’s 
(2000) studies, participants were instructed to pick CR pairs according to a theme.
This appears to be associated with good memorability. Pond et al. state that the use of 
a theme in the selection of a pool of word-associations lead to a significantly better 
memory of CR pairs than with an un-themed selection - an average of 14.6 correct out 
of 20 (73%) with themes, compared to 12.1 out of 20 (61%) without (but they do not 
report inferential statistics).
In summary, associative passwords are more memorable than conventional 
passwords, despite participants having to remember more material overall. These 
results suggest that associative passwords would lead to fewer password recall 
problems than conventional password systems.
There are two general problems with the design of the studies described above - they 
do not test the task of concurrently using several different CR systems, and they do not 
predict the effects of the additional effort and time required to enrol with, authenticate 
with and manage the system.
Concurrent use of several different CR systems would be the task faced by computer 
users if associative passwords came to replace conventional passwords. How easy
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would it be to remember 10 or so sets of CR pairs? What would the problems be? 
There is some evidence that if each set of CR pairs were generated according to a 
separate theme, then interference problems between CR pools would be low if the 
theme were used as a prompt (see the discussion of Figure 9 on page 65 above). The 
use of a theme in generating both challenge and response appears to be of great 
importance.
CR systems require a pool of CR pairs, which in many mechanisms the user will have 
to choose. Because there will be many times the number of CR pairs as the 
passwords they replace, it is plausible that users will have to expend many times the 
effort of choosing passwords in choosing the CR pairs. Authentication will take longer, 
as more information has to be transferred both ways through the mechanism than was 
required for passwords. The studies discussed above do not seek to predict the 
reaction of users to this increase in effort, or to identify appropriate circumstances for 
the use of these mechanisms - for example, users may be more willing to expend this 
effort on rare important occasions such as proving their identity to password helpdesks 
than on normal everyday logging in (cf. Just, 2003).
4.2.3 Cognitive Passwords
Bunnell et al. (1997) and Zviran & Haga (1990,1993) studied the memorability of 
cognitive passwords (challenge-response pairs based on autobiographical data). All 
the studies used similar types of target items. Participants were supplied with a list of 
biographical questions and asked to answer them truthfully. The questions were either 
fact based (the validity of the answers could in principle be objectively checked) or 
opinion based (the validity of the answers could not be objectively decided).
Zviran and Haga’s two studies used 14 opinion based questions and 6 fact based. The 
participants answered the same questions after an interval of 3 months. Bunnell et 
al.’s (1997) study used 20 opinion-based and 20 fact-based questions, and tested 
participants after an interval of only 2 weeks. The results are shown in Table 8.
The recall rates of both fact-based and opinion-based cognitive passwords are 
impressive. Fact-based passwords average a success rate of 89% and opinion-based 
passwords average 77%. These are much higher than the average of 41% recorded 
across all types of conventional passwords in the same experiments.
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Table 8 - Percentage successful recall of cognitive passwords
Type of Bunnell et al. Zviran and Haga Zviran and Haga Average
Cognitive Item (1997) n=86, 2 (1990) n=106, 3 (1993) n=103, 3
weeks months months
Fact based 88% 84% 94% 89%
Opinion based 72% 70% 88% 77%
Cognitive passwords were not all successfully recalled to the same extent. In Bunnell 
et al.’s (1997) study the range for fact-based items was 58% to 100%, while opinion- 
based items ranged from 56% to 90%. Bunnell et al. (1997) point out that those 
questions should be chosen that have been demonstrated to have answers that are 
difficult to guess, as well as being highly memorable. A critical issue is "guessable by 
who?" - anyone who is familiar with the user's biography (such as a family member, 
friend or close working colleague) will have a natural advantage in guessing cognitive 
passwords compared to an attacker who is a stranger. By extension, cognitive 
password pairs should be difficult for an attacker to research without raising the alarm. 
Bunnell et al. (1997) used significant others to guess CR pairs, thus employing a 
difficult test for cognitive passwords to pass. Out of the forty items used by Bunnell et 
al. (1997), only five met their criteria for good memorability (70% or above) and 
resistance to guessing (20% or below). At that rate, it would be necessary to screen 
800 potential cognitive items to gather a set of 100 from which all users would have to 
be authenticated. Though this may appear expensive, the result would be an 
authentication system that was approximately as resistant to guessing as conventional 
password systems (Bunnell et al., 1997). However, this new system would perform 
much better over long retention periods.
There is a related issue of an attacker harvesting CR pairs on one system to break into 
others. Because screening of cognitive password questions is expensive, there will be 
a tendency to use questions that have already been screened by other organisations 
(or not screen at all- which according Bunnell etai,  1997 is dangerous). Once a 
cognitive password item is compromised, it is dangerous for an individual to re-use it. 
Cognititive passwords rely on the memorability of biographical data for their 
effectiveness, and biographical facts cannot be changed. If the user compensates for 
biography disclosure by giving an untrue answer to a cognitive password question, she 
is in effect using an associative password mechanism -  these have lowered 
performance (see section 4.2.2). This performance may be further degraded through 
interference with the historically accurate answer (see sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.5).
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4.2.4 Pass algorithms
Pass algorithms (Haskett, 1984) employ several rounds of questions and answers, 
instead of the single round that is used in traditional password mechanisms. In 
principle, it is similar to a zero-knowledge proof, with a human being taking the place of 
what would normally be a mechanism as the "prover". The user ("prover") has agreed 
a secret algorithm with the mechanism ("verifier"). When the prover attempts to login, 
she is issued with a challenge/question by the verifier. The prover takes this challenge 
and manipulates it using her secret algorithm, returning the answer to the verifier. If 
the answer is correct, some evidence is gained that the prover is who she says she is. 
However, there is always some possibility that the answer was guessed by chance.
The process of challenge and response is repeated until the verifier is satisfied that the 
prover has answered enough questions correctly to establish her authenticity. The 
mechanism can be set to require greater or lesser amounts of proof/rounds of 
authentication according to the security required.
After first use, the memorability of the mechanism should be better than traditional 
passwords, as the secret information is employed in a repeated and elaborate mental 
processing of the challenge information supplied by the verifier. However, unless this 
process is carried out during enrolment, the user may forget the secret algorithm before 
using it. The mechanism's weakness compared to passwords is that it will take longer 
and more effort to authenticate, as several rounds of challenges and responses are 
necessary compared to passwords’ single round. This may be more suitable for 
infrequent but critical tasks, such as authentication with a helpdesk for password 
recovery. Pass algorithms have not been empirically evaluated.
4.2.5 Pass Phrases
The most frequently used definition of passphrases is in the one adopted by this thesis 
- extended length passwords that may include spaces - though else where 
passphrases have been defined as normal length passwords made out of the nth letter 
of every word in a phrase (e.g. Yan et al., 2000). The memorability of pass phrases 
have not been researched in depth. Although the content of pass-phrases may vary as 
widely as that of passwords, only one type has been reported: self-generated phrases 
of 80 characters or less.
In their 1993 study (see section 4.1.2), Zviran and Haga tested the retention of newly 
self-generated pass-phrases over a 3 month interval. The recall rate was 21.4%, with 
91% of them reported as recalled from memory without writing them down. This is 
slightly worse than the recall rates for self-generated passwords. It is possible that the
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increased amount of information to be remembered caused this decrease - the average 
length of pass-phrases was 21 characters / 4.4 words. This is much longer than the 8 
characters available for passwords. Another possibility is that fitting desired content 
into 8 characters results in deeper processing and therefore better memorability (see 
section 3.3.3) than is necessary for the unconstrained passphrase.
The ecological validity of this study is difficult to judge, as the proportion of 
authorisation attempts that occur at 3 month intervals is not known (see end of section
4.1.2). However, as with its password findings, it cannot reveal the memory problems 
associated with passphrases that are frequently used.
4.2.6 Pass Sentence
The pass sentence mechanism (Spector & Ginzberg, 1994) is a passphrase system 
(see section 4.2.5) using artificial intelligence techniques to support human memory 
such that the user must recall the sense of the pass sentence, not its exact written 
form. For example, the pass sentences "Daniel buys a book from John for 5 dollars", 
and "John sells a book to Daniel for 5 dollars", are equally valid. The two pass 
sentences have the same meaning, but are written differently. Moreover, if the user 
does not supply enough detail in the pass sentence, for example by forgetting some 
part of it, then the mechanism can prompt for further details.
All this is achieved while maintaining a huge search space-estimated as being 80 bits 
on average (allowing for the predictability of English in the mechanism’s only empirical 
trial (Spector & Ginzberg, 1994). This dwarfs the search space of even the strongest 
UNIX password (52 bits), and exceeds the search space of commonly self-generated 
passwords (4 bits) by 23 orders of magnitude. In short, pass sentences should be 
difficult to guess, even by using automation.
The system offers the potential for far greater memorability than passwords 
overextended periods, but suffers the cost of forcing the user to enter many more 
characters during each authentication (an average of 40 characters in the trial, more 
than five times the length of a normal password). While the system may reduce the 
probability of memory problems leading to failed login, it greatly increases the potential 
for typos. However, the addition of some extra “intelligence” to recognise and correct 
for typographical errors could mitigate this problem, without greatly effecting the 
mechanism’s security.
A prototype has undergone some empirical testing (Spector & Ginzberg, 1994), 
producing very positive results (Table 9). 15 participants generated a pass sentence 
each (and a PIN, and two passwords in the same study) and were asked to recall it
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Table 9 - Memorability of pass sentences for 15 participants who could log in
Retention interval Memorability:
[number of] / [%]
Two weeks 15/100%
One-month 15/100%
Six months 14/ 93%
One-year 12/ 80%
after 2 weeks, then again three times at increasingly long intervals. No details were 
given of the participants, and their total number is small, so these impressive results 
should be treated with caution. However, if these results are to be believed, then pass 
sentences greatly improve upon passwords’ memorability. However, length of login 
time may make them inappropriate for everyday use.
4.2.7 Rebus Passwords
Rebus passwords supplement system-generated pronounceable (but otherwise 
random) passwords with a rebus - a mode of expressing words and phrases by 
pictures of objects whose names resemble those words, or the syllables of which they 
are composed (King, 1991). For example, the randomly generated password koucehur 
is made from three randomly selected syllables: kou-ce-hur. To make the rebus, a 
phonetic search is undertaken to find English dictionary words that match the syllables 
in the password. In the example, the syllables are matched to the English words cow, 
see, and her; which displays their pictures when the user is enrolling with the system.
If necessary, the user can display one of the rebus images as a cue to help him during 
normal use.
The system relies on several properties of human memory to make system-generated 
passwords more memorable and so improve the effectiveness of password 
authentication:
• memory is superior for pictures than for words
• cued recall is better than unaided recall, and
• the user is performing deeper processing of the password information than
simple phonetic/acoustic processing by recognising the simple rebus images 
which are displayed above the password syllables (identification of the images
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implies a semantic processing of their meaning), and deeper processing leads 
to better memory.
There is no published empirical evaluation of rebus passwords.
4.3 Re-defining the Password Recall Problem
The initial problem of the research reported in this thesis was "how to make more 
memorable passwords", because users forget them and this leads to unwantedly high 
use of helpdesks. Our theoretical framework (section 3.2.5) tells us that passwords are 
forgotten when they are rarely used, or when they are competing with more memorable 
passwords (i.e. that have been more recently or frequently used). Creating more 
memorable passwords will improve the first problem, but do nothing for the second- 
perhaps even make it worse. This chapter has reviewed research about different types 
of passwords, and found that there are small differences in laboratory recorded 
memorability between them over long intervals. However, authentication mechanisms 
that access different routes to memory offer twice the memorability over the same long 
intervals. A focus on password content will therefore lead to a relatively poor solution.
When examining the context of password use, security policies create interference 
between passwords by ensuring that they are regularly changed, and that there are 
many of them. The problem is exacerbated by policies limiting user's ability to prompt 
themselves by writing the password down. Furthermore, the initial question implies 
there is a choice of password content. Most security policies, however, mandate 
content of a particular kind, and will only become more restrictive as computers (and so 
brute force attacks) inexorably become more powerful. Focusing solely on password 
content cannot therefore give a lasting solution. A good solution requires that the 
scope of the problem be widened.
It has already been noted that systems are composed of three kinds of stakeholders 
(section 2.2.1) - not just the user. It is therefore concluded that the differing agendas of 
some stakeholders has resulted in the imposition of security policies and mechanisms 
that allocate security tasks to users (rather than to technology or other stakeholders in 
the work system). The research focus must therefore include all 3 groups of 
stakeholders:
• the users themselves (primary stakeholders) and
• their support staff and managers (secondary stakeholders) and
• their directors or share-holders (tertiary stakeholders).
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The author falls back on HCI’s traditional concerns - work system effectiveness, task 
quality and user costs. The original problem specification is reformulated as "how can 
password system effectiveness be improved". This PhD aims to produce substantive 
knowledge that can be used to reduce the costs of password authentication systems to 
all stakeholders, and to improve the quality with which password systems carry out the 
authentication task.
This research question has several dependencies. To achieve improved effectiveness 
the research will have to address:
• what causes password system performance to be good or bad
To answer this question one must be able to distinguish between good and bad 
performance. The research must therefore address:
• what is the performance of different password systems,
This requires that research is conducted about:
• how password system performance can be measured,
HCI research attempts to make generalised knowledge (see section 2.2.2). This thesis 
aims to make models abstracting across the particular combinations of password 
mechanisms and stakeholders about which data was collected. Eventually it is hoped 
that these will enable general conclusions about password authentication as a class of 
system. This thesis will also start model building that may later allow conclusions to be 
made about wider aspects of security in the corporation.
4.4 Summary
Traditional password mechanisms have substantial memorability problems. To 
improve matters mechanisms are modified so that they employ innately more 
memorable secrets, or support more robust routes to human memory than recall while 
ensuring “cryptographic strength”. A hypothetical matrix of the relationship between 
memorability, the type of secret used in authentication, and the route to remembering 
supported by the mechanisms is presented in Figure 12.
Mechanisms that employ unaided recall such as passwords, pass-phrases tend to use 
one “all or nothing” round of authentication.
Mechanisms that use routes to remembering such as cued recall and recognition 
employ several rounds of authentication (except Rebus passwords which use only 
one). Instead of remembering one difficult to guess strong secret, these clases of 
mechanism ask users to remember and be authenticated on several weaker but easier
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to remember secrets. By combining several weak secrets, the composite strength is 
high. Cognitive passwords (Zviran & Haga, 1990) involve a series of questions about 
the user’s personal preferences and history. After a certain number of correct answers, 
the user is considered to have passed authentication. Associative passwords (Smith, 
1987; Zviran & Haga, 1993) employ word pair or phrase associations in a similar 
manner while avoiding word association stereotypes (e.g. Dear-Sally, Spring-Holiday, 
Black-Settee). Ellison et al. (1999), refer to systems such as these that use the 
contents of episodic memory as employing personal entropy. The Pass sentence 
mechanism (Spector & Ginzberg, 1994) is unusual in that it uses one large difficult to 
guess secret. However, if the user does not get the secret completely right, the user is 
prompted with questions about it. When the user answers enough questions correctly, 
s/he is logged in. Weak empirical evidence (Spector & Ginzberg, 1994) suggests this 
mechanism shows promise.
The critical review of the literature has shown that focusing on password contents of 
traditional password mechanims cannot bring a good solution to the problem of 
password requests clogging up helpdesks. Whilst password content memorability is 
relevant, it is smaller part of a problem caused by the choices made by different 
stakeholders in the organisation. These choices have a great impact on the usability of 
authentication mechanisms, and on security more widely.
Recognition
• n/a
Cued Recall
•  Cognitive passwords
• Associative passwords
•  Pass-sentences
Recall
• Pass-algorithms
•  Passwords
•  Passohrases
Figure 12 - Matrix of knowledge-based authentication mechanisms, categorised
by Route to Memory.
In the light of this realisation, the goal of this PhD has been redefined as:
• How to reduce the costs of password authentication systems to stakeholders,
Better
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• How to improve the quality with which password systems carry out the 
authentication task. Both of these tasks involve:
• Identifying basic parameters of password authentication systems so that
o Ineffectiveness can be diagnosed and
o Interventions be designed
Finally, the PhD addresses the concerns of its parent discipline HCI to start on the path 
to generalising and validating its password related findings.
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5.1 Introduction
The previous chapter identified goals of this PhD as to collect basic parameters of 
password authentication systems in BT and UCL and to diagnose ineffectiveness. This 
chapter will outline two groups of HCI methods and select those appropriate for 
password research so that the process can begin of collecting the data to fulfil these 
goals. A discussion of the strengths and weaknesses of different techniques for 
collecting usability data and for diagnosing ineffectiveness in general, and the specific 
strengths and weaknesses for data collection about password systems, follows.
The purpose of evaluation is to measure the system’s effectiveness, and if the system’s 
balance between work quality and costs is not optimal, diagnose why it is not. The 
interaction between the human and technology parts of the system, and the properties 
of both human and computer parts of the system are studied.
There are two main categories of evaluation:
• Empirical-where data is collected from real users, or artefacts
• Analytic-where the user or technology is modelled
Each of these categories of evaluation will be discussed in separate sections below.
5.2 Empirical evaluation techniques
This section will review available data collection techniques with view to deciding which 
would be best for studying password system performance. The list of techniques in 
Table 10 is representative, though not complete.
5.2.1 Observation
Observation can vary according to the setting (in the field or laboratory), the extent of 
the observer's involvement with the task (ethnomethodology, participant observation, or 
observation from outside), the formality of the observation process (quick and dirty or 
highly controlled), the tools used to record the observations (from pen and paper to full 
audiovisual recordings) (Preece, Rogers, & Sharp, 2002), and the obtrusiveness of the 
techniques used (Dix, Finlay, Abowd, & Beale, 1998). Field observations allow the 
capturing of real world behaviours in the context of use, whilst laboratory observations 
allow easy comparisons and high levels of control (Dix et al., 1998). Most observation 
techniques require an observer to be present, so are expensive if the phenomenon 
being observed occur infrequently.
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Table 10 -  Evaluation techniques
Data collection 
techniques
Appropriate
for
password
research
Strengths Weaknesses
Observation X Collects data on what 
really happens.
Breaks security policies by 
its similarity to shoulder- 
surfing. Misses rare 
events.
Retrospective
interview
Collects data where 
observation is not 
possible
Factual data can be 
inaccurate due to workings 
of human memory
Retrospective verbal 
protocol
X Fleshes out 
observation.
Breaks security policies by 
its similarity to shoulder- 
surfing.
Concurrent verbal 
protocol
X Fleshes out 
observation.
Breaks security policies by 
its similarity to shoulder- 
surfing. Interferes with 
password task.
Questionnaire S Collects data where 
observation is not 
possible
Factual data can be 
inaccurate due to workings 
of human memory
Focus group S Collects data where 
observation is not 
possible
Factual data can be 
inaccurate due to workings 
of human memory
System logs S Objective measure. 
Collects large amounts 
of data.
Little insight into cognitive 
processes - why events 
occurred. Limited by 
administrative domains.
Diaries S Collects data where 
observation is not 
possible. More 
accurate than 
interviews for factual 
data.
Burdensome on diarist. 
Possible interference with 
behaviour being recorded.
Documentation S Tells you how things 
should be done, 
ideally.
Does not tell you what 
activities really happen
Experimentation S Strong control of 
variables.
Low ecological validity
Cognitive
walkthrough/
Heuristic
walkthrough/
KLM, GOMS
X Can collect data 
without users. Can 
model task 
performance times.
Requires the preceding 
data collection activities. 
Designed for more 
complex interaction tasks.
Because there are no published studies of password frequency of use, no one can be 
sure how effective field-based direct observation of people using passwords would be.
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It is predicted that some of the most problematic passwords will be some of the least 
frequently used (due to memory failures), perhaps on the order of once every several 
months. Some important password events are therefore unlikely to happen during any 
period of observation, and observations would be biased towards frequently occurring 
events. Moreover, there is only one observer available, and the amount of useful data 
that could be connected would be small compared to the resources spent collecting it. 
Furthermore, shadowing users would in many cases breach company security policies 
- i.e. watching people as they type in sensitive passwords. Observation of password 
users in the field is therefore not appropriate.
5.2.2 Interview
Interviews are a rich and efficient source of data, because the researcher can ask 
users about events that occurred when the researcher was not present. Interviews can 
therefore collect data that direct observation cannot. However, interviews suffer from 
inaccuracies-events may be remembered as better or worse than they really were, or 
as taking a longer or shorter amount of time (Preece et al., 2002). This can be a 
particular problem for regularly occurring events, since human memory stores such 
events as a general script from which memories are reconstructed, instead of retrieving 
verbatim what actually happened (Schacter, 2001). Memories of these events will tend 
to be regularised, with details missing that perhaps were important (Schacter, 2001). 
Users’ may lack insight about an event being recalled- for example an interviewee may 
genuinely believe they experienced a problem with a password because the server was 
upgraded, when in fact the interviewee slipped and entered the wrong password. 
Interviewees may also attempt to give answers that make them appear more socially 
desirable (Oppenheim, 2000), or refuse to answer questions on sensitive topics. There 
are techniques to combat both these risks (Robson, 2001).
Interviews are more appropriate for password research than direct observation, 
because the researcher can question the participant about rarely used passwords or 
infrequent but important password problems. However, interviews are unlikely to be 
accurate in collecting data about password frequency of use or frequency and severity 
of problems, because of memory biases. Though it may not be very accurate, in many 
instances the user's memory of password related events will be the only source of 
information available to the researcher.
5.2.3 Retrospective verbal protocol / post test walkthrough
Interviews can be improved by presenting participants with recordings of what they
were doing, to cue the participants' memory of events in a post test walkthrough (Dix et
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al., 1998). However, such techniques have the same weaknesses as observation. 
They may miss rare but critical incidents and are expensive of resources if 
observations are made for long durations. Moreover, if the interval between the activity 
and the post test walk-through is long enough, the user may not be able to accurately 
remember her thought processes and the reasons for her actions (Dix et al., 1998).
This technique would be more difficult to use in password research than direct 
observation (see section 5.2.1), as it would have many of its disadvantages, with the 
added necessity of making a permanent record of the sensitive event - an augmented 
shoulder surfing attack; a greater breach of security policies than observation alone.
5.2.4 Concurrent verbal protocols - “Thinking aloud”
Concurrent verbal protocols suffer the same weaknesses as retrospective verbal 
protocols. In addition, there is the potential for interference between the task of using 
the password and producing the verbal protocol. Both thinking aloud and password 
tasks are essentially verbal, and so require the same mental resources (cf. Wickens,
1992) - the resulting competition for scarce resources is likely to degrade performance 
in both tasks.
5.2.5 Questionnaires
Questionnaires are very flexible, offering the opportunity of collecting both qualitative 
and quantitative data (Oppenheim, 2000). However, the data is user reports, and 
suffers some of the same biases of memory that interviews do (see section 5.2.2). 
Questionnaires are efficient, they are cheap to produce and distribute, and cheap to 
analyse if the responses are constrained (Dix et al., 1998). However, they lack some 
of the flexibility of interviews - the researcher is not able to pick up and explore topics 
as they appear serendipitously (Dix et al., 1998). Questionnaires do not allow 
researchers as much scope to establish rapport and put respondents at their ease as 
interviews do (Oppenheim, 2000), and so respondents may be less likely to answer 
sensitive questions. Questionnaires should undergo extensive pilot testing to ensure 
that respondents reliably understand the intended meaning of the questions, as the 
researcher will in many cases not be present to clear up misunderstandings 
(Oppenheim, 2000).
Questionnaires therefore can measure from the entirety of a users password 
experiences in a way that observation cannot, and do not break security policies. They 
are therefore appropriate for password research. However, extra steps may be 
necessary to collect useful data about passwords with questionnaires. An Internet-
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based questionnaire survey was unable to collect information about password design in 
50% of responses (Adams et al., 1997). Appeals to anonymity and authority can 
improve response rates, and so will be employed (Oppenheim, 2000).
5.2.6 Focus group
Flexibility is a particular strength of focus groups, where it is possible to quickly cover a 
wide range of views and home in on interesting topics as they are brought up.
However, they also rely on retrospective user reports, and so suffer the memory 
problems of interviews, and are more suitable for collecting opinions than facts. The 
success of focus groups relies heavily on the skill of the facilitator (Robson, 2001).
Effort may be required to prevent some group members from dominating the group 
agenda, and to ensure that every member of the group can express their true opinion 
when some group members are reserved than others, and in the face of opposing 
views (Robson, 2001). Moreover, focus group data are more difficult to analyse than 
interviews, because of the difficulty of transcribing overlapping speech and of obtaining 
clear recordings of everyone.
Focus groups are appropriate for use with password research because they can allow 
capture of data about events that are rare and occur when direct observation cannot be 
achieved because of security policy, etc.
5.2.7 System logs
Machine recorded system logs contain information recorded automatically by a work 
system. They are seen as objective - not subject to the biases of human memory.
They are however subjected to the biases of the people who designed them (Bowers, 
1992), and so record information of interest to the designers, rather than of interest to 
users or researchers. The researcher may have to make inferences because 
phenomena of interest have not been logged directly, and interpretations of the log can 
be unreliable and inaccurate.
They have the advantage that they are unobtrusive (Preece et al., 1994), are generally 
more accurate than records made manually, and can lead to large amounts of reliably 
coded data being collected which can be at least partially analysed automatically (Dix 
et al., 1998). The unobtrusiveness of system logs leads to an ethical and practical 
problem: do researchers inform users that they are being logged and risk them altering 
their behaviour (and thus confounding the observation), or not inform users they are 
being observed and fall foul of data protection laws.
99
System logs have several problems in password research. Passwords are generally 
not recorded in system logs for fear of security breaches. If they were recorded, it 
would be difficult to obtain these logs from their suspicious owners, who may also have 
a legal obligation to protect their confidentiality. It may even be difficult to identify the 
owners of the logs, or even the logs’ existence. There is likely to be a large number of 
different logs for each individual participant, who may use passwords in many different 
systems which may be in different parts of the world by virtue of the Internet and the 
World Wide Web. It is therefore unlikely that researchers would be able to obtain a 
complete set of logs. However, helpdesks are likely to keep logs about password 
problems-our topic of interest.
5.2.8 Diaries
Diaries are especially useful for longitudinal studies and logging unusual or infrequent 
tasks and problems (Dix et al., 1998). Diaries are portable, and so can be carried 
round by participants, and used concurrently with the tasks being studied, or nearly 
concurrently. This can prevent the biases of human memory that can reduce the 
accuracy of factual interviews and questionnaires, whilst also offering some of the 
advantages of interviews and questionnaires. However, diaries only allow a coarse 
level of recording, and are burdensome to use (Breakwell, 1995) and inappropriate for 
frequent records (Dix et al., 1998). The participant may forget to use them after an 
event and so fill them in retrospectively, by which time the events have been forgotten 
that should have been recorded. This could be ameliorated with an alarm system that 
prompts the diarist to make entry. This requires extra equipment, which the diarist 
must also keep about their person, adding to their burden. However, the alarm may 
sound at an inconvenient moment when the diarist cannot make entry. This may be 
particularly unacceptable in a business context where it may interrupt meetings with 
colleagues or clients.
The diary may influence the behaviour that is being studied (Breakwell, 1995). 
Breakwell suggests that the diary’s instructions should include warnings to participants 
to be aware of this problem and not to let the diary change their behaviour.
Diaries can capture password data across different administrative domains where 
system logs cannot, for example because a person may use computers controlled by 
different parts of the company. Furthermore, diaries can record details of password 
events from outside the company which may interact with the passwords used at work. 
Diaries can be used to record password events which cannot be directly observed 
because of security policy whilst avoiding the memory biases of interview. Diaries are 
therefore appropriate for password research.
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5.2.9 Documentation
The easiest source of research data is manuals, instruction booklets, training materials, 
etc. (Dix et al., 1998). Equipment specific manuals may tell you about the functions of 
the device (Dix et al., 1998), and policy documents can tell you about how the devices 
are meant to be used (although this may not be how they are actually used - Dix et al.,
1998). The researcher must be given access to it, which may not be possible if the 
documentation is commercially sensitive, or is seen as containing information that 
could be a security risk if it became known outside the organisation.
Documentation therefore is appropriate for password research. It can reveal important 
information about the construction and configurations of password mechanisms 
including the restrictions on password content enforced by mechanism. Accepting the 
evidence that some password content is more memorable than others that different 
password mechanisms enforce harsher restrictions on content than others, then 
password systems that restrict password content to that which is unmemorable will be 
systems that cause helpdesk use. It will therefore be possible to predict password 
system performance based on the restrictions that the system enforces on password 
content. However, because password related documentation describes safeguards, 
security departments may be unwilling to release them to outside researchers.
5.2.10 Experimentation
Experimentation simplifies complex phenomena, and controls conditions so that the 
effects of one or two important variables can be judged in isolation. Experimentation 
can be formative and summative-it can be used to investigate the causes of system 
performance, or to measure the performance of systems, for example to show if one is 
better than the other. However, the simplification of the research problem into 
something that can be modelled in an experiment may mean that results are no longer 
meaningful in the context of the original problem.
Moreover, the performance and contexts of password systems are currently not well 
understood, no one knows what all the relevant variables are, or what value to put on 
parameters such as how many passwords users have. It is therefore difficult to model 
them or control these variables and parameters in an experiment. Because these are 
not modelled in the experiments, the result of the experiment may not generalise well 
to the real-world. Despite this, experimentation is highly relevant for password system 
research, and has been one of the most frequently used techniques (see section
4.1.2).
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5.3 Analytic evaluation techniques
When real users are not available, or resources (time, money, facilities, etc.) are 
scarce, it is possible to use analytic techniques. To the author's knowledge, none of 
these techniques have been used in previous password research.
There are good reasons for this. Logging in with a password mechanism is a simple 
and brief activity, as far as the user is concerned: It involves the recall and typing of 
two pieces of information (the username and password) followed by pressing the return 
key. Analytic evaluation methods such as cognitive or heuristic walk-throughs are 
designed for more complex interfaces (cf. Dix et al., 1998; Preece et al., 1994), and so 
are therefore not appropriate for use with passwords. Keystroke level modelling (KLM) 
and GOMS are formal methods for modelling a users physical and mental behaviour at 
an interface, and can be used to predict the time taken/effort required to perform 
particular tasks. These techniques are particularly useful for optimising the interfaces 
of heavily used equipment where the same task is repeated for an entire working day. 
These techniques are not good at modelling errors and require the basic parameters, 
variables and sequences of tasks as input (John & Kieras, 1996), which have not yet 
been established. Analytic evaluation techniques are therefore not useful at this stage 
in research about password system performance.
5.4 Description of studies
A summary of the studies and methods used is given in Table 11. More details are 
given in the following sections.
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Table 11 - Summary of studies and methods
Study Goal Methods Population Comments
1 Begin to estimate the 
basic parameters of 
password use and 
performance in UCL.
Pilot tests a combined 
method
Interview, diary, 
system logs
University 
students 
and staff
Designed for a very detailed 
view of individual's password 
use on all systems.
2 Start to estimate the 
basic parameters of 
password use in a BT 
sample.
Start to diagnose 
performance
Questionnaire Corporate
R&D
Requires greatly reduced 
effort for participants than 
study 1, and so more suitable 
for use with BT population.
Reliance on human memory 
makes this relatively 
inaccurate.
3 Supplement study 2 
with data from a 
different sample of 
users in BT
Questionnaire Corporate
general
Supplements data from study 
2, sampling different parts of 
the BT population.
4 Estimate the basic 
parameters of 
password use and 
performance in UCL 
with more accurate 
instruments.
Continue to diagnose 
performance.
Password 
mechanism 
system logs
University
students
Very accurate view of 
performance: observes both 
normal use and occurrence 
of problems but on only one 
system. Permission could 
not be obtained to instrument 
corporate password 
mechanisms
5 Expanded data 
collection for study 4 
with greatly expanded 
numbers of 
observations.
Password 
mechanism 
system logs
University
students
As above
6 Observe password 
system performance 
for a BT sample using 
objective measure.
Diagnose
performance
Helpdesk 
system logs
Corporate - 
general
Performance measured 
across many systems. 
Incomplete view of 
performance: observes 
problems but not normal use.
7 Validate sub-set of 
interventions with a 
sample of users.
Focus groups Corporate
R&D
Interventions chosen as 
being easily to implement, 
and so more likely to be 
implemented.
8 Validate sub-set of 
interventions with a 
different sample of 
users.
Focus groups Corporate
operations
Supplementing study 8 with 
data from users in a very 
different part of the 
organisation.
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5.4.1 Study 1 (Combined methods)
Study 1 pilot tests a methodology and estimates some of the basic parameters of 
password system performance in a real world setting (using the pilot methodology). 
These parameters include:
1. Number of passwords owned
2. Content of passwords (proportion containing numbers and symbols) / password 
strength
3. Proportion of passwords system generated and self generated
4. Password length (number of characters)
5. Proportion of passwords entered on the user's behalf
6. Ease of recall of passwords (automaticity)
7. Proportion of user ids that are self generated or system generated
8. Frequency of use of passwords
9. Frequency of problems with passwords
10. Type of problem with passwords
The methodology involves an interview, followed by diary use and system logs. The 
interview is necessary to build an individual diary for each participant, which will reduce 
the effort required to fill it. The primary reasons for using a diary were that it could 
collect data across administrative domains, and that it could collect data about normal 
use as well as problems (see section 5.2.8). System logs are also taken so that the 
objectiveness and suitability for password research can be judged.
5.4.2 Study 2 (Questionnaire survey I)
Studies 2 and 3 are to collect information about the basic parameters of password use 
and performance, collecting this information from a corporate population of 
stakeholders. The method from study 1 was dropped because it was found to be more 
effortful and time-consuming than originally hoped, and was therefore considered to be 
inappropriate for a corporate population. Two questionnaires were therefore designed 
that took approximately 10 minutes to complete (the study 2 questionnaire can be 
found in the appendix, the study 3 questionnaire has one question removed but is 
otherwise identical). Both questionnaires had four types of questions:
• Questions about the respondents' password behaviour on the mechanism for which 
the respondents last required a password reset
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• Questions relating the respondents' password behaviour on this mechanism to the 
respondents' behaviour with other mechanisms
• Questions about the respondents' general use of passwords
• Demographic questions (Qs 23-26)
The questions were derived as follows (Table 12):
Table 12 - Derivation of questions in Studies 2 & 3
Function of question Derivation of question Questions
To replicate findings relating perceived sensitivity, 
risk and value of resources to password 
behaviour
Adams et al 3, 4,5
To replicate findings about automaticity vs 
conscious recall of passwords
Adams et al 3, 4, 5, 7, 16
Investigate importance of the number of 
passwords owned by users as a factor
Adams et al 15
To investigate the hypothesised importance of Reason’s model of 8, 10
frequency of password changing as a factor 
influencing password system performance
human error
Investigate the effect of password content re-use, 
which is part of frequency of password use.
Reason’s model 12,13, 14
To investigate the hypothesised importance of 
frequency of password use as a factor influencing 
password system performance
Reason’s model 9, 11
To explore different facets of password content as Literature of password 17, 18, 19, 20
a factor influencing password system 
performance
memorability
Explore automated password entry as a factor. Allocation of function 
concept from HCI
6
Open ended questions about the users’ methods 
for managing and using passwords Open ended questions 
to capture factors not
21
Users’ insights into the cause of their password 
reset
yet hypothesised 2, 22
Study 2 participants were selected geographically: questionnaires were distributed by 
hand to three buildings at the research park belonging to BT where the author was 
based. Study 2 is named as being about passwords in general.
The questionnaires did not ask respondents to estimate the frequency of their
password problems, as Study 1 showed them to be a relatively rare event which
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respondents could reasonably be expected to have difficulty remembering accurately. 
Studies 2 and 3 therefore could not measure password system performance, though 
were able inform us about the parameters of password use and to contribute to 
diagnosis.
5.4.3 Study 3 (Questionnaire survey II)
Study 3 was designed to supplement Study 2 (see 5.4.2) by collecting data from a 
different sample of users in a corporate population. Although it collected information 
about password use in general, it also collected information about the use of Personal 
Identification Numbers (PINs), an important class of passwords.
The study 3 questionnaire was identical to the study 2 questionnaire (see section 5.4.2) 
with its first question removed because its answer was assumed to be known (see
7.2.2): it was distributed by a 3rd party attaching it to the end of a form necessary to get 
a voicemail system's PIN reset. Study 3 will therefore be considered as a survey of 
PIN use and performance.
However, how representative of PIN performance this authentication mechanism is 
cannot be known, as the prevalence, performance context of use of PIN based 
authentication has not yet been studied. The author claims that the feature of PIN 
authentication that distinguishes it the most from passwords in general is that the 
content is numeric rather than alphabetic. All PINs are by definition numeric. It will be 
assumed therefore that the PIN mechanism surveyed in study 3 is representative of all 
PINs.
5.4.4 S tudy 4  (U n ivers ity  co u rsew o rk  system  logs I)
The goal of the study was to improve our general understanding of password system 
performance, and to collect data about password use and content to aid in the 
diagnosis of performance. These goals were achieved by instrumenting a real-world 
authentication mechanism to record the timing, success or failure, and content of login 
attempts, and to allow us to compare these attempts to the passwords that should have 
been used. This allowed unique psychological insights that could not be accurately 
available by any other means.
The study was carried out on a sample of students at UCL, where the researcher was 
able to negotiate permission. Unfortunately, similar data was not available from the 
corporate environment, as permission was not given to instrument an authentication 
mechanism in BT.
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Theoretically system logs are a rich source of data about password use and password 
system performance, as best practice dictates that they are kept (see 3.2.7). Study 1 
found that the standard system logs of conventional UNIX workstations were 
inappropriate for password performance research. This study made use of an 
opportunity to collect system log data that was richer and more appropriate to the 
research objectives than had been available through standard UNIX logs.
5.4.5 Study 5 (University coursework system logs II)
Study 5 was designed to supplement the password performance and diagnostic data of 
Study 4 by improving the sample size by a factor of 10, so as to enable statistical 
inference tests about the performance of different types of passwords. This was 
achieved by repeating a simplified version of Study 4 over a number of years with more 
classes of students, and pooling the data.
Study 4 had captured login and error data for both passwords and pass faces, in a 
repeated measures design (see Brostoff & Sasse, 2000). Study 5 removed the 
Passfaces™ component of Study 4, as the IT infrastructure available to participants 
was found to significantly disadvantage Passfaces™ use (Brostoff & Sasse, 2000) and 
could not be changed.
5.4.6 S tu d y  6 (C o rp o ra te  h e lpd esk  logs)
Study 6 was designed to gain objective password system performance data from a 
corporate sample, and to aid in diagnosing the performance observed. This 
supplements Studies 2 and 3, which collected subjective data from a corporate 
population, and studies 4 and 5, which collected objective data from students.
The study gives an incomplete picture of password system performance, as it 
examines records of helpdesk use rather than password use. These records are a 
direct measurement of important password system costs, but reveal little about their 
causes. However, the data can falsify some hypotheses about password performance 
(see the repeat offender hypothesis-section 8.3.3).
The results of the study will be optimistic, tending to overestimate password system 
performance. This is due to a systematic bias in the data: the helpdesk does not 
support all of BT’s Information Systems, and individual users are likely to use a spread 
of supported and unsupported systems. This means that password resets of 
unsupported systems will not be recorded in the helpdesk's logs, and so the logs will 
underestimate the actual number of passwords reset for each user.
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There is a further difficulty with this method. The helpdesk has no part in the provision 
of user accounts on BT's Information Systems, and so does not have access to 
information about the number of accounts on each of these systems. Without 
supplementary information, it is not possible to calculate the number of resets per 
system per user, which is an important performance measure. This supplementary 
information was available for some of the systems through the helpdesk staffs 
contacts, but its accuracy could not be validated.
5.4.7 Study 7 & 8 (Focus groups I & II)
Studies 7 and 8 were designed to begin validation of interventions described in Chapter 
9 with BT users - as evidence suggested BT had more password problems than UCL 
(section 8.4.4). The effects of interventions would likely be greater at BT and so more 
easily detected. BT was the better place to test interventions. However, BT did not 
give permission for any of the interventions to be tried experimentally. BT also had a 
new policy that reduced the priority given to research, and so greatly reduced the 
availability of users for participation in research. Moreover, it was necessary to share 
research participants with another research project to achieve levels of efficiency 
acceptable to BT.
Focus groups were chosen, as they could be used to collect data from BT users about 
interventions without implementing them (a BT requirement), and would allow 
participants to be more easily shared by researchers (another BT requirement).
A set of interventions that relied on users changing their behaviour (rather than that 
relied on infrastructure changes) were chosen for two reasons:
1. The interventions required users to change their behaviour without putting in place 
mechanisms to enforce it. This would mean that users’ attitudes to and perceptions 
of the interventions would be particularly important, which focus groups are 
especially good at exploring.
2. It was believed that these interventions had a greater chance of being 
implemented, as they required little investment in infrastructure and so were 
cheaper to implement at a time of economic hardship for BT.
Study 7 was conducted at a large research park at BT, where participants were 
generally higher corporate grades with little access to confidential customer records. 
Study 8 was conducted at a local office where many jobs require access to confidential 
customer records, and participants were generally of lower position in the hierarchy.
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5.5 Summary
This chapter describes standard HCI evaluation techniques, describing them and their 
general strengths and weaknesses, and then discussing their strengths and 
weaknesses in relation to password research. The applicability of these methods to 
password research are summarised in Table 10. It was concluded that empirical data 
collection techniques were more useful at the current stage of research than analytic 
techniques. The purpose and methods of eight studies were outlined and summarised 
in Table 11.
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Chapter 6 Study 1: Diaries & system logs pilot study
6.1 Introduction
This chapter describes a pilot study of a diary- and system log-based methodology for 
collecting basic data about password systems and their performance. Results are 
presented and discussed, both substantive results about the basic parameters and 
performance of certain password systems, and methodological results about the 
suitability of diaries as instruments for collecting data about passwords.
A pilot study was performed to assess diaries as the main data collection instrument for 
password performance data. Diaries show great promise as instruments for collecting 
this data (section 5.2.8). By using participants from UCL, it was possible to collect 
system log data, which could be used to assess the concurrent validity of the diaries.
It is understood that using the diary may influence the behaviour that is being studied 
(Breakwell, 1995). Breakwell suggests that the diary’s instructions should include 
warnings to participants to be aware of this problem and not to let the diary change 
their behaviour.
The diaries in this pilot study did not contain such warnings, as the researcher had not 
been aware of the issue at the design stage of this study. However, it was 
hypothesised that participants would try to reduce the burden of completing a diary 
using 3 techniques (Table 13 below):
Table 13 - Hypothesised participant behaviour to reduce the burden of diary
filling
Hypothesis 1 Not recording events in the diary
Hypothesis 2 Using passwords less frequently.
Hypothesis 3 Retrospective entry making in batches, instead of individual entries 
concurrent with the events they describe.
6.2 Method
6.2.1 Participants
Of the 6 participants, 4 were within the Computer Science Department (3 PhD 
students, one system administrator) where the author had access to the system logs.
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The other 2 were undergraduates from the School of Library and Information Science, 
UCL, studying Information Management.
6.2.2 Procedure
The participants were given a 40 minute semi-structured interview about their 
passwords (the interview schedule is in Appendix 2). Interviews were recorded onto 
audio cassette if the participants gave their permission (5 of the 6 did).
The results of this interview (section 6.3) were used to personalise password diaries, 
which the participants were instructed to carry with them for one to two weeks, noting 
down each use of a password with its time and date shortly after it had occurred. If a 
problem occurred, participants were asked to record the nature of the problem. At the 
end of the period participants were asked to a debriefing interview, their diaries were 
examined and system logs obtained from the Computer Science Department's 
Systems Group.
6.2.3 Apparatus
The password diaries were constructed from paper, and were made to A6 size so that 
they might be easily carried in a pocket or purse, and so facilitate rapid recording of 
password uses to lessen the likelihood that password events would be forgotten before 
they could be noted down. To achieve such small size and maintain legibility, it was 
decided to use a 3 character code (item id) to identify each password that participants 
used, entering this code into a table with the date and time, and any problems. Each 
table contained a memory aid for the passwords and their item ids.
Diaries are effortful to fill in (Breakwell, 1995). Employing a multiple-choice/checkbox 
format in the diary would have reduced the effort required for record-keeping.
However, this would have greatly increased the size of the diary, as much more space 
is required on the page to display the relevant information. In the trade-off between 
ease of data entry and portability, it was decided that portability was more important. 
Even so, the diary was designed to reduce effort; most entries would require only the 
writing down of a time, and a three character item id.
Example pages from a diary are shown in Appendix 3. Each diary consisted of the 
following:
1. A front page with a serial code identifying the diary's owner and the number of the 
diary, which maintains the privacy and anonymity of participants in case of loss
2. Two pages of instructions about the use of the diary
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3. A section where item ids could be generated for any new or expired and replaced 
passwords participants acquired during the course of the study, with instructions on 
how to do so,
4. The password use record tables themselves, including customised memory aids. 
There are ten slots per record table, and 22 tables, one each per double page 
spread.
5. A section where participants could record the details of how and why they shared 
passwords with other individuals during the course of the study
6. A section in which participants could make their own notes,
7. A back page, which gave instructions about returning the diaries if they had been 
lost and found.
Participants from the Computer Science department used either SUN or SGI 
workstations. Participant’s consent was given for the release of the Computer Science 
Department (CS) systems logs that recorded their password use, covering a period 
from 2 weeks before password diary use to 2 weeks after. System logs were captured 
by using the UNIX command grep to select relevant items from the UNIX system log 
wtmpx contained on the participants’ workstations.
6.3 Results
6.3.1 Substantive
Summary statistics for each participant are shown in Table 14 and Table 15. The 
average number of passwords was 10.5, the minimum 6 and maximum 14. The 
frequency of use (logins per week) fell into 3 bands: low (7,11); medium (29,34); high 
(91,94). Of the 352 diary recorded uses of passwords and PINs, 11 errors were 
reported by 3 participants, which is approximately a 3% error rate. Typographical 
errors were in the majority (7) giving an typo rate of 2%, with other errors making up 
the remainder (1% error rate). No errors were reported for the 9 recorded PIN uses.
Table 14 - Summary by participant of password frequency of use
Participant No of 
Passwords.
Logins/week Total logins Min/pwd/week Max/pwd/week Mean
C 6 7.0 7 0 7.0 1
B 8 10.5 21 0 8.0 3
D 11 22.4 32 0 11.9 3
F 14 33.5 67 0 27.0 5
G 10 91.0 91 0 34.0 10
E 14 93.8 134 0 42.7 10
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Table 15 - Descriptive statistics of details of participants* passwords
Percentage Mean Median Mode St. Dev.
Self generated 50 - - - -
Contains symbols 15 - - - -
Contains numbers 79 - - - -
Length (characters) - 7.2 6 4 10.5
How often changed per year - .9 0 0 1.4
Change forced 18 - - - -
Automated entry of password 
by mechanism
5 - - - -
Passwords that came to mind 
automatically
43 - - - -
Self generated user ID 15 - - - -
6.3.2 Methodological
It was possible to discover substantially detailed information about interviewees 
passwords (Table 15). Participants were able to give details about all of their 
passwords during a 40 minute interview. However, detailing each and every password 
was tedious, and some details subsequently were discovered to be incorrect.
Table 16 - Descriptive Statistics for Participant D's System Logs
Condition Mean Logins/Day Standard Deviation No. of Days 
Observed
D Pre-diary 0.3 0.5 10
D Diary 0.7 0.6 16
D Post-diary 0.5 0.6 4
Table 17 - Descriptive Statistics for Participant E's System Logs
Condition Mean Logins/Day Standard Deviation No. of Days
Observed
E Pre-diary 0.4 0.5 14
E Diary 0.7 1.2 11
E Post-diary 0.6 0.6 14
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Tabie 18 - Descriptive Statistics for Participant F ’s System Logs
Condition Mean Logins/Day Standard Deviation No. of Days 
Observed
F Pre-diary 1 0.4 14
F Diary 1 0.0 14
F Post-diary 1.8 1.4 14
There would appear to be 2 different patterns in the 3 participants: increase in the 
number of logins during the period of diary use (participant D), and increase in the 
number of logins after diary use (participants E and F). However, it would not be 
appropriate to test for these differences using inferential statistics due to the small 
number of data points.
The hypothesis that diary use leads to reduced password use (Hypothesis 2) is not 
supported by the data, as only cursory examination of Table 16 to
Table 18 reveals. Although conclusions must be tentative due to the small sample 
size, it appears that diary use did not significantly reduce the usage of passwords.
Diary Accuracy
41 (12%) of the reported uses were of passwords where system logs were available. 
System logs were used as a baseline to check the accuracy of the diaries. The daily 
totals of logins recorded in the diaries were taken away from system log daily totals. 
Summary statistics are in Table 19.
Tabie 19 - Summary statistics of System iogs daily totals minus diaries daily
totals for password use
No. of
observations
Mean Median Mode Min Max Std. dev.
41 -1 -1 -2 -11 8 3.4
A distribution of these differences was prepared (Figure 13). The distribution is 
approximately normal, and shows that participants tended to over-estimate the 
numbers of passwords they had used. On one day, one participant over-estimated 
(compared to system logs) by 11 uses of a password. Over-estimations in diaries by 
between 3 and 6 uses a day were frequent.
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12 i
Error (logs - diaries)
Figure 13 - Frequency distribution of diary errors compared to system logs, in
recording number of password uses
There was a strong positive correlation between the numbers of uses in the diaries and 
in the system logs (Pearson’s r = .749, df=39, p<.0001, significant). However, a 
correlation of this size gives an R2 of 0.56, which means that 44% of the variance in the 
data is unexplained.
6.4 Discussion
6.4.1 Diary Accuracy
The password diary appears to be promising as a method for measuring the numbers 
of uses of passwords. It shows good correlation with an ‘objective’ measure of 
password usage - Computer Science Department System logs.. This is a 
methodological contribution, as diary methodologies have not been used in this field 
before.
The diaries show a small systematic bias in favour of over-estimation, and large 
random bias. The systematic bias was in an unexpected direction. Hypothesis 1 was 
that participants would act to reduce the burden imposed upon them by not recording 
some of their password uses. Several of the participants reported this during 
debriefing but it could be not be detected in the diary or log data.
Hypothesis 2 - that participants would use passwords less often, and so avoid making 
diary entries was not detectable in the data, though two of the participants reported 
they had behaved this way on more than one occasion.
Hypothesis 3 - that participants retrospectively filled in their diaries making entries in 
batches was partially supported by the data. The analysis was ambiguous but
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suggestive, and agreed with the participant reports. Batch completion of the diaries 
may explain the difficulties encountered in matching some diary entries to records in 
the system logs. Perhaps participants could not accurately recall the time, and so 
entries made would reflect this problem. To measure the former problem and counter 
the latter, it would be necessary to allocate the task of recording the time away from the 
participant to a more accurate source. The most elegant solution would be a diary that 
time-stamps each entry.
Another method would be to instruct participants that diary entries may not be made 
later than the same day as the event. However, there is evidence that participants have 
already ignored instructions about the timing of entries, and no evidence that further 
instruction will be effective.
The most efficient but potentially least effective solution is to go without diaries, and 
rely on the system logs for data. This would drastically curtail the number of 
passwords about which data could be collected (nearly 90% of password uses 
recorded in this study would not have been captured using this strategy).
6.4.2 System log critique
Diary studies are known to have high drop out rates (Breakwell, 1995). All the 
participants who expressed an opinion about using the diary were negative, reporting 
that it was onerous, and the length of time they used the diary was the most they would 
consider using it for. It appears more likely than not that their avoidance behaviours 
were significant, but were not picked up in the analyses that searched for them. It is 
necessary to try and objectively measure participants' reported "burden lifting 
behaviours" for there to be trust in the results of future password diary studies.
Assuming that the method of comparison was good, the only remaining source of error 
is the system logs data.
Several problems were encountered when collecting and analysing the system logs.
At the time of the study, the Computer Science Department (CS) officially supported: 
SunOS, Solaris, Irix, Windows 95, Windows 98, Windows NT, NTrigue (emulated 
Windows NT), and FreeBSD. These systems record system logs in different ways: 
storing different information, using different nomenclature and locations. The 
participants in CS used a mixture of Irix, SunOS and Solaris. When asked for “system 
logs” of the participants, the systems group initially forgot about the Irix users.
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<username> ttyql Fri Feb 6 10:21 -15:54 (05:33)
<username> ttyqO Fri Feb 6 10:21 -15:54 (05:33)
<username> console Fri Feb 6 10:20 -15:54 (05:33)
<username> ttyql Thu Feb 5 10:22 -16:45 (06:22)
sonic,<usemame>Ipts/24,henry>@CS,19980220 1638,19980220 1830,0:01:52, 
henry,<username>,ttyql „@LOCAL, 19980220 1637,19980220 1830,0:01:52, 
henry,<username>,ttyqO,, @LOCAL, 19980220 1637,19980220 1830,0:01:52, 
henry,<username>,console„@LOCAL, 19980220 1637,19980220 1830,0:01:52, 
sonic,<username>,pts/5,henry,@CS, 19980219 1909,19980219 2012,0:01:03, 
sonic,<username>,pts/15, henry, @CS,19980219 1028,19980219 1641,0:06:12, 
henry,<username>,ttyq2,,@LOCAL,19980219 1131,19980219 1131,0:00:00,
Figure 14- A small sample of wtmpx system log data, henry and sonic are 
workstation names. Participants’ usernames have been replaced with <username>
Successful password use
A small sample of the raw log data is shown in Figure 14. The wtmpx logs did not 
record instances of passwords being typed by the participants, recording instead 
instances of successful connections being made between machines by particular 
protocols, and terminal windows being opened. On further investigation was found that 
there is no direct mapping between connection or terminal establishment and a user 
entering password. Some protocols may or may not require the user to enter 
passwords, and one action by a user may result in several terminals being established 
and logged. Password use must be inferred from the system logs and what is known 
of the user’s habits and preferred methods for connecting between machines. This is 
in effect informed guessing. Though it is informed, it is still guessing and so prone to 
error.
The process of inferring involves removing the distracting redundant entries from the 
log (laborious, painstaking work) so that useful log entries remain and can be 
interpreted. Useful entries can be taken out by mistake. This source of error could be 
removed or standardised by automating the log ‘cleaning’ process, but this would not 
remove the ambiguity of some of the log entries.
Unsuccessful password use
Unsuccessful use of passwords is logged in a different way. In standard UNIX, 5 failed 
attempts at using a password must be made consecutively before it will be logged.
This has been reduced to 2 in CS. Failed attempts at password use do not have to be 
inferred, however they are most often not recorded. The system does not classify
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failed attempts, severely reducing the utility of the logs. For instance, entering an often 
used but inappropriate password would be recorded in the same way as a 
typographical error.
There are two approaches to collecting this error type data. The first approach is 
altering the.password authentication system.
The source files of UNIX “login” applications are sometimes in the possession of 
systems administrators. It is possible that the login application could be altered to log 
each failed attempt, or even to categorise the failures. The second approach is to alter 
the diary.
Impact of password error
The purpose of the diary is to gauge the size and scope of the problem of password 
memorability. So far, the impact of the errors has not been considered, and is not 
recorded in the current design. It should be recorded in future designs. It is 
suggested that a list of options be supplied to participants, reducing the data entry 
burden upon them. The categories in the list should be impacts of password error, 
indicate differing levels of inconvenience, and be applicable for users in many different 
situations. A suitable class of measures would be “generic error correction 
behaviours”. For example, re-entering a password would be less serious impact than 
contacting the system administrators.
For effective logging of password use it is necessary to consider the mixture of 
applications running as well as the mixture of operating systems, as some may require 
password use. A software audit is recommended. Otherwise it is possible to miss out 
software that uses passwords, as happened in this study with XLOCK-a password 
protected screensaver that the author did not know about at the time of data collection. 
There is another reason that audits should be included and system administrators 
recruited as far in advance of data collection as possible-not all password using 
applications will keep logs (for example XLOCK), but may be easily adaptable to do so, 
and without significant risks. Most applications in UNIX can be modified to generate a 
message for syslog, UNIX’s general logging facility (Garfinkel & Spafford, 1996).
An additional methodological problem was discovered-study participants may treat 
separate authentication mechanisms as the same if they use the same password 
content on them - one participant did not regard XLOCK as different to his network 
login - despite its use for a different purpose and its consequences for data logging and 
analysis. Given the advanced computing knowledge of the participant (final year 
Computer science PhD) this may be a problem for system administrators, and may be
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more acute of stakeholders who have less technical computing backgrounds. This will 
affect user reports data collection (diaries, interviews, questionnaires, focus groups, 
etc.) as well as logging in studies. This problem may be tackled by recording the 
context or purpose of password use, as well as its happening.
The problems with the password diaries were not limited to the diarists' behaviours.
The nature, design and media of the diary led to inefficient methods for construction - 
which is appropriate in small studies, but would not scale well. Each diary has to be 
individualised with its owner's passwords and printed pages processed to make a 
booklet by hand. Precious data can be lost if the diarists’ handwriting cannot be 
understood. Ideally the diary would configure itself to suit each diarist, do away with 
handwriting and when completed automatically or semi-automatically transfer the data 
to computer, with little intervention from researcher or participant.
These goals, and others mentioned throughout the discussion could be met if the diary 
was an electronic device (PDA, etc.). They are more expensive, weigh more and are 
more vulnerable than paper based diaries. However, the additional functionality and 
attractiveness of the PDA may even encourage individuals to participate.
6.5 Substantive summary & conclusions
Real world data has been collected that begins to answer Research Question A - What 
is the performance of password systems in actual use?
All participants in Study 1 used a password at least once per day, with a total of 361 
uses of passwords recorded. This is roughly equivalent to 2 uses per day, 6 uses per 
day, and 18 uses per day (for a 5 day week). Participants were categorised into 3 
groups according to their password usage:
• Low useage, 7 to 11 uses/week;
• Medium useage, 23 to 34 uses/week, and
• High useage, 91 to 94 uses/week
The range of uses of individual passwords was from 0 to 43 per week, or 0 to 6 per 
day. 11 errors in password use were recorded, giving an overall login error rate of 3%. 
Two thirds of the errors were typos. This suggests that most login problems are simple 
to recover from at UCL, and that login problems at UCL are rare in absolute terms.
Data was collected that puts parameters on the password system performance 
observed. This data will be useful in designing highly controlled laboratory stdies, and 
for making comparisons with performance of password systems in other real-world
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contexts (such as BT) - which may later help in the diagnosis of password system 
performance (Research Question C). The average number of passwords that 
participants reported owning was 10.5, the minimum 6 and maximum 14. Their 
average length was 7.2 characters, and 80 % contained numbers, 15% contained 
symbols. These participants chose relatively strong passwords.
Half of passwords owned had been chosen by the participant, the other half chosen by 
the mechanism for them. Participants reported that 18% of their passwords had 
enforced password expiry, and that their passwords were changed on average once 
per year.
6.6 Methodological summary & conclusions
Progress was made towards answering Research Question B - How can the 
performance of password systems be measured? Password diaries and system logs 
were shown to collect useful data. Their performance is summarised below, with 
recommendations for their improvement.
6.6.1 Password Diary
Overall there was a good correspondence between diary reports and system logs, with 
a small systematic bias. Diaries over-reported password use by an average of 1 use 
per person per day in the study, but there was some difficulty matching times recorded 
in diary to times recorded in wtmpx logs (see system log summary). However, the data 
did not show participants altering their behaviour to avoid making diary entries. Diaries 
therefore provisionally show good concurrent and face validity as a technique for 
password research.
Amendments to diaries were suggested to make them fitter for password research. A 
number of these came together in the recommendation for an electronic password 
diary, using a personal digital assistant or palm-top computer. This would allow studies 
to scale up more easily (through efficiencies gained in diary configuration, transfer of 
data, etc.), and to control for or measure retrospective diary entries (with a daily 
deadline and associated statistics for “missing value” imputation; or time/date stamp for 
entries).
In addition to the data already captured, it was proposed that future studies should 
capture error correction behaviours, the consequences of errors and error types, and if 
possible what the passwords are used for. It was also suggested that diary studies 
should be preceded by software and operating system audits with systems
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administrators to identify password mechanisms (as diarists may treat separate 
password systems as the same).
6.6.2 System Logs
There are challenges in using UNIX authentication system logs (such as wtmpx) for 
analysing password system performance. They record a successful password use as 
several terminals opening, not as a password being typed. Logs are therefore 
ambiguous and full of distractors and must be interpreted according to what is know 
about the habits of the user. It’s time consuming cleaning log data and so more difficult 
to be consistent in interpretations. There is therefore error proneness in processing 
logs by hand. Automated log analysis/log cleaning would be more reliable.
Moreover, 2 failed attempts are required before a record is made (in the study’s 
environment, 5 in standard UNIX configuration), and errors are not categorised into 
types. UNIX system logs therefore do not have enough content to accurately record 
password system performance, or be particularly useful in diagnosis. To make 
optimum use of system logs in password research it may therefore be necessary to 
implement new logging software.
In designing this logging software it should be noted that there is much variation in 
logging systems. Different systems record same events in different ways, logs are not 
stored centrally (though some may be configured to), and users can identify completely 
separate password system as being the same one. The researcher inadvertently 
missed out some password mechanisms from a system log study. It is important 
therefore to perform an audit, and involve system administrators at an early stage.
6.7 Contributions
6.7.1 Substantive
A start has been made on identifying the basic parameters of password system 
performance. Real world data has been collected that begins to illustrate:
• Number of passwords owned by users at a large acadmic organisation
• Frequency of their use, and
• Frequency of problems occurring
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6.7.2 Methodological
Diary based password research has been attempted for the first time. This will improve 
researchers’ appreciation of the diary’s strengths and weaknesses as a password 
research tool. Workarounds have been suggested for some of its shortcommings. The 
strengths and weaknesses of system logs for password research have also begun to 
be outlined, and improvements to logging systems and studies identified.
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7.1 Introduction
This chapter presents the first set of data collected from BT. The previous chapter 
began to address the measurement of basic parameters of real-world password 
systems' performance, by collecting empirical data from 6 UCL based users about 
their: number of passwords (mean=10.5, range=6-14 passwords), frequency of 
password use (between 2 and 18 uses a day), frequency of password problems (mean 
error rate of 3%), and password construction (mean password length = 7.2 characters; 
80% contained numbers, 15% contained symbols). However, it would not be feasible 
to repeat this in BT as the data collection was time consuming for participants, and 
moreover did not capture the consequences/recovery behaviours required to cope with 
the problems that were recorded.
To reach users in BT it was decided to use a questionnaire survey methodology 
instead: participants could give useful data at a time and place of their choice, and in a 
matter of ten minutes rather than the 40 minute interview and subsequent diary use 
employed in the previous chapter.
7.2 Methods
7.2.1 Study 2
152 questionnaires were distributed by hand in Study 2 to three buildings selected 
pseudo-randomly at BT's research park, asking respondents to give details about the 
last password that they were forced to have reset at a helpdesk, the circumstances 
surrounding it, and some details of their other passwords and approach to password 
management (see section 5.4.2 for more details and Appendix 4 for the questionnaire 
itself). Within each building, half the floors were selected for questionnaire distribution, 
and approximately every fourth occupied desk approached and the occupant asked if 
they would participate in the survey. These questionnaires will be referred to as the 
passwords-in-general survey.
7.2.2 Study 3
A version of the questionnaire was designed for Study 3 which was identical to the 
Study 2 questionnaire (see section 5.4.2) except that its first question had been 
removed as its answer was already known due to the distribution technique used: the 
last password reset for these respondents was for a voicemail system used widely 
within the organisation.
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This voicemail system's authentication mechanism had the following properties:
• It's passwords could contain only numbers
• They must also be exactly 6 digits (i.e. a 6 digit PIN),
• It's PINs expired after only a month,
• The last 12 versions of the PIN could not be reused.
Study 3 will therefore be called the 6-digit PIN survey. This PIN mechanism is a 
severe example of a password system - the security policies applied to it increase the
user's cognitive workload (see all policies in section 3.2.8; strong password content
policy is being applied here from a psychology of memory viewpoint because the user 
is forced to choose a number instead of a more memorable word; furthermore, 
constraints that are put on the number to prevent it being easy to guess are likely to 
make it more difficult to recall).
The questionnaire was attached to the fax-back form necessary to get the voicemail’s 
PIN reset. Study 3 respondents are therefore selected by having recently suffered a 
PIN problem (they had to request a voicemail PIN reset to receive the questionnaire).
7.2.3 Response classification
Responses were classified into 4 categories, relating to the cause of users last 
password reset (Table 20). The answers to two questions in the surveys were 
examined for each classification (see Appendix 4 for full questionnaire):
1. Please describe below why it needed to be reset?
2. What caused the password management system you described to break 
down for the BT work related password you last requested to have reset?
The author acted as sole judge. If both answers suggested the same classification, the 
questionnaire was given that category. If only one of the answers clearly suggested a 
classification but the other answer neither confirmed or contradicted it, the 
questionnaire was also given that category. However, if the two answers contradicted 
each other, or neither answer clearly suggested a classification the questionnaire was 
given a can't classify category.
Users reports were treated as truthful and accurate. Questionnaires were anonymous 
and used neutral language to reduce responses aimed at improving social desirability 
(Oppenheim, 2000). It was assumed respondents had insight into the cause of their 
reset.
126
C ha p te r 7 Studies 2 & 3: Survey Data
Table 20 -  Categories for causes of password resets
Category Definition Example response
Forgetting The respondent could not 
recall their password.
"Very low usage - forgot password"
n.b. the response indicates the password 
couldn't be retrieved from memory, but no other 
memory related phenomena are described.
Slips, Lapses, 
Mistakes
A slip, lapse or mistake 
related to password 
content was implicated in 
the problem (see section 
3.3.5),
"user error - 1 was using the password for a 
similar system which had a different password"
n.b. this response describes a slip or a mistake 
rather than an incident of forgetting.
Technical or 
Organisational
Causes were implicated, 
unconnected to a failure 
of human memory for the 
target password content.
"because it was in use on both an NT and 
Win95 machine concurrently. This gives some 
form of conflict and therefore lock out"
n.b. this indicates that technical incompatibilities 
between different parts of the authentication 
infrastructure caused a problem; no aspects of 
human memory are implicated
Can’t Classify Not enough information 
was available to classify 
the response into one of 
the other categories.
"not used for a long time"
n.b. this response could describe either 
forgetting or an incident of password expiry, 
which is a technical or organisational cause of 
password resetting. No other information was 
available to decide between these two 
categories.
7.2.4 Statistical tests
Chi squared tests were used for inferential statistics. Unless otherwise stated, the 
observed values were counts of problems in each group, rather than proportions of 
problems within each group. Values of Chi squared were calculated by manual 
construction of formulae in MS Excel 2002 to perform the calculations described by 
Rosenthal and Rosnow (1991). Significance values were calculated from these using 
Excel’s CHIDIST function.
7.3 Results
152 passwords in general questionnaires were distributed in Study 2. 96 
questionnaires were returned, giving a response rate of approximately 63%. The 
respondents were 13% higher management, 59% lower management and professional 
grades, and the remaining 28% technical and administrative staff.
137 responses were received for the 6 digit PIN questionnaire (Study 3)- the 
researcher has not been able to obtain information about the exact number of 
questionnaires distributed. However, approximately 60 PIN resets were requested per
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week (based on data from Jan and Feb 1999) and the questionnaire was being 
distributed for approximately 18 working weeks. A 12% response rate is therefore 
inferred. Respondents were 22% higher management, 32% lower management and 
professional grades, and the remaining 46% technical and administrative staff.
7.3.1 Number of passwords
Respondents’ numbers of passwords are displayed in Table 21. Study 3 respondents 
had fewer passwords on average than Study 2 respondents, with 11 passwords versus 
16. However, the range of passwords owned was higher in Study 3, even though this 
group was more tightly focused around the mean.
Table 21 - Number of systems owned that use passwords. *number of passwords
owned, not just six digit PINs.
Source Mean N Minimum Maximum Std. Deviation
Study 2 - passwords in general 16.2 86 3 52 9.7
Study 3 -6  digit PIN 11.3* 121 2 65 7.9
7.3.2 Types of problem
Respondents were asked to describe the causes of the problem that last required them 
to have a password reset. Table 22 shows summary statistics. Forgetting the PIN or 
password was the biggest source of error - accounting for almost half the total 
responses and 60% of those that could be classified. Problems that could not be 
attributed to memory accounted for 25% of all responses and 30% of responses that 
could be classified. 10% of responses that could be classified could be attributed to 
slips, lapses, and mistakes.
From this point on, results will be given separately for the Study 3's 6 digit PIN system, 
and for passwords in general from Study 2.
Table 22 - Overall sources of problems for questionnaire respondents
Error Number % of total responses % of responses that 
could be classified
Can't classify 40 17.2 -
Technical or organisational 59 25.3 30.6
Forgetting 114 48.9 59.1
Slips, lapses, & mistakes 20 8.6 10.4
Total 233 100.0 100.0
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Table 23 -  Technical and organisational problems, Study 3
Source Count Percentage
Expiry 13 41%
Unknown server problem 8 25%
Comms failure 1 3%
Expiry+strikeout 1 3%
Inherited equipment 7 22%
Covering for absence 1 3%
Striked out due to tampering 1 3%
Table 24 - Technical and organisational problems, Study 2
Source Count Percentage
Operating system conflicts 1 4%
Expiry 9 35%
Expiry+autologin scripts 3 12%
Autologin across incompatible NT domains 2 8%
Unknown server problem 2 8%
Server upgrade 2 8%
Software installation 1 4%
Caps lock 2 8%
New system 1 4%
SSO bug 1 4%
Login interrupted by Comms failure 1 4%
Inherited equipment 1 4%
7.3.3 Frequency of use
The questionnaires asked for the uses per month of the password for which 
respondents last required a reset. The passwords-in-general responses are 
summarised in Table 25, and displayed in Figure 15.
Table 25 - Summary statistics of frequency of use of passwords/month in Study
2
N Mean Median Mode Min Max St.dev. 33.3*
%ile
66.6*
%ile
85 30.3 4 30 .08 300 53.2 1 30
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Figure 15 - Frequency of use of passwords/month, Study 2
The responses divided naturally at the 33rd and 66th percentiles, making three groups, 
which were:
Light = <1 per month
Medium = 1 to 29 times/month
Heavy = 30 + times/month
Proportions were calculated of how many respondents belonged to each frequency of 
use group, for both questionnaires. The proportions for the 6 digit PIN users (Study 3) 
are shown in Figure 16, the proportions for users who responded about passwords-in- 
general (Study 2) are shown in Figure 17. The proportions are very different. Study 3 
respondents were in the majority heavy users of their PIN. However, Study 2 
respondents tended to be light users of the password they most recently had a problem 
with.
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medium
Figure 16 - Percentage of Study 3 responses about 6 digit PINs by frequency of
use. n=127
20%  -
10%  -
medium
Figure 17- Percentage of Study2 responses about passwords-in-general by
frequency of use. n=85
Frequency of use responses were combined with types of problem responses, to show 
which users of which systems suffered which kind of problems. Table 26 shows the 
data for 6 digit PINs (Study 3), and Table 27 shows the data for passwords-in-general 
(Study 2).
These data were refined further, creating a problem profile in Figure 18 for PINs (Study 
3), and Figure 19 for passwords-in-general (Study 3). Each profile shows three 
clusters, one cluster for each frequency of use: light, medium, and heavy. Each cluster 
contains three bars which add up to 100% of respondents in that category, with the 
bars representing how many respondents suffered problems of a particular kind.
131
0373^26785
Chapter 7 Studies 2 & 3: Survey Data
Table 26 - Study 3 sources of error, according to frequency of 6 digit PIN use
6-digit PIN, 
with use that is:
Technical or Forgetting 
Organisational
Slips, Lapses, 
Mistakes
Row total
Light
(<1 per month)
6% 12% 1% 19%
Medium
(1 to 29 times/month)
7% 26% 3% 36%
Heavy
(30 + times/month)
11% 26% 8% 45%
Column total 24% 64% 12% 100%
n=108 missing cases/unclassifiable =30 (22%)
Table 27 - Passwords-in-general sources of error according to frequency of
password use, from Study 2.
Passwords in general, 
with use that is:
Technical or Forgetting 
Organisational
Slips, Lapses, 
Mistakes
Row total
Light
(<1 per month)
5% 29% 0% 33%
Medium
(1 to 29 times/month)
11% 21% 6% 38%
Heavy
(30 + times/month)
18% 6% 5% 29%
Column total 33% 56% 11% 100%
n=66 missing cases/unclassifiable =24 (27%)
The two profiles appear to be quite different. 57% of respondents who were heavy 
users of a 6 digit PIN had forgotten it. However, only 20 % of users who responded 
about passwords-in-general which they used heavily had forgotten them. The 
proportions of forgetten 6 digit PINs and passwords-in-general were significantly 
different (Chi2= 7.2, df=1, p=0.0075).
There are other differences. Forgetting is an important problem for light users of both 6 
digit PINs and passwords in general. The proportions of each group reporting 
forgetting is 65% and 86%, though there is no statistical difference (Chi2= 2.6, df=1, 
p=0.10). There is a significant difference in the problem profiles of medium users of 6 
digit PINs and medium users of passwords-in-general (Chi2= 6.2, df=1, p=0.045).
Heavy users of passwords-in-general suffer proportionately about twice as many 
problems that are due to technical or organisational causes than do heavy users of 6 
digit PINs (Chi2= 9.0, df=1, p=0.003, significant). Finally, heavy users of passwords-in- 
general have highly significantly different problem profiles than light users of 
passwords-in-general (Chi2= 35.8, df=1, p<0.001).
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Figure 18 - Problem profile for 6 digit pins, by frequency of use, n=108
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Light Medium Heavy
Figure 19 - Problem profile for passwords in general, by frequency of use, Study
2, n=66
7.3.4 Append digit
Respondents were asked if they appended a digit to the password, as a strategy for 
coping with historical compartmentalisation of passwords. This is not an appropriate 
question for Study 3 users, since their password is wholly numeric. However, 
respondents to the passwords-in-general questionnaire (Study 3) had alphanumeric 
passwords, where this question makes sense, and their responses are shown in Figure 
20. Where respondents answered the question, and their answer could be clearly 
interpreted, the majority of respondents (56%) did append a digit to their password.
H Technical/ 
Organisational
B  Forgetting
■  Slips/ Lapses/ 
Mistakes
65%
72%
^Technical/
Organisational
EH Forgetting
■  Slips/ Lapses/ 
Mistakes
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70%
59%
60% -
50% -
40% -
% respondants
30% - 23%
18%20%  -
10% -
0%
Can't tell Do Don't
Figure 2 0 - %  of respondents (Study 3) appending a digit to their passwords,
n=95
7.3.5 C om partm enta lisation  o f passw ords
59% of respondents who answered the question (n=85) said that at least two of their 
current passwords were the same as this one. Table 28 shows that an average 17% (a 
bit more than 1 person in 6) of each respondents’ passwords were the same. 21% of 
respondents who answered the question (n= 219) said that their current password was 
the same as a previously used password.
Table 28 - Descriptive statistics for % of passwords respondents report as
having made the same
Source N Mean Min Max St.dev.
Study 3 group 16 12.8% 0 50% 18.0
Study 2 group 58 18.3% 0 100% 24.3
All samples 74 17.1% 0 100% 23.1
7.3.6 Passw ord  changing  and exp iry
Another frequently employed password policy is password expiry, where users are 
forced to change their passwords at set intervals. Respondents were asked whether 
their last serious password problem occurred just after changing a password or a 
password had expired. 29 of the 233 respondents suffered problems just after 
changing, 17 % (a bit more than 1 person in 6). For each of the three frequency-of-use 
groups, a ratio was calculated for the number of respondents who suffered their last 
serious password problem just after changing to the number of respondents who 
suffered their serious problem at some other time (Figure 21). There was a statistical 
trend that these ratios were different (Chi2= 5.5, df=2, p=0.06). Lightly used passwords
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had a 1 in 20 chance of suffering a problem just after being changed, heavily used 
passwords had 3 chances in 20, and with medium use passwords had a chance of 5 in 
20. The ratio for lightly used passwords was statistically different to the other 
frequencies of use combined (Chi2= 4.4, df=1, p=0.04). Passwords that had medium 
use also had a statistically different ratio to the other frequencies of use combined 
(Chi2= 3.8, df=1, p=0.05).
0.3 
0.25 
0.2 
0.15 
0.1 
0.05 
0
Light Medium Heavy
W Ratio Qust after)/ (other 
times)
Figure 21 - Ratio of problems that occured just after changing a password to 
problems occuring at other times, for light medium and heavily used passwords,
n-213
Table 29 appears to show that with increasing frequency of changing passwords 
comes increasing likelihood that there will be a problem just after the password has 
changed. However, it should be noted that the results for the first column come from a 
very small number of data points, and so cannot be relied upon statistically.
Table 29 - Relationship between frequency of password changing and 
occurrence of problems just after password changing (data from studies 2 and 3)
Frequency of password changing Every 3 months Every month
% of problems occurring just after changing 10% 14%
N 10 112
Table 30 shows how the proportion of different problems experienced by both groups 
combined can change with frequency of password changing. There is a statistical 
trend in the table (Chi2= 6.3, df=4, p=0.17). As the frequency of changing a password 
increases, the proportion of slips, lapses, and mistakes increases too. The proportion 
of technical/ organisational problems remains fairly level, and the amount of forgetting 
problems decreases. The trend does not reach statistical significance. However, the
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numbers of responses is very small, and approximately 800 responses would be 
required per frequency of changing group for an 80% chance of detecting effects of 
these hypothetical sizes (w= 0.05, 0.11 and 0.16) (cf. Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991).
Table 30 - Relationship between frequency of password changing and types of 
problems leading to password resets
Frequency of 
password changing
Technical or 
Organisational
Forgetting Slips, Lapses, 
Mistakes
N
Never 33% 67% 0% 18
Every three months 24% 67% 10% 21
Every month 29% 55% 16% 96
Finally, the percentages of users appending a digit to the end of the password was 
calculated for respondents who changed their password less often than once every 3 
months (low change frequency), and for those who changed them every three months 
or more frequently (high change frequency). 18% of the low change frequency group 
appended a digit to their password, while 64 % of the high change frequency group did 
so (n=22 for both groups, passwords-in-general questionnaire). This difference was 
highly significant (Chi2= 9.6, df=1, p=0.002).
7.3.7 Writing down passwords
BT's password policies mandated that passwords should not be written down. The 
questionnaires asked respondents if they wrote down passwords, and if so qualitatively 
how much they did so. Figure 22 shows the proportion of different problems suffered by 
respondents who claim not to write down any of their passwords versus respondents 
who claim to write down some or all of their passwords. The writing down of 
passwords is associated with a 9% drop (from 67 % to 58 %) in the proportion of 
forgetting problems compared to not writing down passwords. This drop is not 
significantly different (Chi2= 1.2, df=1, p=0.26). However, a hypothetical effect of this 
size (w=0.09) would have only a 15% chance of being detected with this number of 
respondents, and would require 800 respondents in each group to give it an 80% 
chance of being detected using Chi squared (cf. Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991).
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10% - 
0%  -
67%
■  Slips/ Lapses/ 
Mistakes
^Technical/
Organisational
H Forgetting
Write none All people who write
Figure 22 - Problem profiles for respondents who wrote down passwords, and 
those who did not (Studies 2 and 3 combined) (n-157, or 67% of responses)
These profiles were refined further, splitting the writing group into those who wrote 
down only some of their passwords, and those who wrote down all of their passwords 
(Figure 23). From this chart you can see that the proportion of slips, lapses, and 
mistakes remains almost constant. However, with increasing numbers of passwords 
written down, the numbers of passwords forgotten appears to drop (from 67% to 53%) 
and the number of technical/organisational problems appears to increase by about the 
same amount. These changes are not significantly different (Chi2= 2.1, df=2, p=0.35 
and Chi2= 3.3, df=2, p=0.19 respectively). However, hypothetical effects of these sizes 
(w=0.11 and 0.14 respectively) would have only a 15% chance of being detected with 
this number of respondents, and would require 800 respondents in each group to give 
them an 80% chance of being detected with Chi squared (cf. Rosenthal & Rosnow,
The charts appear to show that users who write down all their passwords tend to forget 
fewer of them than users who do not write them down. Statistical falsification of this 
will require 10 to 20 times the current sample size.
1991).
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67%
0  Technical/ 
Organisational
0  Forgetting
■  Slips/ Lapses/ 
Mistakes
Write none Write some Write all
I  /o
60%
20%  -
10%
Figure 23 - Problem profiles for respondents in 3 groups by propensity to write 
down passwords (Studies 2 and 3 combined), n=157 - 67% of responses
Figure 24 (below) shows the proportion of respondents in each writing category. The 
proportions do not add up to 100 percent, because some respondents did not answer 
the question. These responses show that a large proportion of respondents write down 
all their passwords.
Write none Write some Write all
Figure 24 - Proportion of respondents who write down passwords (Studies 2 and
3 combined), n=233
The analysis is now refined further, looking in turn at the responses from users about 
passwords-in-general in Study 2 (Figure 25), and those respondents using 6 digit PINs 
in Study 3 (Figure 27). Looking first at passwords in general, there was a trend for 
users who reported that they write down their passwords to have fewer incidences (a 
third less, 45% vs 68%) of forgetting problems (Chi2= 3.1, df=1, p<0.07), though the 
proportion of respondents forgetting passwords was still high.
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down
Figure 25 - Problem profiles for respondents in 3 groups according to how they 
write down passwords (for passwords in general), n=79 (57% of Study 2
responses)
Figure 26 shows that the numbers of respondents in each writing category was about 
the same, with about half of these respondents writing down at least some passwords.
Figure 26 - Proportion of respondents who write down passwords-in-general
(Study 2 data only), n=95
Figure 27 shows problem profiles versus writing down group for users who responded 
to the Study 3 questionnaire. A pattern similar to Figure 25 is shown, whereby writing 
down passwords is associated with a reduction in forgetting-74% of Study 3 users who 
claim not to write down any passwords had last experienced a forgetting problem, 
versus an average of 60% of Study 3 users who wrote down at least some of their 
passwords. This test suffered the sample size problem of previous figures - the test 
had a 15% chance of detecting a real effect with a hypothetical size indicated by the 
data (w=0.10) - 800 responses per group would be needed to have a test of the 
recommended power (cf. Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991), approximately 20 times the
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
46%
Write none Write 
some
Write all Sum of 
write down
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existing sample size. However, there was a strong trend for the relative proportion of 
Technical/ Organisational problems to increase from respondents who did not write 
down passwords to all respondents who wrote down passwords (Chi2= 3.4, df=1, 
p<0.06). This supports a hypothesis of reduced proportions of forgetting.
74%80% -
70%
50% -
40% -
20%  -
60%
m
Write Write Write Sum of 
down down down all writing
none some down
H Technical/ 
Organisational
9  Forgetting
■  Slips/ Lapses/ 
Mistakes
Figure 27 - Problem profiles for 6 digit PINs according writing down behaviour 
(Study 3 data only), n - 93 (66% of Study 3 responses)
Figure 28 shows the proportion of respondents in Study 3 who reported each kind of 
writing down, showing a similar pattern to Study 2. The proportion of respondents 
claiming to write down at least some of their passwords is about half (44%), with 
slightly less than this (35%) claiming not to write down any passwords at all. As before, 
about a quarter of respondents claimed they wrote down all of their passwords.
50% n 44%
40% 35%
30% 24%
19%
20%  -
10%
0%
Sum of 
writing down
Write down Write down Write down 
none some all
Figure 28 - Proportion of respondents who write down passwords-in-general (for
Study 2 data only), n=140
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7.3.8 Automaticity
Respondents were asked about the frequency of use, and the automaticity with which 
they are able to recall the password that they most recently asked to be reset. Figure 
29 displays this data from Study 2. The x-axis of the figure shows frequency of use, 
with high use on the left-hand side (180 per month) and low use on the right (1 per 
year). The average frequency of use over all was 31 uses per month. The passwords 
reported as being automatically recalled without effort are clustered towards the left of 
the figure, with a mode of about 30 uses per month (tallest light bar). The passwords 
reported as taking conscious effort to recall are clustered towards the right-hand side of 
the figure, with a mode of approximately 1 use per month (tallest dark bar). However, 
there is no clear dividing line between the two distributions, which overlap considerably. 
For example, there is a password used 60 times a month which must be recalled with 
conscious effort, and a password used every three months which can be recalled with 
no effort at all.
■  Conscious Effort 
□  Effortless
Figure 29 - Frequency of use of automatically and consciously recalled 
passwords in general, Study 2 data (n=85). Horizontal axis = password uses per 
month, vertical axis = no. of respondents.
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■  Conscious Effort 
□  Effortless
Figure 30 - Frequency of use of automatically and consciously recalled 6 digit 
PINs, Study 3 data (n-117). Horizontal axis = password uses per month, vertical
axis = no. of respondents.
Figure 30 shows a similar chart constructed from the Study 3 questionnaire data. The 
overall average frequency of 6 digit PIN use was 80 per month, nearly three times as 
high as the Study 2 responses about passwords in general. The mode of frequency of 
use for 6 digit PINs that are recalled with conscious effort is 90 uses per month (tallest 
dark bar in chart, 10 respondents). This is in stark contrast with passwords in general, 
where the mode is one use per month. The 6 digit PIN also has large numbers of 
respondents who use it 60 or 30 times a month, who must expend conscious effort to 
recall it. However, respondents reporting effortless/ automatic recall of the PIN did so 
at similar frequencies of use as had respondents about passwords-in-general (in Figure 
29). In both figures, the mode of frequency for effortless/ automatic recall is 30 uses 
per month (tallest light bar in Figure 29 & Figure 30).
7.3.9 Security policy context
Table 31 & Table 32 show that study 3 respondents reported that they had to change 
their 6 digit PINs (0.9 times/month) more frequently than study 2 respondents reported 
they had to change their passwords (0.4 times/month). This difference was significant 
(Fi,i84=133.11, p< 0001,R2=.42, observed power = 1).
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Table 31 - How many times passwords-in-general and PINs were changed per
month; Descriptive statistics
GROUP Mean no. of times 
changed per month
N. 95% Cl for Min 
Mean
Max Std 
Dev
6 digit PINs 0.93 109 (.89, .97) 0 1 0.21
Passwords in general 0.42 77 (.33..51) 0 2 0.39
Table 32 - One way ANOVA table for how many times passwords-in-general and
6 digit PINs were changed per month.
Source of Variation SS DF MS F Sig of F
WITHIN+RESIDUAL 16.33 184 .09
Password type 11.81 1 11.81 133.11 .000
(Model) 11.81 1 11.81 133.11 .000
(Total) 28.14 185 .15
The frequency of mandatory password changing increases with the strength of other 
security policies (see Table 2, section 3.2.7). The 6 digit PIN system in study 2 
therefore had harsher security policies associated with it than the general password 
mechanisms examined in study 3. During study 2 it emerged that the 6 digit PIN 
system had inflexible security configuration - it allowed either harsh policies (6 digit 
PIN, etc., see 7.2.2) or nothing.
7.4 Discussion
7.4.1 Many passwords
Users in BT have a lot of passwords. Two questionnaire surveys were conducted by 
the author. In the survey which had pseudo random distribution of questionnaires 
(Study 2), the average number of passwords was 16. Published figures are rare and 
reported with little statistical detail, but this appears to be more than previous studies - 
172 office workers surveyed at Liverpool street station had an average of 4 passwords 
(Wagner, 2004); 2,500 European IT administrators, executive management and 
security professionals reported an average of 4.3 passwords each. Other surveys 
present password ownership in bands - but these also suggest an average of lower 
than 16: 40% of users in the highest band were reported to have between 6 and 10 
passwords (Protocom, 2003); whereas only 23% of SafeNet’s 3,050 survey 
respondents had 8 passwords or more; 70% of 500 computer users surveyed at
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Victoria Station had less than 10 passwords (Wade, 2002); and only 20% of 
SearchSecurity.com poll respondents had 15 passwords or more (Hurley, 2003).
7.4.2 Problems not related to memory
A second striking feature of the surveys is that a large proportion of problems that 
result in a password needing to be reset have nothing to do with the user’s memory. 
They are predominantly caused by passwords expiring whilst the user is away (Table 
23, Table 24), automated login systems triggering password policies such as three 
strikes, server problems, inheriting equipment without the password to access it, and a 
number of other less frequent problems. In some cases, the user could have taken 
action that would have prevented the problem from occurring-such as changing their 
password before they went away on business or on holiday so that it would not expire 
while they were away. However, this is more an issue of policy, organisation, or 
technology than of human memory. Such issues account for approximately 30 percent 
of password problems. Previous published discussions of password problems imply 
that they are the users' fault (Bunnell et al., 1997; Pond et al., 2000; Yan et al., 2000; 
Zviran & Haga, 1990,1993), but this is not true. These figures agree substantially with 
an internal survey at BT which this author has since gained access to: 14% of 
password resets are caused by access control problems, 5% security management 
problems, 4% systems/integrity of data problems (MacKay, 1999) - 23% overall due to 
technical or organisational issues.
7.4.3 Password resets due to forgetting
While users are not the single point of failure for password mechanisms, they do 
account for the vast majority of instances where a password must be reset. 
Approximately 70% of password problems recorded in our surveys were reported to 
have resulted immediately from a failure of the users' memory. In this respect, 
conventional wisdom is accurate-users do forget a lot of passwords. However, users 
do not exist in a vacuum. They exist as part of a security architecture which allocates 
them certain functions and workloads, not all of which may be compatible; a particular 
stance has been taken by the organisation in risk management, balancing some rules 
against others. If an organisation finds the high rate of password forgetting to be 
unacceptable, then it might consider redesigning its security architecture and the trade­
offs it made in risk management.
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7.4.4 Password expiry has security costs
A good example of this is the policy of password expiry-where users are forced to 
change their passwords at regular intervals. This has a security benefit that attackers 
who have unauthorised access to a password are locked out of the system after a 
while, unless they have installed malware/backdoors. However, this benefit must be 
weighed against certain security demerits: weaker passwords selected, higher 
helpdesk use, and greater disclosure of passwords. These will be discussed below.
The appending of a digit to a password is a sign of users attempting to circumvent 
historical compartmentalisation of passwords, which are associated with strong 
password contents policies. For example, while the word "password" would not pass a 
strong password policy, the addition of a number to its end could transform it into 
something that does -it goes from being a dictionary word (weak) to a mixture of letters 
and numbers (stronger). 18% of our respondents who changed their passwords 
infrequently appended digit, versus 64 % who changed their passwords frequently.
This is a statistically clear and negative relation between changing passwords and 
password content. Therefore, the enforcing of password expiry makes password 
content weaker.
There appears to be a particular risk for users associated with password changing-17% 
(1 in 6) of our respondents’ problems occurred just after they had changed their 
password (see section 7.3.6), and it seems that the more frequent the changes, the 
greater the number of problems (Table 29). The percentages in Table 29 suggest that 
password expiry is causing the majority of these problems. If password problems were 
randomly distributed, then only 2% of respondents (with a three monthly change) would
expect to have a problem on the same day they changed a password ^ , instead of the 
actual figure which is 10%. For passwords changed every month, the expected figure 
would be 5%, and the observed figure is 14% (1 in 7). This supports users reports that 
22 of their 233 resets (9%) were due to password expiry when they were away (section
7.3.2).
There is a trend for the types of problems experienced by users to be different when 
password expiry is in force: instead of merely forgetting their passwords, they confuse 
them more often (Table 30). This increases the risk of unintentional password 
disclosure.
1 the random chance of having a problem on the day you change a password is: 1 chance in (5 
working days per week x 4 weeks per month x 3 months), or 1 in 60, or 1.7%
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7.4.5 Writing down is common and helpful, and so 
should be supported
Another striking feature of our results is how widespread is the writing down of 
passwords - approximately 45 percent of our respondents admitted to it. It seems odd 
that so many users would make the effort to do this unless there were real benefits in 
doing so. Our results seem to point to the expected benefit - a trend for the reduction 
in the numbers of passwords forgotten. For example, the numbers of respondents 
whose last serious password problem was forgetting: 68 % vs 45 % of our passwords- 
in-general respondents claiming not to write down any passwords vs writing down all of 
them (Figure 25). This is reducing the rate of forgetting by a third. Anything that is so 
common and so useful would seem appropriate to support, taken under the umbrella of 
the organisation and made safer. However, it should be noted that writing down 
passwords is not a panacea. It would still leave 45% of problems being due to 
forgetting. How could this be? It is the author's hypothesis that it is due to a 
combination of intermittent writing down and lack of the record’s availability at the time 
it is needed. Writing down is effortful, and so it is unlikely that users will be scrupulous 
with it. Particularly when the immediate cost of not making the record is so low. 
Record-keeping is also less likely unless it is properly supported with the materials 
and/or apparatus necessary to complete it. If the writing down is ad hoc, then it may be 
difficult to gain access to the record when it is needed. Moreover, it may be needed 
when the user is away from their normal place of work-unless there is organisational 
support to help this user to get to their password record, then they will not be able to do 
so.
7.4.6 Frequency of use protects against forgetting
We have seen that writing down passwords is associated with reduced forgetting. The 
evidence shows what is expected, that frequent use of a password is also associated 
with reduced forgetting. Figure 19 showed that forgetting accounted for 86% of 
problems in lightly used passwords, but only 21% of problems in heavily used 
passwords. This result was highly statistically significant. These findings are consistent 
with a hypothesis that increased password frequency of use and writing down protect 
against forgetting, and that frequency of use is a far greater protection against 
forgetting than writing down.
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7.4.7 Security policies destroy protection given by 
frequency of use
However, the results also suggest that high frequency of use can only go so far. The 
effect is moderated by the burden of security policies placed upon it. This is evident 
when data from Study 3 is examined. This 6 digit PIN system has the lion’s share of 
security policies-extremely restricted password content (a minimum of six characters, 
and numbers only, i.e. close to meaningless), monthly password expiry, and a 12 
password history. Even when this is heavily used- more than once a day-57% of its 
problems are forgetting (Figure 18). This is more than 2 1/2 times the rate of less 
restricted password systems (Figure 19), and highly statistically significant. In fact, 
Figure 30 shows how difficult it is to remember passwords of this type-respondents had 
to expend conscious effort to remember them even when they were used three times a 
day (90 uses per month). More average passwords had become so effortless 
respondents classed their recall as automatic at a third of this frequency of use (Figure 
29).
7.5 Summary & Conclusions
The average number of passwords owned by respondents was 16, which is 
substantially more than other published figures. This could be because:
1. BT users have a larger password burden than users in other organisations, or
2. More passwords were being reported due to differences in methodology (such 
as question phrasing).
3. Both the above.
These hypotheses should be explored - the hypothesis 1 is theoretically relevant to 
Research Question C (what are the causes of good or bad password system 
performance?), but the size of its effect has not yet been studied; and hypothesis 2 is 
an important component of Research Question B (how can the performance of 
password systems be measured?) that has also not been investigated.
Further data was presented towards answering Research Question C. About 70% of 
password problems were related to human memory. A high level of memory related 
problems is expected from the literature of human error (see section 3.3.5).
However, this leaves approximately 30% of problems reported by users as resulting in 
a password reset as being due to technical or organisational problems and so not to do 
with failure of the user’s memory. This is a surprising result in the literature of
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password system performance. Password expiry whilst the user was away was the 
most frequent category (approx. 45%) of technical or organisational problems reported, 
and a large proportion (approx. 14%) of ail problems reported. Evidence was also 
presented that password expiry policies lead to weak passwords, increase the numbers 
of problems requiring helpdesk support.
Progress was made toward answering Research Question D - What interventions can 
be made to improve the performance of password systems? Data suggested that 
using a password frequently appears to protect against forgetting it. This is consistent 
with the literature of human memory. The protective effect of frequent use of 
passwords is moderated by the severity of password policies. Severely restricted 
passwords can require little effort to recall if used three times a day, but are not as 
memorable if used once a day. However, even when used 3 times a day, passwords 
created under severely restrictive policies were still forgotten by some of the users 
surveyed.
The writing down of passwords is widespread (admitted to by approx. 45% of 
respondents) and appears to prevent memory problems leading to password resets. It 
was concluded that it should be better supported so it can be appropriately defended.
7.6 Contributions
7.6.1 Substantive
The impact of security policies (in particular password expiry) on password system 
performance has been empirically demonstrated. The data from this chapter has 
allowed the beginnings of a diagnosis of password problems. Data has therefore been 
presented that can be used as a basis for more rational and informed risk management 
in authentication.
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8.1 Introduction
This chapter returns to system logs as a source of data for password research, bringing 
together three studies that use them more successfully than was possible in Study 1. 
Studies 4 and 5 build upon the methodological conclusions of Study 1 (see section
6.6.2), implementing and employing an improved password use logging mechanism on 
a computer system at UCL. Study 6 opportunistically uses a large data set made 
available by BT's central password helpdesk.
The work done by password systems is letting through authorised users (and denying 
access to unauthorised users). When an authorised user needs access to a computer 
for part of her job but is denied it by a password system, a login failure has occurred, a 
breach of availability has happened and the password system is performing less than 
perfectly. Studies 4 and 5 examine logs of login success and failures - direct measures 
of password system performance. After repeated attempts the user may have logged 
in successfully, or may be experiencing problems that leave her unable to go further. 
Study 6 examines logs of helpdesk use that occur when users are unable to progress 
beyond login failures, and so are prevented from doing their job.
The goals, datasets, and analyses performed in each study are summarised in Table 
33. Studies 5 and 6 contributed data from one specific password system at UCL and 
three at BT towards answering our Research Question A (what is the performance of 
password systems in actual use?), in a way which allows comparisons between 
different systems. Previously Study 1 had presented password system performance 
data that had focused on the user rather than systems, and so did not allow such 
comparisons.
Studies 4, 5 and 6 contribute data towards answering Research Question C (what are 
the causes of good or bad performance?). This data allows hypotheses about the 
causes of password system performance to be tested that could not have been in 
previous chapters. Two of these hypotheses are implicit in the literature of password 
memorability (the long Interval and character set size hypotheses). One hypothesis 
was supplied by BT (the repeat offender hypothesis), and the remaining (frequent 
changing) hypothesis was a result of research in Chapter 7 (see section7.4.4).
Study 5 starts to investigate one answer to Research Question D (what interventions 
can be made to improve the performance of password systems?). Altering the number 
of strikes allowed is explored as an intervention in thought experiments based upon 
data collected during the study.
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Table 33 -  Summary of purpose and data of Studies 4,5 and 6
Study Goal Data Participants Analyses performed
Estimate password system Password
performance in UCL with mechanism
enhanced instruments. system logs
Continue to diagnose 
performance.
33 UCL 1. Types &
students frequencies of
password errors
2. Validity of long 
interval 
hypothesis
3. Validity of 
frequent changing 
hypothesis
Expanded data collection for Password 386 UCL
Study 4 with better precision mechanism students
through greatly increased system logs
numbers of observations.
Estimate the basic parameters 
of password system 
performance, continue to 
diagnose performance.
Explore a possible 
intervention.
Observe password system Helpdesk 47,145 BT
performance for a BT sample system logs users
using objective measures.
Measure & diagnose 
performance.
4. Frequencies of 
errors
5. Password content
6. Validity of 
character set size 
hypothesis
7. Number of strikes 
observed
8. Validity of repeat 
offender 
hypothesis
9. Identification of 
problem 
password 
systems
8.2 Methods
Data were collected from two sources: the Teaching And Coursework Online (TACO) 
system at UCL Computer Science (a web-based coursework system), and the logging 
system of a large central password helpdesk at BT called Newpass. Studies 4 & 5 
were conducted using the TACO system (see section 5.4.4). Study 6 used the 
Newpass system (see section 5.4.6).
8.2.1 Study 4 (UCL coursework system logs I)
Participants
Thirty-four 1st year undergraduate students (Information Management majors taking a 
1 term course in 1999 in Systems Analysis at UCL's Computer Science Department) 
participated in the trial. 33 students logged in frequently enough to be included in the 
study.
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Context of Experiment
As part of their Systems Analysis course, the students had to complete 6 courseworks 
on-line over a period of 10 weeks; the coursework was authored and managed through 
the TACO system (Sasse, Harris, Ismail, & Monthienvichienchai, 1998). To interact 
with TACO, students used computer terminals at University or from home.
The system is designed to give scores and feedback, so frequent practice tends to 
result in better grades. Students could practice on the question sets as often as they 
liked before submitting an assessed version. Users of TACO are required to go 
through authentication before being allowed to interact with courseworks. 
Authentication usually consists of entering a username and system-generated 
password (both of which had been previously supplied to the user through a secure 
channel). In addition TACO was fitted with both a facility for participants to select their 
own passwords, and a facility to select and use Passfaces™. Passfaces™ is an 
alternative authentication mechanism, which uses recognition rather than recall.
Participants in Study 4 used both passwords and Passfaces™, swapping halfway 
through the ten-week period. Study 4’s password results are presented in this chapter, 
and its Passfaces™ results are discussed elsewhere (e.g. Brostoff & Sasse, 2000).
Apparatus
The password mechanism of TACO is executed at the server side, and appears 
instantaneous to users. User IDs and an enrolment password are distributed through a 
secure channel, such as being handed out on slips of paper in the first lecture. The 
enrolment password consists of 6 randomly selected lowercase letters, appended with 
two random digits.
The password enrolment procedure gives guidance about the selection of strong 
password content, and requires users to submit a password of their choosing twice, 
and their enrolment password. TACO does not enforce any constraints on users’ self­
generated passwords. If the enrolment password is correct, and both submissions of 
the chosen password match, then enrolment is complete.
TACO was further changed to offer participants reminders of their passwords. On their 
request, participants were emailed a copy of their password, or sent the address of a 
web page where they could view their Passfaces™.
TACO log files were enhanced so that the failure or success of login attempts could be 
determined, all requests for reminders were recorded, and all log entries were 
timestamped. TACO stores users’ passwords in plain text. The enhanced logging 
system took advantage of this to display the correct password next to what was typed
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in by a user during a failed login attempt, so that the two could be easily compared and 
the nature of the failure inferred. The logs did not introduce greater vulnerabilities to 
the TACO system, as logs were stored in the same database that stores users’ 
passwords.
TACO log files were cleaned and analysed in MS Excel 2000 and 2002, and also 
analysed with SPSS 10.
Procedure
Participants used the web-based coursework system as normal to complete course­
works. A repeated-measures design was used, with each student using both 
passwords and Passfaces™. Halfway through the term the authentication 
mechanisms used by students were changed over (those using passwords were now 
using Passfaces™ and vice versa). The participants were pseudo-randomly assigned 
to Group 1 (starting with passwords, then using Passfaces™) or Group 2 (starting with 
Passfaces™, then using passwords). This maximised power for the test of difference 
between passwords and Passfaces™.
Participants were required to re-enrol after the changeover, and new enrolment 
passwords were distributed by email to all participants and on paper slip by request. 
The academic term ended for Christmas, and participants were asked to log in during 
their first week back - approximately 1 month after last using the system.
8.2.2 Study 5 (UCL coursework system logs II)
Participants
386 undergraduates students participated over one academic term each (10 weeks), 
though the data were collected from students over the course of several years. The 
students were enrolled on one of the courses B160, 2B14, C363 given at UCL CS, and 
who used the system between the dates of 20th Oct 1999 and 18th Nov 2002. Study 5 
includes the data from Study 4. No participants could be in more than one class at a 
time, although they may have moved from one course to another course in subsequent 
years. Individuals are given separate accounts for each course.
Context of Experiment
Though focusing exclusively on passwords, Study 5 expanded on Study 4 by capturing 
data for several years from several other courses. Students in Study 5 used 
passwords exclusively, whilst students in Study 4 also used Passfaces™ and were
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forced to change authentication mechanisms halfway through the term. In all other 
respects, participants use of the TACO system was the same.
Apparatus
The same apparatus was used as in Study 4.
Procedure
Participants were given enrolment passwords (on paper slips or via email) at the start 
of term, to authenticate them for their subsequent selection of passwords. Participants 
used TACO as normal to complete course-works over the course of the term, and their 
use of TACO passwords was logged.
8.2.3 Study 6 (BT helpdesk logs)
Apparatus
Data were collected using BT's Password Control helpdesk's normal in-house logging 
system (Newpass) as part of everyday business. The data was analysed in MS 
Access 2000 and SPSS 10.
Participants
Password Control covers 650 of the organisation’s several thousand computer 
systems. At the time of data collection, 120,000 of the organisation’s 150,000 
employees (80 percent) were registered for services with Password Control. Password 
Control’s callers are therefore representative of users in the organisation. It should be 
noted however that most of BTs password mechanisms are not served by Password 
Control.
Users contributed data if they called Password Control for help during six months (May, 
June, July, August, October, and November) in the year 1999. During this time, 47,145 
people called the helpdesk, requiring 138,687 password resets.
Procedure
Callers to Password Control have information about them logged such as their name, 
workgroup code, time and date of the call, and the systems that required a password 
reset, among other things.
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8.3 Results
8.3.1 S tudy 4  R esults
Error types
By comparing the failed attempt with the participant’s correct password, problem types 
could be inferred. Table 34 shows the relative frequencies of password problems 
encountered during Study 4. The most frequent problem was entering an expired 
TACO password in place of the current one. The next most frequent problem was 
substituting a password-like sequence for the correct password - the sequences were 
classed as passwords because they did not have the appearance of random key­
presses - though these classifications were not verified with participants.
Table 34 - Password problems encountered by participants in Study 4
Problem type Proportion Description of problem
Use Expired 
Pwd
37% Using the old TACO password instead of the currently valid 
one.
Substitution 15% Using some password like sequence of characters instead 
of the currently valid password.
Enter 9% Pressing Enter instead of typing a password - no password 
was entered in the login attempt
Omission 6% Omitting a necessary character from an otherwise correct 
password
Addition 5% Having an unnecessary extra character in an otherwise 
correct password
Partial Recall 5% Recalling part of a password, but not the rest of it
Distribution 4% A problem occurred during the initial distribution of the 
account details
System Error 3% A malfunction in the password mechanism
Replacement 2% Having incorrect characters in an otherwise correct 
password
Blend 1% Mixing parts of passwords together
Capitalisation 1% Using the wrong capitalisation in all or part of a password
Userid 1% Entering the username instead of the password
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Long interval hypothesis
The long interval hypothesis is that people forget passwords because they have not 
used them for long periods. It is an implicit explanation for the usability problems of 
passwords in password memorability research, and is consistent with the literature of 
human memory (see section 3.3.2). It has been demonstrated in laboratories using 
highly artificial experimental tasks (Zviran and Haga, 1990; Zviran and Haga, 1993; 
Bunnell et al., 1997). This is the first time that it has been observed using system logs 
in a population of real users during their normal work.
Some of the data from Study 4 was used to assess our preliminary finding from Section 
7.4.3 that infrequently used passwords are forgotten. The descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 35.
Table 35 - Descriptive statistics for login success and interval since last
successful login
Group N Mean interval since 95% C.l. Std. Dev.
last use, in minutes for mean
Successful logins 1349 1341 (22 hours) 1152 to 1530 3538
Failed logins 103 2631 (44 hours) 1745 to 3517 4534
The interval between a failed login and the last successful login was approximately 
twice as long as the average interval between successful logins - long intervals 
between uses of a password lead to problems. This effect was highly significant 
(Fi,1448=14.74, p<.001, observed power = .969) though relatively small (eta2 =.01), and 
supported the hypothesis and previous observations.
Frequent changing hypothesis
Many users in large organisations are forced to change their passwords regularly. 
There appeared to be a trend in our questionnaire data (Sections 7.3.6 and 7.4.4) for 
users to experience problems with their passwords, just after they had changed them.
An attempt was made to validate the effect of password changing using system log 
data from Study 4. The elapsed time since the password had last been changed was 
calculated for each successful and failed login. Descriptive statistics are shown in 
Table 36.
Problem logins occurred on average at less than half the elapsed time since the 
password had last been changed compared to successful logins. This result was
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highly significant (Fi i1174= 43.75, p < .001, eta2 = .036, observed power = 1.0). Our 
hypothesis and observation that changing or resetting of passwords can cause 
password problems was supported. This is evidence that password expiry causes 
people to have problems with their passwords.
Table 36 - Descriptive statistics - login success and elapsed time since password
was changed
Group N Mean time since 
pwd was changed, 
in minutes
95% C.l. 
for mean
Std.Dev.
Successful logins 1018 15123 (10 days) 14321 to 15925 13037
Failed logins 160 6022 (4 days) 4455 to 7590 10039
8.3.2 Study 5 Results
Error frequencies
Study 5’s experimental apparatus captured successful and failed login attempts, and 
their descriptive statistics are shown in Table 37. Out of 386 participants, 87 (23%) 
required password reminders over the period measured, which was effectively 10 
weeks. The average failure rate for passwords in Study 5 was one login failing per 10 
attempts (10%). Approximately 7% of these failed login's were converted into requests 
for password reminders. Therefore approximately 0.7% of Study 5 login attempts 
resulted in a password reminder request (an approximation to a helpdesk call).
Table 37 - Descriptive statistics of login success and failure in Study 5
No. Successful No. of Login failure No. of Reminders 
logins failed logins rate requested
Total 12044 1261 N/A 87
Average 31 3.3 0.1 0.2
Min 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Max 339 71 1.0 9.0
St.dev 32 7.6 0.2 0.9
No. of participants 386 386 - 386
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Password content
Although the apparatus in Study 5 requires the use of a password, it does not enforce 
any other password policies. Users can therefore elect to use their enrolment 
password as their active password on the system. However, 229 of the participants in 
Study 5 chose a password that was different than their enrolment password - 59% of 
the 386 participants.
The passwords selected by participants were analysed using Petrie’s (2002) taxonomy 
(see section 4.1.2). The proportions in the different categories are shown in Table 38. 
90% of passwords were strong (Cryptic in Petrie’s taxonomy). Examining only 
participants who chose not to use their enrolment password (Table 39), 84% of their 
password choices were also strong. The proportions in each category were 
significantly different from Petrie’s (2002) (Chi2= 656, df=3, p<0.001).
Table 38 - Content of TACO passwords (including seif generated and system 
generated passwords that users had chosen to keep)
Strength Weak Strong
Type Family Fan Fantasist Cryptic Total
Number 16 14 6 350 386
% 4% 4% 2% 90% 100%
Table 39 - Content of self generated TACO passwords
Strength Weak Strong
Type Family Fan Fantasist Cryptic Total
Number 16 14 6 193 229
% 7% 6% 3% 84% 100%
Table 40 - Descriptive statistics about self generated TACO password length
Measure Value
Average Length 7.8 characters
Min. Length 4 characters
Max. Length 13 characters
St.dev. of Lengths 1.5 characters
N 229
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Table 40 shows some descriptive statistics about the length of self-selected TACO 
passwords. TACO passwords were on average quite long, at nearly eight characters. 
Table 41 shows the distribution of self generated password lengths
Table 41 *> Distribution of password lengths, for self generated TACO passwords
only
Password length 
(characters) 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Total
Number of 
participants 2 5 39 33 106 18 12 7 6 1 229
% 0.7 1.8 13.9 11.8 37.9 6.4 4.3 2.5 2.1 0.4 100
Character set size hypothesis
One of the fundamental hypotheses about password usability is that more complex 
passwords are less usable. Password usability is commonly operationalised as 
memorability (see section 4.1.2). Here usability is being operationalised as login error 
rates - an index of breakdowns in memorability (though are also other reasons for login 
errors - see section 8.3.1). The passwords chosen in Study 5 were analysed to see 
how many character sets they contained of:
• Uppercase letters
• Lower case letters
• Digits
• Symbols
Descriptive statistics for the login failure rates were calculated for each group (Table 
42). The mean error rates for passwords with between 1 and 3 character sets were 
approximately the same, with the error rates for passwords with four character sets 
being nearly double the error rates for passwords with one or two character sets.
Table 42 -Descriptive statistics about the number of character sets in Study 5 
passwords, and their respective error rates
No. of charsets Average of error rates Std. Deviation Number %_ _  _  __ _ _
2 0.09 .16 277 72%
3 0.11 .21 26 7%
4 0.17 .21 15 4%
This data was entered into a one-way independent groups ANOVA, with four 
conditions-one for each number of character sets (Table 43). No significant difference
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was found (F3j383=1.2, p= 3 not sig., eta2= 009, power = .326). Power analysis showed 
that this test would only have stood a one in three chance of detecting an real effect of 
this hypothesised size.
Given the tow power of the omnibus test, it was decided to use a more focused test, 
adding together the data from passwords with between 1 and 3 character sets, to 
compare these against the error rates from passwords with four character sets. The 
data was entered into a one-way ANOVA, the results of which are shown in Table 43. 
No significant difference was found, although there appeared to be a trend (F1>385=3.27, 
p=.07 not sig, eta2=008, power= .438).
Table 43 - ANOVA table testing for the effect of number of character sets on login
failure rates in Study 5
Source Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta2 Observed
Power
Character sets 0.1 3 0.03 1.2 .303 .009 .326
Error 10.3 383 0.03
Total 14.1 387
Table 44 - ANOVA table for number of character sets per Study 5 password and 
associated error rates, comparing passwords with between 1 and 3 character 
sets to passwords with 4 character sets.
Source Sum of 
Squares
df Mean
Square
F Sig. Eta2 Observed
Power
Character Sets 
(1,2,3 vs. 4)
Hypothesis
Error
0.08
10.31
1
385
0.08
0.03
3.27 .07 .008 .438
How many strikes?
One of the more favoured methods of configuring password mechanisms is the three 
strikes policy (see section 3.2.8), which usually locks a users’ account after three failed 
attempts at togging in. This section investigates the potential impact of setting the 
number of strikes to 3, rather than another number. Figure 31 shows the distribution 
numbers of login failures-with the light bars representing the participants who required 
password reminders, and the dark bars representing the participants who did not. Bars 
are total numbers of login failures for each participant over the whole study - not 
failures per session. Figure 31 shows that participants who required password 
reminders suffered proportionately greater numbers of failed login attempts.
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Figure 31 - Distribution of numbers of login failures, for users who did not 
require password reminders, and users who did. Study 5.
Table 45 shows descriptive statistics about the relative numbers of failed login attempts 
for the two groups. Participants who required password reminders experienced on 
average three times as many failed login attempts as participants who did not. Table 
46 shows that this difference is highly significant (F 1i234=28.7, p<.001, eta2 = .109 , 
power = 1).
Table 45 - Descriptive statistics of failed login attempts, for people who did and 
did not require password reminders in Study 5
Group Mean failed login 
attempts Median Min. Max.
Std.
Dev.
No. of 
people
Failed logins but no need 
for reminders 4.1 2 1 57 6.5 202
Failed logins and needed 
reminders 12.7 6 1 71 16.3 34
Total 5.4 3 1 71 9.1 236
Participants who required password reminders experienced an average of 6.9 failed 
login attempts per reminder request, with a standard deviation of 7.5, and an average 
number of 2 reminders.
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Table 46 - ANOVA table testing for a difference in numbers of failed logins 
between participants who did and did not require password reminders in Study5.
f Source
Type III Sum 
of Squares df
Mean
Square F Sig. Eta2
Observed
Power
Failed login Hypothesis 2118.9 1 2118.9 28.7 .000 .109 1.000
group
Error 17292.3 234 73.9
Figure 32 shows cumulative data about the total number of failed login attempts of 
each participant in Study 5. The orange line shows participant data. The smooth line 
is a line of best fit, with its equation beside it. Reading the graph will be illustrated with 
three data points. Users who had a total of up to three failed logins over the course of 
the study made up about 33% of participants. About 65% of participants had 10 failed 
logins or less, and 90% of participants had 30 login failures or less during the study. If 
you assume that users had all their failed logins in one session then you can start to 
reason about how many strikes would impede the login attempts of how many users. 
The figure is attempting to answer the question, "How many strikes do users want 
before giving up and asking for a reminder?". Under this assumption, the graph shows 
that approximately 90 % of Study 5’s participants would give up trying to login before 
triggering a 30 strikes policy. Approximately 80 percent would give up before hitting a 
20 strikes policy, about 65 percent before a ten strikes policy, and about a third would 
give up before hitting a three strikes policy.
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Figure 32 - Graph of the number of strikes allowed, and the proportion of 
participants accommodated, data from Study 5
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8.3.3 Study 6 Results
Repeat offender hypothesis
BT’s repeat offender hypothesis is that the password related load on helpdesk's is due 
to a small minority of people who do not take due care with their passwords, and who 
consequently must contact the helpdesk repeatedly. This hypothesis has large 
implications for both measuring password system performance and diagnosing it: it 
suggests that password system performance is acceptable, and that any problems 
observed are due to misuse of password mechanisms by a small minority. The 
hypothesis is already followed up by BT, who identify and refer repeat offenders to their 
line managers, who may initiate disciplinary procedures. Password Control’s definition 
of repeat offender is someone who has 6 passwords or more reset a month
The data presented in this section comes from Study 6 - from a central password 
helpdesk at BT, which has approximately 80 percent of BT's workforce on its books. 
The data shows that 90,000 different people a year use this helpdesk. This is 
approximately 60% of BT, and 75% of those registered with the helpdesk. This 
suggests that the majority of people who use information technology experience 
difficulty with passwords, and is evidence that the hypothesis is wrong.
Repeat offenders (using Password Controfs definition) account for only 8.3% of 
password resets (Table 47). Approximately 30% of passwords reset by repeat 
offenders are associated with Self Administered User IDs (Prince, 1999) - i.e. user-ids 
that are recycled for employees in departments with high staff turnover - for example 
call centres. The user-ids for all the tempory or new staff (i.e. that are likely to leave 
soon after joining) in a department are registered with a permanent member of staff 
who is required to reset these passwords each time somebody leaves and is replaced. 
In these cases correctly following organisational procedures leads to the resets, so 
these users behaviour cannot be described as offending. Discounting these resets 
leaves about 5.8% of password resets being due to repeat offenders. This small 
percentage refutes the repeat offender hypothesis, as defined by BT.
What if the hypothesis is correct, but BT’s definition of repeat offender is set too high? 
Slightly over half of resets observed were due to people who used the helpdesk 4 times 
or less in 6 months (see line 4 in Table 47) - about a third of the people registered with 
the helpdesk. The majority of password resets are therefore due to people who have 
2/3 or less of a password reset a month on average. This evidence refutes the repeat 
offender hypothesis in its wider definition.
163
' Studies 4, 5 & 6: System logs revisited
Table 47  -  Summary data for 6 months of Newpass logs. * approximate values
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1 19695 16.41% 19695 16.41% 19695 19695 85.8%
2 10585 8.82% 30280 25.23% 21170 40865 70.5%
3 6970 5.81% 37250 31.04% 20910 61775 55.5%
4 3474 2.90% 40724 33.94% 13896 75671 45.4%
5 2047 1.71% 42771 35.64% 10235 85906 38.1%
1 6 1490 1.24% 44261 36.88% 8940 94846 31.6%
7 806 0.67% 45067 37.56% 5642 100488 27.5%
8 538 0.45% 45605 38.00% 4304 104792 24.4%
9 418 0.35% 46023 38.35% 3762 108554 21.7%
10 267 0.22% 46290 38.58% 2670 111224 19.8%
11 185 0.15% 46475 38.73% 2035 113259 18.3%
2 12 149 0.12% 46624 38.85% 1788 115047 17.1%
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~
3 18 47 0.04% 47018 39.18% 846 120939 12.8%
4 24 19 0.02% 47146 39.29% 456 123641 10.8%
5 30 10 0.01% 47214 39.35% 300 125490 9.5%
6 36 4 0.00% 47267 39.39% 144 127244 8.3%
7 42 7 0.01% 47303 39.42% 294 128667 7.2%
8 48 5 0.00% 47325 39.44% 240 129664 6.5%
9 54 2 0.00% 47339 39.45% 108 130390 6.0%
10 60 7 0.01% 47360 39.47% 420 131598 5.1%
15* 91 1 0.00% 47384 39.49% 91 133410 3.8%
20* 121 1 0.00% 47396 39.50% 121 134689 2.9%
35* 212 1 0.00% 47406 39.51% 212 136133 1.8%
50* 296 1 0.00% 47413 39.51% 296 137905 0.6%
75* 448 1 0.00% 47415 39.51% 448 138687 0.0%
Identification of problem password systems
Figure 33 shows average password reset rates per user for nine major information 
technology systems in BT, based on telephone survey data from April 1999. It shows 
that of the first three systems, there is a steady increase from System 1 to System 3 
which has the most resets per user.
This chart also shows that System 7 has a relatively high rate of password resets. 
System 7 has a particularly elaborate password authentication mechanism employing a
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Secure-ID token, that requires a random number that changes every few seconds to be 
copied from the token and appended to a PIN.
Table 48 is based on reset log data from a six-month period in 1999, with the same 
number of users per system information as in Figure 33. Table 48 shows the opposite 
pattern - there is now a decrease from System 1-which has the most resets per user- to 
System 3, which is now shown as having the least.
It is estimated that under similar operating conditions (continuous use throughout the 
year instead of only ten weeks, and with uniform distribution of resets through time), 
TACO would have 0.7 resets per user per year.
1.8 
1.6 
1.4 
1.2 
1.0 
0.8 
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
Figure 33 - Ratio of relative password reset rates per user of different IT systems 
compared with to System 9- data from Password Control phone survey, April
1999.
Table 48 - Number of password resets for each IT system administered by
Password Control
System
Name
No. of
Resets per V2 year
% of total 
resets
No. of 
users^
Rate of resets 
per user per year
System 1 31,825 22.9 17,490 3.6
System 2 11,703 8.4 20,000 1.2
System 3 6,642 4.8 15,000 0.9
2 Data from April 1999 (Mackay, 1999a)
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8.4 Discussion
8.4.1 Identifying a problem password system can be 
difficult
It emerged from the data that it would be possible to identify problem password 
systems by observing performance of a number of systems so that diagnostic efforts 
could be sure to encompass those systems that perform badly. However, identifying a 
problem password system in a large corporation is not as straightforward as it first 
appeared. There are at least 2 ways it might be tackled:
1. looking for the system with the highest number of resets
2. looking for the system with the highest number of resets per user
Approach 1 is probably the easiest, as helpdesks are likely to keep logs of problems 
dealt with, which include which systems problems originated with. In this case, you can 
see in Table 48 that System 1 generates the highest volume of password resets out of 
the three. In one sense, this is a problem system because it produces the most work 
for the helpdesk. However, how does it compare to other systems? It may be for 
example that it simply has more users than other systems.
To assess this, it is necessary to get both numbers of resets per system, and number 
of users per system, which allows you to generate a chart such as Figure 33 (shows 
the April 1999 data for some of BT’s major computer systems), and which shows that 
system 1 generates a very low rate of helpdesk requests compared to other systems 
and that System 7 has a relatively high rate.
After identifying System 7 as having relatively severe problems, it might be examined 
to find out their cause. System 7’s password authentication mechanism is configured 
to be unusually complex (see section 8.3.3) with more steps performed by the user 
during login than most password systems, giving more room for human error. This is 
further evidence to support our finding in Chapter 7 (section 7.4.7) that restrictive 
password policies reduce the effectiveness of password mechanisms (by increasing 
login problems and helpdesk use).
The principle used in making the Figure is sound, and could be used to target problem 
systems to be given priority for intervention. However, in practice it can be difficult to 
get the data. For example, while reset rates are stored at the helpdesk, numbers of 
users data may be kept in other parts of the organisation, which may have an 
incompatible political agenda, or may simply be difficult to track down and ask. The
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inquiry may be left with outdated or otherwise inadequate information, as occurred in 
the pursuit of this PhD.
8.4.2 Three strikes is too little, ten strikes is better
A common policy in high security environment is that users should be allowed no more 
than three strikes at login. Enlightened security specialists have recommended up to 
50 strikes (e.g. Viega & McGraw, 2001), though such a high number may not be 
acceptable to traditionally conservative security personnel. Although the number of 
strikes may vary from system to system, it does not appear that this number has ever 
been selected from analysis of empirical data. A first attempt has been made here. As 
will be discussed in the next section, the sample of UCL users on which this attempt is 
based faces different circumstances than our BT population of users - so direct 
extrapolations to them are inappropriate. Moreover, some precision has been lost by 
examining totals and averages of failed login attempts and resets, rather than counting 
for each reset how many attempts preceded it. However, our attempt remains an 
improvement over the existing state-of-the-art, which is based solely on speculation.
There are two issues:
1. Reducing use of a helpdesk by giving users enough chances to successfully 
enter their password
2. Acco/nmodating users by allowing them to give up and not forcing them to call a 
helpdesk before they are ready to
The first issue is to do with balancing the risks of increased vulnerability to attackers 
and loss of availability to authorised users. The second issue is about the respect with 
which users hold safeguards.
For the first issue we must look at the distribution of failed logins among users who did 
not later require password reminders (dark bars in Figure 31) - these are the users who 
could be unnecessary forced to use a helpdesk. The existing norm of three strikes is 
predicted to accommodate only a third of these users. Ten strikes would be enough to 
accommodate people who could recover from login failure. There are 202 of them in 
total. 107 of them suffered two failed logins or less, and so would have passed a three 
strikes rule (28% of all participants). However, a further 80 of them suffered between 3 
and 9 login failures. These users would have triggered a three strikes policy and 
probably be required to contact the helpdesk had the policy been in force. Instead of 
just 87 helpdesk requests (section 8.3.2) there might have been 80 extra, an increase 
of nearly 92%. With ten strikes instead of three, these extra helpdesk requests could 
be avoided. Moving from three strikes to ten strikes should reduce password related
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helpdesk calls. However, the amount of reduction should be predicted with a more 
accurate method, and may still be inaccurate if users adapt their behaviour to the new 
policy.
To address issue 2, we must look at the distribution of users who experienced login 
failures that did result in helpdesk requests (light bars in Figure 31). 11 of these (32%) 
would have passed a three strikes policy. Extending the number of strikes to ten would 
double the number of people accommodated (68%), leaving only a third prematurely 
forced to call a helpdesk. An extra 12 stakeholders accommodated out of 236 may not 
seem many, but security depends on the weakest link - alienating 5% of the user group 
cannot be sensible.
By increasing the number of strikes, the chance is increased that an attacker may 
successfully guess the password and break into your system. Moving from three 
strikes to ten approximately triples this risk. However, if an organisation enforces 
strong password content policies, then the actual risk will still be very small. Moreover, 
Viega and McGraw (2001) suggest another strike counter operating in conjunction with 
the first-recording the total number of strikes rather than the number of strikes in a 
session. After a suitably small total number of strikes is reached, such as 50 (see 
Figure 32), then additional security procedures are started. This would help to reduce 
any negative impact of moving from three strikes to ten.
8.4.3 Unusually strong passwords
A striking feature of our results is how security-conscious the participants in Study 4 
and 5 (all from UCL) were in their choice of passwords. 84% of the sample chose 
strong passwords, in stark contrast to Petrie’s (2002) recent survey, where only 9% 
were as virtuous. Moreover, the passwords they chose were of recommended length 
(8 characters). This is highly unusual behaviour for users given completely free rein in 
which passwords they chose. It raises 3 important questions:
1. How can other users be encouraged to choose strong passwords ?
2. Would it be a good thing to do this, or would it be better to try other 
interventions?
3. To what extent can results from an academic environment be generalised to 
corporate populations?
The first question is difficult to answer, because it is not known why the participants 
behaved like this. The solution to this problem is a Holy Grail of computer 
administrators.
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It is the author's opinion that on balance it would be better for an organisation to 
improve password mechanisms (for example by using BCRYPT, see section 4.2.1) 
than to improve stakeholders’ behaviour. By improving the encryption of passwords, 
an organisation would dramatically improve the effective quality of all its passwords- 
raising the bar on dictionary attacks without increasing costs for users or secondary 
stakeholders, and more than likely decrease them.
However, as has been seen in section 3.1.4, many techniques for breaking security 
concentrate on the human rather than the password mechanism itself. Attempting to 
replicate the good behaviour of Study 4 and 5’s participants in corporate users would 
likely harden them against these other attacks to a far greater extent. Moreover, this 
approach may not greatly increase stakeholder costs. Though there is much evidence 
from laboratory studies to show that complex passwords are more difficult to remember 
than simple ones, the few available real-world studies (such as Yan et al., 2000 in 
section 4.1.2, and this chapter* s studies 4 and 5) show relatively little difference. For 
example, no statistically significant difference was found in error rates between 
passwords of differing numbers of character-sets. However, all of these real-world 
studies were carried out on computer science undergraduates at prestigious 
universities, rather than users in corporations- this brings up our third question - how 
well can the results be generalised? This has not yet been studied, and remains an 
important topic.
8.4.4 Password system performance and password 
policies
We are beginning to get an idea of password system performance in different 
environments, and with different configurations and policies enforced. It was possible 
to calculate rate of password helpdesk use per user per year for three BT information 
systems, and one at UCL. The UCL system had the lowest stakeholder costs-with 0.7 
password related helpdesk calls per person per year, compared to 0.9,1.2, and 3.6.
The UCL system had no password policies in force, and also had the smallest 
stakeholder costs. Other evidence was presented in Ch.7 (particularly section 7.4.7) 
that common password policies increase stakeholder costs. By comparing the 
stakeholder costs across systems whose configurations and policies are known, better 
understanding of the impact of these policies on system performance will be gained. If 
this happens, we will be better able to diagnose password system ineffectiveness, and 
have better guarantees that interventions will work. In that spirit, a performance matrix 
for TACO is presented in Table 49.
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Table 49 -Observed password performance matrix for TACO. No password
system policies in force.
Goal - let through users Real user Attacker
Denied access Incorrect rejection 
rate 10%
Correct rejection rate ?
Let through Correct acceptance 
rate 90%
Incorrect acceptance rate ?
8.4.5 Password problems are everyone’s problem
Study 6 took place inside a corporate environment (see section 8.3.7). It was 
calculated that 60% of BT’s users would require password reminders over the course 
of the year, and about three-quarters of users phone the helpdesk once a month or 
less, and that only 5.8% of password resets were due to repeat offenders (using BT's 
definition). This refutes the repeat offender hypothesis. Password resets were found 
to be a problem for all, not just the few.
However, the data collected at UCL showed only 23% of users requiring password 
reminders. This would appear to contradict the previous findings, as it is much less 
than BT’s 60%. However, the participants of Study 5 used their system for only 10 
weeks of the year, while those of Study 6 were observed for six months of their all year 
round computer use. The participants of Study 6 had more time to experience 
problems. Only if Study 5’s results were projected to a year's worth of system use 
could a proper comparison be made. However, the relationship between time and 
cumulative number of helpdesk users is unlikely to be linear. More research is needed 
to construct a method for projecting annual numbers of password helpdesk users from 
short duration studies.
8.4.6 Password changing is a vulnerable time, so 
password expiry increases problems
Study 4 (section 8.4.1) shows us more evidence that password changing is a sensitive 
time that is predisposed to password problems. This is more evidence that password 
expiry has negative consequences on password system performance. To fully 
understand its impact, it would be necessary to investigate this experimentally, 
manipulating the intervals between password expiry and recording the result.
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8.4.7 Passwords interfere with other passwords
Another striking result was the large extent to which passwords interfere with each 
other-37% of the errors found in Study 4 were the use of expired passwords, and 
another 15% were the use of other password like sequences. This points to several 
fairly obvious conclusions:
• The more passwords, the greater the trouble with them
• The more frequent password expiry is, the greater the number of problems
• (and together with section 7.3.2) password confusion is the next biggest 
memory problem with passwords after forgetting
This makes password confusion the second or third largest source of password 
problems. Password confusion is therefore a significant problem, and it has to date not 
been addressed by research on password system performance.
This issue shows a difficulty in password content or memory based interventions-if you 
make passwords more memorable, you make them more prone to confusion because 
the distractor passwords come more easily to memory (section 3.3.5). There are three 
main approaches to solving this dilemma. One could either ignore the problem of 
password confusion as it is a lesser problem, one could engage in a difficult balancing 
act to make passwords just memorable enough, or one could try and reduce the 
number of passwords. In practice, it seems likely that the first approach will be taken.
It also seems unlikely that the real number of passwords will be decreased, given that 
security departments are conservative and that corporations have so much to defend.
It seems more likely that corporations would pursue a technical solution, reducing the 
effective number of passwords by allocating their use to a machine/or middleware on 
the user’s behalf. Such technology is called a Single Sign-On (SSO). Such 
technologies tackle both main problems-password numbers are reduced so they are 
less likely to be confused with each other, and what passwords are left are used more 
frequently so they are less likely to be forgotten. SSOs can also protect against ghost 
accounts: by centralising the control of authentication, it makes it easier to remove an 
individual’s permissions when they have left the organisation. SSO can therefore take 
up some of the responsibilities given to password expiry mechanisms and so lessen 
the need for them. However, the solutions can be expensive to implement, both 
because of the complexity and amount of integration required, and also because they 
must be better defended than individual password systems-as more systems fall under 
an SSO it becomes more fundamental to the running of the organisation, and so a 
more devastating and therefore likely target.
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8.4.8 Long interval hypothesis supported
More empirical evidence has been found (section 8.3.3) supporting the long interval 
hypothesis-that passwords are forgotten if they are infrequently used. Though this is 
not a startling result, it is important to check fundamental assumptions. Moreover, 
studies of these kinds may eventually help to predict helpdesk usage for IT systems 
which are on the drawing board-by knowing the approximate frequency of their use, it 
may be possible to estimate their future authentication problems.
8.5 Summary
This chapter collected data toward answering Research Question A - What is the 
performance of password systems? Study 5 found that users of a UCL password 
system experienced substantial login failure rates (overall 1 in 10 attempts failing).
Whilst user report data has identified similar problems (Adams and Sasse 1999), the 
extent of failure had not been quantified in the security or HCI literature to date. This 
study therefore represents an increment forward in the evaluation of user- 
authentication mechanisms, and computer safeguards more widely.
Progress was made towards answering Research Question C - What causes this 
performance to be good or bad? Data was collected that shed light on the role of three 
strikes policies on password system performance, the validity of the repeat offender 
hypothesis, and the effect of password expiry policies & long intervals between 
password uses on performance.
By examining the number of login problems experienced by people who did and did not 
have to request a password reminder, we found that three strikes would be likely to 
cause substantially more reminders than ten strikes. This finding led to progress in 
answering Research Question D - What interventions can be made to improve 
password system performance? It was suggested that moving from three strikes to 
ten would lead to substantially reduced helpdesk use, with a very small change in the 
amount of protection offered against attackers, so little in fact that it would be 
negligible.
The strain imposed on BT password helpdesks was not due to a small minority of 
repeat offenders, but in fact was due to huge numbers of normal users. It was 
calculated that 60% of BT's users would require support for their passwords from 
helpdesks in a typical year, and that only 5.8% of password resets were due to repeat 
offenders.
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Further evidence was found that changing a password is a particularly sensitive activity 
that can cause problems. Furthermore, password confusion was found to be the 
second or third most frequent password related problem, and that entering obsolete 
passwords instead of the currently valid one was the largest source of such errors. It 
was suggested that these were further evidence for the deleterious effect of password 
expiry policies. It was further suggested that single sign-on technologies could in some 
senses replace password expiry mechanisms.
Evidence was presented that long intervals between uses can lead to problems with 
passwords. This examination was justified as supporting our fundamental theoretical 
assumptions.
It was discovered that the participants in studies 4 and 5 were atypical because they 
chose particularly strong passwords. This and other aspects of the UCL environment 
(such as its lower rate of password problems) give us caution in extrapolating the 
results from UCL to BT. This caution should be shared by researchers in interpreting 
their studies results.
8.6 Contributions
8.6.1 Methodological
A novel paradigm for capturing password usability data (an enhanced password 
system logging mechanism) was introduced. This allowed diagnostic information to be 
collected that was not previously available.
8.6.2 Substantive
An empirical model of failed log in attempts was presented that can be used to make 
better decisions about the number of strikes allowed by password policies. The data 
on which the model was based suggested that ten strikes would lead to less helpdesk 
use than three strikes, with little reduction in the security offered.
Differences between university and corporate user populations were documented that 
could prevent meaningful extrapolations of results from one population to the other.
For example: undergraduates in study 4 had substantially stronger passwords than the 
general population. This can form the basis of further research.
A hypothesis about the causes of password system performance was refuted.
Evidence was presented that password helpdesk use is by the majority of users, not a 
small hard-core of repeat offenders. This finding may be used in risk management or 
further research.
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The documenting of the use of password system support services (0.7 password 
reminders per user per year) for a system with known password policies. This could be 
used to compare to other systems with different but known password policies, and so 
study the effects of different password policies on password system effectiveness.
Password confusion was identified as a major source of password errors and requests 
for help. This source of error has been previously neglected in the literature, and is 
evidence that password expiry policies increase helpdesk use. This finding can feed 
into further research and eventually into risk analyses.
Ecologically valid evidence was presented that supports a fundamental assumption 
about password system performance-long intervals mean forgotten passwords.
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9.1 Introduction
This chapter will present a 1st pass of abstraction of the research from the previous 4 
chapters to diagnose the problems in password system performance. It will start by 
introducing,a model that summarises the causes of password problems identified. A 
preparatory section introduces a taxonomy of password costs. Finally, different 
interventions to reduce password costs will be introduced and related to the model.
9.2 Diagnosis of Password System 
ineffectiveness
This section introduces a model that is abstracted from the results so far-the diaries 
and interviews (section 6.3.1), questionnaire responses (section 7.3), and system log 
data (section 8.3). The model summarises the causes of password system 
performance, and so forms a diagnosis of it. However, the model evolved as a result of 
validation activities described in Chapter 10. Rather than present both old and new 
models in detail, only the new model is given, and the reader is referred to Chapter 11 
to view it. However, an outline of the revised model is given below.
The model consists of eight stages, describing different sets of factors that impact 
password system performance. Each stage feeds into the one below it, but stages 
lower in the model may feed up to higher stages:
1. Mechanism stage is at the top of the model, describing perceived and real 
properties of password mechanisms
2. Security administration stage, describing the administrative contribution to 
password systems through allocation of function between users and 
mechanisms, security policies, disciplinary procedures and publicity surrounding 
breaches
3. Environment stage , describing the social, psychological and business context 
surrounding a user’s participation in a password system: the users perceptions 
of resource sensitivity and associated risks, the availability of sources of 
support, the prevailing working practices, and the timing of critical business 
tasks to which the user must conform.
4. Design stage, which describes the user’s strategies for designing and using 
passwords.
5. Input stage, describes the properties of passwords and prompts, and the task 
environment in which they are used
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6. Activator stage describes psychological phenomena that occur in planning and 
execution of plans to use passwords - taken from the literature of human error 
(see section 3.3.5).
7. Schemata stage describes the actual cognitive processing of plans to use 
passwords
8. Output stage describes the resulting successful or unsuccessful use of 
passwords.
Notes on the derivation of interventions from the model are given in section 9.4.
9.3 Costs of password problems: taxonomy 
and estimates
Section 2.2.2 defined a worksystem’s performance as being divisible into quality of the 
work achieved, and the costs accrued in achieving that quality. This section will 
examine the various stakeholder costs that may occur in password systems. They 
have been split into three categories outlined in Figure 34, and given in more depth in 
Table 50.
Waiting for login sequences to finish Waiting in a phone queue
Calling the helpdesk
Time spent 
logging in "
Getting out and putting 
written down passwords
Password 
Daily Use
costs
2L________
Password
Assistance
costs
System administration 
password mechanisms
Password 
Account 
M ainte
costs
Having to be called back but 
your passwords still don’t work
Writing down, storing, altering 
written down passwords
Time spent in monthly (etc.) 
password changes
Figure 34 - Stakeholder costs of password systems.
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Table 50 - Taxonomy of Password system costs
Password Password Password
Daily Use Account Maintenance Assistence
Costs Costs Costs
Users A 8 C
1. Getting out 
and putting 
back written
1. Locating and 
initiating password 
change function
1. Time spent
a. Locating and 
initiating
down 2. Getting out and contact with
passwords & putting back written password
prompts down passwords & helpdesk /
2. Time prompts support
preparing 3. Entering exisiting systems
the passwords b. Waiting in
workstation 4. Designing new queue
to connect to passwords c. Authenticating
remote 5. Confirming new with helpdesk
resources passwords d. Describing
3. Time spent 
typing in 
passwords
6. Redesigning and re­
entering passwords if 
designs don’t meet
problem 
e. Receiving new 
account details
4. Waiting for 
response
mechanisms’
requirements.
f. Storing new 
account details
from 7. Ammending written /Ammending
resources down passwords and written down
5. Re­
establishing 
timed out 
connections
prompts
2.
3.
passwords and 
prompts 
Reputation damage 
Deadline pressure
6. Time spent 
opening 
screen locks
Secondary D E F
stakeholders 1. Included in 1. Providing new users 1. Authenticate users
(Systems Cell A with accounts 2. Listen to problem
administrators, 2. Performing audits description
line managers, 3. Removing obsolete 3. Initiate resetting of
helpdesk accounts passwords
analysts, etc.) 4.
5.
6. 
7.
Patching / updating 
the system 
Contributing to 
purchasing decision 
making 
Installing new 
systems
Decommisionning old 
systems
4.
5.
Transmit new 
passwords to users in 
secure fashion 
Ensure details of 
transaction are properly 
stored
Tertiary G H /
stakeholders 1. Sum of 1. Sum of Cells B & E 1. Sum of Cells C & F
(Executives, Cell A for all across all employees across all employees
board members, users
shareholders,
etc.)
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9.3.1 Costs to the user
Password daily use costs, is the time spent in normal use of passwords-logging in, 
preparing for logging in, etc. This is a cost for users and tertiary stakeholders-users 
are delayed from doing their work, and tertiary stakeholders therefore receive less 
productivity from users. This cost is rarely mentioned, but may become significant if 
users are required to use many different computer systems in the course of their work. 
While this may intuitively seem trivial, the steps required to authenticate are more 
numerous than recall alone (see section 3.1), and are repeated frequently. Bellcore 
(cited in Brentano & Wiseth, 1996) estimate that a user with four applications will spend 
5.5 days per year simply logging in. If 240 working days per year are used, then this 
cost averages out at about half an hour per user per working day.
How realistic is this estimate? This figure seems high-at least from this researcher’s 
own personal experience. However, the author has not yet found other literature 
corroborating or falsifying this amount, or been able to find and verify the original 
research on which this amount was based. Never the less, daily use is likely to be a 
substantial cost for users with an average of 16 passwords (section 7.3.1), and one 
which it seems reasonable to expect to be not less than a tenth of the reported value 
(i.e. not less than 3 mins per BT user per working day).
Users must also regularly perform account maintenance tasks such as choosing new 
passwords, amending their password records, etc. This may become significant if they 
use many password systems that force frequent changing. Studies within BT (Leung, 
2000) have found changing passwords to take 15-30 minutes per user per month 
(giving a midpoint of 22.5 minutes). If the maintenance tasks are scheduled, then this 
is the only cost. However, users may be compelled by password expiry mechanisms to 
perform account maintenance at a critical point in a production task, interrupting it, and 
potentially causing other costs: missed deadlines, reduced appearance of 
professionalism with customers, etc.
As we have seen, the password system can break down for a number of reasons 
(section 8.3.1 and section 7.3.2). When this occurs there are password assistance 
costs. For BT users, this is primarily in time spent contacting the helpdesk to be given 
a new working password. The average time spent on the phone to Password Control 
(including being held in the queue) is 9 minutes (Brennan, 2000), with average of 0.8
calls to the helpdesk per BT user per year, or once every fourteen months 3 (though 
there is a very large spread, as has been shown in section 8.3.3).
3 33,000 resets per month on average, equivalent to 8,000 calls per month, times 12 months 
per year, divided by 120,000 users
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Password assistance may be required at any time, is not planned, and so may interrupt 
production tasks. This is a relatively small interruption, but may occur at critical points 
during production, such as when dealing with customers. Moreover, some users and 
tertiary stakeholders may be in circumstances where any interruption is intolerable - for 
example in call centres, where every second must be accounted for to the extent that 
even toilet breaks require permission.
9.3.2 Costs to the organisation
The relative cost to BT of these different sources of password related expense is 
displayed in Figure 35. It is hypothesised that these costs will be in a similar ratio and 
magnitude for most organisations of a similar size. Relevant data were not available 
for UCL, so a comparison was not possible.
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Figure 35 - BT’s annual password costs, in person-years.
When users spend time interacting as part of a password system, this unproductive
time can be thought of as a cost to the organisation and tertiary stakeholders. In an
organisation on the scale of BT, password account maintenance costs is equivalent to
29.25 person years annually (for an average of 22.5 mins per user, assuming an 8 hour
working day, 240 working days/year, for 150,000 employees). The work of secondary
stakeholders who administer the password systems (adding and deleting accounts) is
generally replicated dozens of times over in the organisation, because the
authentication mechanisms that are installed are not designed to interoperate.
However, it is assumed that the cost of replicated administration by secondary
stakeholders is relatively small compared to the cost of users’ account maintenance,
and so this part of password maintenance costs has not been included in the estimate.
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The Bellcore estimate of password daily use costs (cited in Brentano & Wiseth,
1996)is far more significant when considered at the scale of BT. 5.5 days per year per 
user is equivalent to 3,437 person years annually, across the whole of BT - an 
enormous cost for tertiary stakeholders.
From the perspective of an organisation, Password assistance costs are those that are 
associated with helping users when the password system breaks down, including all 
the costs associated with running a helpdesk, and time spent by the users themselves 
in troubleshooting, or liasing with secondary stakeholders. Approximately half of 
computer helpdesk calls are password related (Carden, 1999; Murrer, 1999). This 
organisational cost is particularly mentioned in arguments promoting the use of 
biometrics (e.g. Murrer, 1999). BT's central password helpdesk currently costs 40 
person-years annually to run, in support staff’s salaries alone. At 9 minutes per call, 
with an average monthly call volume of 30,000, including the costs of primary users’ 
time spent interacting with the helpdesk4 (approx. 28 person years annually) would 
make BT’s password assistance costs 68 person-years annually.
However, these figures are based upon data from one helpdesk. Whereas the 
password daily use estimate is likely to be pessimistic, this estimate of password 
assistance costs is likely to be optimistic - a more accurate estimate would include the 
costs of other password helpdesks. However, BT is sufficiently large and complex that 
even identifying the helpdesks in the organisation can present a significant challenge 
for researchers. The helpdesk from which this estimate has been made is BT's largest 
helpdesk. It supports BT's largest computer systems (in terms of numbers of users), 
with a large fraction of the total number of users in the organisation registered with it.
9.4 Potential Interventions
A number of potential interventions to improve password system effectiveness (though 
not an exhaustive list) are presented in Table 51.
The interventions are derived from the model. Some of the derivations are simple. For 
example model component 6 of the Security Administration stage (see section 11.2 for 
model) contains a variable number of strikes - where a low number of (three) strikes 
increases login problems and so reduces password system performance. There is a 
simple step from this to the intervention (#7 in Table 52) more than three strikes.
However, many of the interventions do not have simple one to one derivations with 
model components because the model components are interrelated. For example, the
4 (9min per call /60min per hour/8 hours per day/240 days per year) times (30,000 calls per 
month times 12 months/year)
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Table 51 - Potential interventions to reduce password costs
Relevant 
Model Stage
Intervention Model
component
Mechanism
1. Better encryption of passwords 1
2. Standard password policy requirements in purchasing 3
Security
Administration
3. Password synchronisation SSO 5
4. Automated login SSO 5
5. Automated login SSO with centralised administration 5
6. Less frequent password changing 6
7. More than three strikes 6
8. Declassification of systems 6
9. Standardised password restrictions 6
10. Support for Writing down passwords 6
11. Punishing users bad password behaviour 7
12. Rewarding of users good password behaviour 7
13. Highlighting the occurrence of incidents 8
Environment
14. Education about Attack methods 10
15. Education about Risks 10
16. Job description changes 10
17. Electronic assistant 11
18. Common password format generator 11
19. Improve helpdesk turnaround time 11
20. Cultural change 12
21. Intrusion detection systems 13
22. Link policy enforcement to personnel dept, 
(provisioning)
13
Design
23. Mnemonic training 14
24. Selection of hints training 14
25. Password selection training 15
26. Encourage Manual password synchronisation 15
Input
27. Sending reminders of password expiry 20
28. 7-day multiples for password expiry intervals 20
Activator
29. Increase number of repetitions to verify password 22
intervention better encryption of passwords crosses model components 1 (variables: 
speed and cryptographic strength) and 2 (variable: resistance to dictionary attack) (see 
section 11.2 for model, and section 4.2.1 for the background of this intervention). 
Moreover, some interventions entail dependencies between model components-for 
example more than three strikes is a policy intervention (component 6) that is 
dependent on mechanisms supporting the desired number of strikes (component 3).
In general there will be a single component that is particularly associated with an 
intervention, and this is noted in Table 52, with the intervention’s predicted primary 
effect on performance. Each intervention could potentially affect all three sources of 
password cost as well as task quality - even if these effects are not expected. The
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author does not attempt to analytically derive estimated effect sizes. Collecting 
observational data from intervention trials would inform the estimation of expected 
primary effects and unexpected secondary effects.
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Table 52 - Description of interventions and their predicted primary effects.
[Mechanism stage]
1. Better
encryption for 
passwords
1 Use slower encryption so that dictionary attacks become orders of 
magnitude harder.
Improves the strength of password content
2. Standard 
password 
policy
requirements 
in purchasing
3 Only purchase authentication mechanisms that will allow a standard set 
of preferred password policies to be configured and enforced.
Assisted manual password synchronisation, reducing 
the complexity of the task and thereby reducing the 
frequency with which it breaks down and requires 
helpdesk use.
[Security
Administration stage]
3. Password 
synchronisation 
SSO
5 Extra software is added behind-the-scenes to synchronise the users 
passwords. The user is still required to login as frequently as before, only 
using the same password whereas previously she would have used 
many. This intervention is less costly to implement and maintain than 
automated login SSOs (Yasin, 2002). One password synchronisation 
solution provider claims a 50 to 70 percent reduction in password resets 
(Yasin, 2002). Purchase costs from $15 per user (Bort, 2002).
The user is able to employ the same passwords 
across a wider range of systems, thus effectively 
increasing the frequency with which these passwords 
are used, and therefore lessening the probability that 
they will be forgotten, therefore lessening use of 
helpdesks.
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Intervention Inspired by intervention Predicted primary effect
Name Model Description
[& Model Stage] Component
4. Automated login 
SSO
5 Extra software is added so that the user only has to login once to use all 
her computer applications, whereas previously she would have logged in 
many times. There are different methods of achieving this, which have 
different costs and benefits (Brentano & Wiseth, 1996). The scripting 
approach is fairly cheap to implement but has higher administration costs 
than standard passwords (Brentano & Wiseth, 1996). The middleware 
approach is expensive to implement but has no additional administration 
costs compared to standard passwords (Brentano & Wiseth, 1996). 
Purchase costs around $80 per user (Bort, 2002).
Some logging in tasks are allocated to the computer 
rather than the user, thereby reducing overall the time 
spent in logging in.
5. Automated login 
SSO with 
centralised 
administration
5 Extra software is added so that the user only has to login once whereas 
previously a separate login would be required for each computer 
application. In addition, administration of access rights for all applications 
is centralised, making administration much easier (Carden, 1999). This is 
the most expensive form of SSO to implement, and the cheapest to 
maintain (Brentano & Wiseth, 1996). Can cost about $1 million to 
implement (Bort, 2002).
Some logging in tasks are allocated to the computer 
rather than the user, thereby reducing overall the time 
spent in logging in.
6. Less frequent 
password 
changing
6 Password changing increases the likelihood of password related slips and 
forgetting. Reducing the frequency of password changing lowers the 
probability of these problems occurring, and so low as the probability of 
helpdesk use.
Study 5 showed that password changing is a 
particularly dangerous time for password problems. 
Reducing the frequency of passwords changing 
therefore will reduce password helpdesk use.
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Intervention Inspired by intervention
Neme Model Description
[& Model Stage] Component
Predicted primary effect
7. More than three 
strikes
6 Gives users more chances to remember their passwords when logging in, 
and so predicted to increase availability of computer applications when 
there is difficulty in remembering of passwords, and so reduce helpdesk 
use.
Giving people more chances to enter their passwords 
means that they are more likely to successfully enter 
it if they are having problems remembering it. This 
means that they are less likely to get locked out of 
their accounts, and therefore less likely to require 
password helpdesk assistance to unlock their 
accounts.
8. Declassification 
of systems
6 Reducing the number of password authentication mechanisms reduces 
the opportunity for password problems. Some computer applications may 
not require passwords or other user authentication mechanisms, but may 
be protected in other ways.
Declassifying some systems means that password 
authentication will not be necessary on them. This 
means that there will be less daily use of passwords.
9. Standardised 
password 
restrictions
6 Allows users to manually synchronise their passwords so that they are 
able to use one password for their applications, rather than being forced 
to select many different passwords because of differing requirements.
This intervention means that users will be able to use 
the same passwords across multiple systems, 
thereby effectively using what passwords they have 
more frequently and so making them more 
memorable and less confusable, and so reducing the 
probability of problems, and so reducing helpdesk 
use.
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Intervention Inspired by Intervention Predicted primary effect
Name Model Description
[& Model Stage] Component
10. Support for 
Writing down 
passwords
6 Mandating that users write down all of their passwords, and giving them 
the infrastructure required to store their password records securely. 
Allows users to consult their password record rather than call a helpdesk 
for a reset.
Writing down passwords means that you have a 
quicker source of assistance than calling a helpdesk , 
which means that time and effort are saved if you 
forget your password.
11. Punishing users 
bad password 
behaviour
7 Punishing users for frequent helpdesk use and cryptographically weak 
password selection may motivate them to improve their practices.
This intervention is designed to motivate people to 
use password helpdesks less.
12. Rewarding of 
users good 
password 
behaviour
7 Rewarding users for exemplary password use and lack of helpdesk use 
may motivate them to put more effort into selecting good passwords and 
managing them effectively.
This intervention is designed to motivate people to 
use password helpdesk's less.
13. Highlighting the 
occurrence of 
incidents
8 Increases users perceptions of risk and vulnerability, and so predicted to 
motivate users to behave in a more security conscious fashion, including 
expending more effort in the selection and management of passwords.
Increasing the strength of password content., 
improving password system task quality.
[Environment stage]
14. Education about 
Attack methods
10 Users are taught how passwords are compromised by crackers, which 
helps them to understand how to make a strong password.
Improve password content strength.
15. Education about 
Risks
10 Enables users to make informed judgements about the relative risks of 
computer use, so they can better judge their own vulnerability and risk, 
and behave in an appropriately security conscious fashion.
Improve password content strength.
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16. Job description 
changes
10 By adding security duties to job descriptions users are better motivated to 
behave in a security conscious manner, including choosing and 
managing passwords.
If people believe that it is their role to pursue security 
behaviours such as managing their own passwords, 
and they are less likely to attempts to get others to do 
these tasks-such as the password helpdesk -  Studies 
7 and 8. This means that helpdesk's will be used 
less frequently.
17. Electronic 
assistant
11 An electronic version of writing down (intervention 10) - allows users to 
keep a record of their passwords, which can be consulted instead of 
helpdesk use. May offer the advantage over paper based methods of 
easier remote access.
Having a record of the passwords to refer to when it 
cannot be remembered reduces the need for going to 
a helpdesk.
18. Common 
password 
format 
generator
11 Will give you password format that will allow you to manually password 
synchronise with a minimum number of passwords.
Simplifies the manual password management task, 
thereby reducing opportunity for error and so 
reducing helpdesk use.
19. Improve 
helpdesk 
turnaround time
11 Makes helpdesk use quicker, so less time is spent by users and helpdesk 
workers in resetting passwords. One instance of self-service password 
resets has been recorded leading to a 60% reduction in helpdesk calls 
(Yasin, 2002), whilst another gave a 10-13% reduction (Bort, 2002). It is 
not recorded how long users spent interacting with the software per reset.
Improved helpdesks means less time and effort spent 
by users when they require password assistance, and 
potential reduced costs in supplying assistence 
(through automated, self service systems).
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Intervention Inspired by Intervention Predicted primary effect
Name Model Description
[& Model Stage] Component
20. Cultural change 12 A concerted programme to put security as one of the core values of the 
organisation, so that people are highly motivated to choose strong 
passwords and make efforts to use and manage them appropriately.
Increasing the strength of password content. 
Reducing the risk of disclosure.
21. Intrusion 
detection 
system
13 The intrusion detection system monitors logins and system used to 
highlight unusual patterns. This shifts the emphasis to detection and 
reaction to attacks rather than using password mechanisms to prevent 
them-enabling password policies to be relaxed on systems that are less 
frequently used.
There is reduced need to change the password each 
time it is used, and so less password maintenance
22. Link policy 
enforcement to 
personnel 
dept.
(provisioning)
13 Tying the password policy enforcement system into the personnel 
department will allow expiry times to be extended if the user is absent.
Reduced helpdesk use as less passwords will expire 
and need to be reset while users are absent.
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[Desgin stage]
23. Mnemonic 
training
14 Gives users techniques to memorise passwords, so that they are 
less likely to forget them. Techniques need to be applied every 
time a password is changed, and can seem effortful.
The use of mnemonic's will make passwords 
more memorable, so there will be fewer cases of 
them being forgotten, and so fewer instances of 
helpdesk use. It may also increase the 
incidence of password confusion, as obsolete 
passwords would harder to forget, and so more 
likely to interfere with the new passwords. This 
would tend to increase helpdesk use. The 
ballence of effects is likely to depend on each 
user’s relative frequencies of long durations 
between password uses and password expiries.
24. Selection of 
hints training
14 Guidance about the creation of hints that can be used to jog one's own 
memory if one has forgotten a password. Users may therefore be able to 
avoid calling a helpdesk.
Use of good password hints may enable stakeholders 
to assist themselves more speedily then a helpdesk, 
and therefore save some assistance costs.
25. Password
selection training
15 Gives people guidance on the creation of strong and memorable 
password content.
More memorable passwords mean less forgetting, 
which means less assistance required.
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Intervention Inspired by Intervention Predicted primary effect
Name Model Description
[& Model Stage] Component
26. Encourage 
Manual 
password 
synchronisation
15 Users make as many of their passwords the same as possible. When an 
information system forces the user to change her password, the user 
voluntarily changes all her other passwords to synchronise them.
Because passwords have been synchronised, there 
are in effect fewer of them to remember. This should 
lead to less memory load on the user, and therefore 
fewer chances for slips, lapses, or forgettings.
[Input stage]
27. Sending 
reminders of 
password expiry
20 Prompts users to change their passwords at a time of their own choice, 
when they can better pay attention to what they're doing and so be more 
likely to learn their new password effectively and update their records of 
it, and so make them less likely to forget it and require helpdesk use.
Sending reminders in advance that passwords will 
have to be changed means that users will be able to 
pick a time when to make the changes that will 
interfere least with their work, and so when they are 
less likely to suffer divided attention. This means 
they will be able to pay attention to what they're 
doing, and so less likely to forget the new password 
this means they are less likely to require a helpdesk.
28. 7-day multiples 
for password 
expiry intervals
20 Allows users to more easily plan their password changing activities, as it 
leads to easier manipulation of calendars or diaries. Better planning of 
password changing activities means less opportunity for slips lapses, and 
mistakes with passwords, or their being forgotten.
This more easily allows people to note in the diaries 
when password changes are due. This means that 
password changing is less likely to be a surprise, and 
therefore that people will be able to do it better, and 
so are less likely to need helpdesk support.
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[Activator stage]
29. Increase number 
of repetitions to 
verify password
22 Gives users more practice in correctly recalling a new password, and so 
leads to better learning of the password, and so accurate recall over 
longer durations, and so less chance of forgetting their passwords and 
consequent helpdesk use.
Increasing the number of repetitions to verify 
passwords would make passwords more memorable 
, which means they would be less often forgotten , 
and so users would have less need for helpdesk's.
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9.5 Summary & Conclusions
A model was introduced that summarised the causes of password system performance 
observed in this PhD's data collection (see Chapter 11) - and so has answered 
Research Question C - What are the causes of good or bad performance? This model 
tied the PhD's results to the literature of human error (section 3.3.5) and HCI research 
of password system performance (section 4.1.1).
Three categories of password system cost were presented - Daily use, assistance, and 
maintenance costs. These costs were estimated for BT as 3437,134 and 29 person 
years annually (relevant data were not available for UCL), adding to this thesis' answer 
to Research Question A - What is the performance of password systems in actual use? 
It was hypothesised that similarly sized large organisations would have similar ratios of 
password costs.
The model of password performance causes was used to inspire the design of 29 
interventions - forming an answer to Research Question D - What interventions can be 
made to improve the performance of password systems? These were outlined with 
their predicted main mode of action and primary effect. It was noted that interventions 
may not have a simple mapping to components of the model.
9.6 Contributions
9.6.1 Substantive
A taxonomy of password costs was presented, with an estimate of their magnitudes in 
a large organisation. These may inform further password system research and 
practice.
Interventions designed to improve performance were presented that were based on a 
model of the causes of password system performance in large organisations. These 
may also further password system research and practice.
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10.1 Introduction
It is impractical within the time-frame and scope of a Ph.D. to implement and validate 
more than a few of the interventions identified in the previous chapter (section 9.4). It 
was decided that validation would be most effective with BT users, but this entailed 
restrictions in the choice of research methods, which guided the choice of interventions 
to be validated (see section 5.4.7). The interventions chosen were a subset focussing 
on ‘redesigning’ users and avoiding changes to infrastructure or policies. All but three 
(interventions: 23 - mnemonic training, 14 - education about attack methods and 15 - 
education about risks) of this subset were chosen. The selected interventions were 
predicted to improve performance by reducing password costs. The three rejected 
interventions were thought to be unsustainable (intervention 23 - mnemonic training), 
or increase costs (14 - education about attack methods and 15 - education about risks) 
by motivating users to behave more securely but not more efficiently. The included 
interventions comprised:
1. Manual password synchronisation (intervention 26 in Ch 9)
2. Password selection (intervention 25 in Ch 9)
3. Selection of hints (intervention 24 in Ch 9)
4. Writing down passwords (intervention 10 in Ch 9)
It was decided to combine the interventions into one package, to be called a Password 
Manager (PM, see Appendix 6).
This validation activity attempts to address two questions:
1. Relevance - If adopted, would the interventions address users’ problems in 
a positive way?
2. Acceptability - Would users be motivated to adopt or subvert the 
interventions?
Both of these questions need to be answered in the affirmative for the interventions to 
be effective: if the interventions do not positively address users’ problems, then there 
will be little impact on password system performance so the interventions will be 
pointless. Moverover, interventions change the password system, and if users do not 
accept the new security system they would attempt to subvert it (Adams & Sasse,
1999) and so password system performance would be lowered through reduced 
security and/or additional costs instead of improved.
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10.2 Description of PM
The Password Manager was designed to make the password task easier for users so 
that they would suffer fewer problems (reduced assistance costs), and give users 
training about password related security issues to enable them to be more security 
conscious without significantly increasing costs. An example Password Manager is 
shown in Appendix 6. The features of the PM are described according to the 
intervention they implement:
1. The first feature of the Password Manager (PM) is support for Manual password 
synchronisation. It directs users to split the computer systems they use into 
groups according to how often the password needs to be changed. This combines 
a support tool with training - computer systems that require frequent password 
changing usually protect more sensitive data and resources - the systems require 
stronger security, and therefore stronger passwords. The tool prompts users to 
group systems together in this way, and give stronger passwords to systems with 
requirements for stronger security.
Users are instructed where possible to give one password to each group of 
systems-and to synchronise the passwords within each group by changing all the 
passwords of a group at the same time. This is designed to simplify the password 
task, by reducing the effective number of passwords that have to be remembered. 
Synchronising the passwords on different systems is a technique already used by 
many users. However, the PM version improves security because it reduces the 
threat of password harvesting by reducing the use of sensitive passwords on 
insecure systems, for example: using one's customer records system password on 
an external web site.
The PM supports this by asking users to write down the names of the systems in 
each group on separate pages. When the time comes to update the passwords in 
each group, the users will be reminded of each group’s contents so that they do not 
miss a system out. Moreover, users are instructed to record which systems they 
have updated, so they do not lose track of which systems they have updated and 
which they have not. This should increase the rate of successful synchronisation, 
and reduce helpdesk use and assistance costs.
By grouping systems together and changing them at the same time, the user is less 
likely to forget her password for two reasons: by using it more frequently at the 
beginning (when changing all the passwords in a group) she will have more 
practice, which leads to better memory; and by having the same password on
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several systems, this password will by definition be used more frequently, again 
leading to more practice and so greater memorability.
The PM has the additional feature that it prompts users to login to systems that 
would otherwise suspend or delete their accounts due to their inactivity. This is 
intimately associated with password expiry policies, which are a common cause of 
password resets (see section 7.3.2). Again, users are prompted to record which 
systems they have logged into, and which they have not. The PM therefore trains 
people about the importance of logging into systems that one might not otherwise 
do, and acts as a tool that will help them to keep track of which systems are 
outstanding, and which systems they have dealt with. This should reduce helpdesk 
use due to expired accounts, and so reduce assistance costs, though would 
increase maintenance costs.
The PM also supports users in changing passwords on systems that have 
automated password synchronisation. The automation on the systems often works 
in a complex web of propagation of password changes. If the user changes the 
password of the wrong system some of the systems will be synchronised to it, and 
others will not be. This will cause difficulties that will result in a call to the password 
helpdesk to have all the passwords reset. The complex password propagation 
relationships between the systems are simplified in the PM so that they are linear- 
users are forewarned about the possible difficulties of the automated 
synchronisation, and shown a safe route through it.
The second feature of PM is Password selection: it tells users how to select 
passwords of different strengths that are designed to be memorable, thereby 
reducing assistance costs (passwords are designed to reduce helpdesk use due to 
forgetting). Users are given algorithms for generating passwords of different 
strengths that they can learn (a training aspect), or merely refer to when needed (a 
tool aspect).
In feature three, Selection of hints, users are given instructions on how to 
compose hints for their passwords, so that the hints are helpful to users should they 
forget their passwords without being clues to help attackers make guesses. This is 
designed to improve security, by lowering the risk of disclosure, for example cutting 
down the number of passwords that need to be written down on a sticky note that 
has been stuck to the screen. The PM therefore has training aspect, instructing the 
user about secure behaviours, and has a tool aspect, a reference to aid the users’ 
memory of passwords.
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4. The fourth feature of the PM is a limited form of Writing down passwords. Users 
are instructed to write down passwords that are for systems requiring low security. 
This should reduce assistance costs, as users will be able to refer to their 
passwords, and so be less likely to forget them and require helpdesk use. 
Maintenee costs should be relatively unaffected, as low security systems are 
associated with reduced or absent password expiry policies, which would therefore 
require few updates to the written down passwords. The limitation to low security 
systems only was introduced to lower the risk of disclosure, because it was not 
believed the PM would be kept securely (i.e. not in a locked drawer).
Finally, should the worst happen and a password reset is required, the PM facilitates 
this by containing the password reset team's contact details, potentially cutting down 
the time to establish a connection to the helpdesk, and so reducing assistance costs.
10.3 Method
Five focus groups were held at BT. The focus groups were shared between the author 
and another researcher because access to users in BT was only possible at BT's 
request that researchers doubled up. In both cases the other researcher was another 
PhD student researching human factors and security.
10.3.1 Study 7 (Focus groups I to 3)
Participants
Three focus groups were held in a research park belonging to BT. The groups 
contained 4, 5 and 5 participants, in addition to the author and co-researcher. 
Participants were recruited by the author's industrial supervisor, who had advertised 
inside BT with e-mail circulars. The participants consisted of:
• Security researchers
• System administrators
• Human factors specialists
• Development technologists/engineers
• Contractors
• Receptionists
• Postgraduate students on placement
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Apparatus
The password manager was combined with a document testing a fear appeal (created 
by the co-researcher) that had been designed to encourage users to behave in a more 
security conscious way, offering the password manager as a guide to illustrate best 
practice and tool to help achieve it.
Each discussion was recorded onto standard D90 cassette, using an omni-directional 
boundary microphone plugged into a standard cassette recorder. Each recording was 
subsequently transcribed.
Procedure
Half of each focus group’s duration was spent discussing the password manager, and 
the rest spent discussing topics related to the other student’s research. Focus groups 
lasted approximately one hour, with half an hour devoted to the password manager per 
session.
Participants were welcomed to each group, asked permission that the session be 
recorded to audiotape, offered refreshments, and all focus group members introduced 
themselves to each other, and the discussion started. Participants were first asked to 
read the fear appeal, and asked questions about this by the other researcher. In the 
second half of the focus group, the password manager was outlined to the participants 
(illustrated with a sheet taken from it), who then gave their reactions to it, and spoke 
more generally about their use of passwords.
10.3.2 Study 8 (Focus groups 4 and 5)
Participants
Two further focus groups were held at BT, this time in one of its operational arms - 
where the organisation carries out some of its core profit-making activities. Participants 
were recruited internally by a contact of the researchers inside the organisation, with 
the promise of drinks bought for them after work.
The participants consisted of two groups of 5, containing a mixture of people who often 
came into contact with sensitive customer data:
• Administrative personnel
• Technical support engineers, and
• Their line managers
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Procedure
Less time was available, and so focus groups were restricted to 40 minutes split 
between the two researchers. As before, participants were welcomed to each group, 
asked permission that the session be recorded to audiotape, and discussion started.
The topics of these groups were slightly different than in the previous series. The 
author led the first half of the groups in a discussion of how many passwords/systems 
the participants used, how they managed them, and the ways and consequences of 
their management techniques failing, covering all of the techniques in the PM. The 
other researcher then led the rest of the group in a discussion of their attitudes to 
security, the understanding of it, and their feelings of vulnerability to attack.
Apparatus
As before, the discussion with recorded onto a 90 cassette with an omnidirectional 
boundary mic and standard cassette recorder, and the recordings were then 
transcribed.
10.4 Results
10.4.1 Study 7
Relevance of interventions
Participants described having experienced problems that the password manager was 
designed to solve. These included:
1. The proliferation of passwords/how to remember them all (7 users / 50%)
2. Losing track of one's place in the process of updating (4 users / 29%)
passwords
3. Problems with password expiry being more frequent than (3 users / 21 %)
the need to use systems
4. Failing to sign into systems that consequently suspended (2 users / 14%)
their accounts because of lack of activity.
5. Forgetting infrequently using passwords (2 users /14% )
Some of the participants used solutions to these problems that are similar to those 
promoted in the password manager. For example:
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6. Giving different systems the same password, to reduce (10 users / 71 %)
the overall number to be remembered
7. Grouping systems according to the security that they 
need
(2 users /14%)
8. Making reminders instead of writing down the password (1 user / 7%)
9. Changing all passwords at the same time to keep them (1 user / 7%) 
synchronised
Acceptability of interventions
Participants made negative comments when asked about the password manager 
implementation that they had been presented with, indicating they found it to be 
unnacceptible. Criticisms were various, including:
10. The wrong problem is being addressed-changes should 
be made to the systems, not the people who have to use 
them
11. A call to the helpdesk would be preferable to the effort 
involved in using the PM
12. Techniques used in the password manager may clash 
with personally preferred techniques already used, for 
example: how to choose passwords
13. It’s hard to tell how often each password needs to be 
reset, and so which password should go in which PM 
group
14. It is clumsy and effortful to store securely, so it will end 
up being stored not-securely therefore making security 
worse
15. It would make its users vulnerable to version control 
problems and / or denial of service if they work in more 
than one location, or are travelling.
16. It would only be suitable for people who work in a very 
organised kind of way, which is no one round here!
(8 users / 57%)
(2 users /14% )
(5 users / 36%)
(1 user/7%)
(2 users /14% )
(3 users / 21%)
(1 user/7%)
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17. It would take too long to learn how to use (and be used (3 users / 21 %) 
too infrequently to remember how-implying that it need
be re-learned each time), too long to set up and too long 
to use
18. They did not believe it could offer a way of creating (4 users / 29%)
memorable and secure passwords and password
reminders
19. It's just not very good (5 users / 36%)
20. They would not use it unless they were sure they would (4 users / 29%) 
be caught and punished
10.4.2 Study 8
Relevance of interventions
As in Study 7, participants in Study 8 described experiencing problems that the 
password manager was designed to solve; evidence that the interventions were 
relevant and would make a positive impact if adopted. Study 8 participants mentioned 
some of the password problems given in Study 7:
1. Losing track of one's place in the process of updating (4 users / 40%)
passwords
2. Failing to sign into systems that consequently suspended (2 users / 20%)
their accounts because of lack of activity.
3. The proliferation of passwords/how to remember them all (1 user /10% ) 
Study 8 participants mentioned in addition:
4. Difficulty in giving the same password to different (4 users / 40%)
applications/systems (implicit in Study 7)
Study 8 participants used fewer techniques from the PM already than those in Study 7:
• Losing track of one's place in the process of updating (4 users / 40%)
passwords
• Giving different systems the same password, to reduce (4 users / 40%)
the overall number to be remembered
• Changing all passwords at the same time to keep them (3 users / 30%)
synchronised
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Acceptability of interventions
Fewer negative points were raised, consisting only of:
• The problem of secure storage and (1 user /10%)
• The problem of access for mobile workers (1 user /10%).
10.5 Discussion
The data in previous chapters were analysed to diagnose the performance of password 
authentication systems. These results were used to generate potential interventions 
(section 9.4). A subset of interventions focusing on user behaviours were brought 
together in a paper-based tool, which was discussed in five focus groups of BT users 
(permission was not given to deploy the tool experimentally). If users experienced 
problems that the interventions were designed to tackle, and users found the 
interventions acceptable, then some validation of the interventions had been achieved. 
This discussion will therefore focus on the relevance of the proposed interventions, and 
their acceptability to users.
Relevance of interventions
It was found that users in both focus groups had password problems the PM was 
designed to combat:
• The proliferation of passwords/how to remember them all (8 users / 3%)
• Losing track of one's place in the process of updating (8 users /33%)
passwords
• Failing to sign into systems that consequently suspended (4 users /17%)
their accounts because of lack of activity.
• Forgetting infrequently used passwords (2 users /8%)
The PM was therefore relevant in that it addressed problems experienced by a 
substantial number of participants. Some of the participants used solutions to these 
problems that were similar to those promoted in the password manager:
• Giving different systems the same password, to reduce the (14 users / 58% 
overall number to be remembered of sample)
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• Changing all passwords at the same time to keep them (4 users /17%)
synchronised
• Grouping systems according to the security that they need (2 users / 8%)
• Making reminders instead of writing down the password (1 user / 4%)
This showed that the Manual password synchronisation and Selection of hints 
interventions in the PM in particular were relevant in that users already deployed them. 
However, Study 8 users raised specific issues militating against their personal use of a 
paper based PM that was used as a password repository: their mobility - working at 
different locations and the PM’s consequently reduced availability.
Acceptability of interventions
The data collected from Study 7 focus groups show that the PM interventions on their 
own would not prove acceptible, with a large proportion (57%) of this powerful group of 
users (manager grades, researchers and developers) predicting that they would merely 
pay lip service to the interventions unless they were accompanied by technical or 
administrative or cultural changes. These participants described having experienced 
problems that the PM would solve if used, and in fact already employed some of the 
techniques suggested. However, a third of these participants reported that they would 
be unwilling to use the PM unless they were sure to be caught and displined for 
avoiding it, showing that they found it unacceptable, and would risk punishment in their 
attempts to subvert it.
There is a potential feature of the password manager that could defeat this
unwillingness by means of usefulness. This feature was raised in Study 8. Though it
was not initially conceived as being an explicit part of the PM functions, it is very much
in its spirit of training users how to pick memorable and secure passwords, and with
applying the same password where possible within each of the groups of systems.
These interventionscould be extended to promote algorithms that produce universal
passwords that would be acceptable on all the systems in BT; or at least as widely
accepted as possible within each password expiry group. Even if the resulting
password was complex, the overall reduction in complexity of the password
management task would more than compensate. By offering such a useful feature,
previously unwilling users may be seduced into using, or at least looking at a password
manager. However, permission was not given to test this. Moreover, user based
password synchronisation is still a lot of effort for users. The organisation is likely to
receive far greater benefits by supporting users with machine based password
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synchronisation or single sign-on technologies than with a PM. Indeed, by highlighting 
the ease with which passwords can be manually synchronised, the organisation also 
reveals the repetitive nature of the procedure and so its ripeness for automation. By 
forcing users to perform simple yet repetitive and time consuming password 
maintenance, greater discontent might be brewed with the security architecture. There 
is therefore a paradoxical risk that simplifying the password management task (with a 
half-way measure) could foment greater dissatisfaction with and less respect for 
security among users.
The Study 8 participants (who were from a more operational and lower status part of 
the organisation) were generally more concerned with security than Study 7 
participants, for their own and the organisation’s sake. They too reported a similar mix 
of problems that the PM would help with. They seemed more open to techniques that 
could help them.
It should be noted that some participants in both series already employed some of the 
techniques promoted in the password manager - particularly grouping systems together 
and giving the same password (70% in Study 7, 40% in Study 8), and that many of 
these participants still found password management difficult, and had what they 
reported as extensive contact with helpdesks as a result. Employing the password 
manager in its entirety rather than only a small selection of its recommendations could 
lead to far fewer forgettings and confusions. However, despite best efforts to make it 
simple and quick, learning and using the password manager is likely to require a 
significant investment in time and effort. In weighing the benefits and costs of using it, 
users may come to a conclusion that it is better for them to avoid using it and simply 
call the helpdesk instead - this is a rational decision on their part, as the password 
costs are shared out with other parts of BT, not just borne by them personally.
In this context, encouraging users to take more responsibility for password 
management was seen by users in Study 7 as a cynical ploy by the technical support 
department to reduce its costs at the expense of everyone else. Thus users lose yet 
more respect for security in the organisation; see less point in conforming to it, and so 
the “weakest link” is weakened (cf. Adams & Sasse, 1999). Study 7 users’ attitude of 
"someone else's problem" represents a difference in culture and perception of risk 
between the two study sites. Extra interventions could encourage Study 7 users to act 
in a way that would improve security and reduce helpdesk use: cultural change 
programs, publicising impacts, contractual obligations to perform security management 
functions and punishment if they don't (to make users perceive higher personal risk). 
However, these will come at the expense of allocating security tasks to stakeholders 
who could be carrying out production tasks instead. Overall, a strategy of having users
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shoulder the security burden rather than technical and organisational infrastructure 
could cost BT more to achieve the same security.
10.6 Summary & Conclusions
A package of interventions designed to improve password system performance was 
created containing information and paper-based tools to support users in: the selection 
of passwords, selection of password hints, manual password synchronisation, and the 
writing down of passwords. This package was reviewed by BT users from two different 
parts of the organisation in a series of focus groups, to increase the level of confidence 
that these interventions addressed appropriate problems and would be acceptable. It 
was found that these interventions, and by extension user based interventions have a 
role to play, but will not be very effective on their own because they suffer from lack of 
buy in from powerful groups of stakeholders.
User based interventions might be made more acceptable to users if they included 
algorithms for generating passwords that would be universally acceptable across 
systems with different password constraints (ie, official support for user based 
password synchronisation), thereby dramatically reducing the number of passwords 
users’ had to manage. This is at best a tentative conclusion - such an intervention 
might also reduce security’s standing among users.
However, a paper-based password management tool approach would not suit mobile 
users. Moreover, machine based password synchronisation would lead to greater cost 
savings to the users themselves than only manual password synchronisation. User 
based interventions would therefore be much more acceptable to users (and so 
apopted by them rather than subverted) if combined with technical and organisational 
changes.
10.7 Contributions
10.7.1 Substantive
The existence of different agendas of different groups of stakeholders in the 
organisation has been identified. This has important implications for researchers and 
practitioners designing interventions to improve password system performance. For 
example, it reveals the necessity of supporting user based interventions with technical 
and organisational interventions, and identifies a risk in attempting user based 
interventions on their own. Studies 7 and 8 therefore partially validate the requirement 
for a holistic approach to security. By so doing the necessity is established for models
206
ts. \ Studies 7 & 8: Validation of interventions
such as have resulted from this research and presented in chapters 11 and 12, that 
encompass human memory as well as technical and organisational aspects of 
password system performance.
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11.1 Introduction
This chapter abstracts the findings from the previous chapters into a model (Figure 36). 
The model is described in both prose and diagram form. Some benefits of the model 
are presented.
11.2 Description of model
This small scale framework focuses on how factors combine inside the user to produce 
password system performance. This framework is composed of several different 
stages: mechanism, security administration, environment, design, input, activator, 
schema and output stages. The first five stages build upon this PhD’s findings and 
Adams et al’s (1997) model of password usability, and the final three stages integrate 
Reason’s (1990) conception of human error.
11.2.1 Mechanism stage
The first stage addresses the perceived qualities of password mechanisms. In some 
cases, the perceived qualities match the actual qualities of password mechanisms - the 
strengths and weaknesses of password encryption algorithms (model component 1) 
and password files (model component 2) are well understood. These qualities are 
given in the model as they are known to be for UNIX password mechanisms. This is 
the model from which password content recommendations are implicitly generated, and 
is therefore the underlying model of password mechanisms that are used in risk 
management. This is important because the UNIX password mechanism is considered 
poor by modern standards, and so its use requires users to choose password content 
that makes up for its inadequacies (section 4.2.1).
In contrast, password mechanism performance (model component 4) is a quality that is 
either assumed to be adequate, or not adequate (but not researched). For example, 
the incorrect rejection rate (see 8.4.4) of password mechanisms has never been 
studied. Similarly, there does not seem to be published work about the incorrect 
acceptance rate associated with password systems in real world studies. Moreover, 
the costs associated with users’ password daily use, maintenance, and assistance is 
not discussed within the password performance literature.
Different password mechanisms may have built into them different configuration 
options (model component 3). These may limit the policy choices available - for 
example a choice between no policies and 6 digit PINs forced upon the administrators 
of the voice mail system in Study 3 (section 7.3.9).
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These data, perceived and real values and configurations options feed into risk 
management, which is undertaken in the next stage: security administration.
11.2.2 Security administration stage
The basis of security is the management of risk-the assessment of the likelihood and 
severity of impacts, their subsequent prioritisation, and the allocation of resources to 
protect against them. However, security administrators are not in possession of all the 
information they require: for example the costs of password mechanisms to individual 
users, and in aggregate to the organisation (section 9.3) are not fully appreciated, and 
it is still not certain what protection they offer.
Security administrators set policy (model component 6) and allocate security functions 
(model component 5) on the basis that the allocations have an acceptable cost, but 
these administrators do not know what the costs are because the costs had not started 
to be measured until this PhD. Moreover, instead of adapting the password 
mechanisms to protect against dictionary attack -an intervention which is know to have 
high costs: security administrators allocate this function to users (where the costs are 
not measured).
There are other difficulties in risk management relating to passwords. Password 
mechanisms are vulnerable to many different attacks, but few can be subjected to 
persuasive numerical analysis. Dictionary attacks are one of the threats where it is 
possible to (seemingly) easily calculate the effect of a defensive measure. Because 
defending against dictionary attack is easy (and is believed to have negligible costs), it 
becomes a focus and priority of the security architecture. Contrast this with the social 
engineering vulnerability: it cannot easily be predicted how much protection is offered 
by n-minutes of training. This is a general problem in the allocation of resources to 
production and security (see Brostoff & Sasse, 2001).
The next factor is disciplinary procedures (model component 7). These appeared to 
promote secure behaviour in Study 9 focus group participants (section 10.4.2,10.5), 
who feared for their jobs if some security breach occurred with one of their computer 
accounts. However, these were relatively politically weak employees. Study 8 
participants were generally several grades higher in the organisation, and were far less 
fearful of disciplinary procedures. Disciplinary procedures feed into the perceived risks 
part of the environment stage. Disciplinary procedures are in tension with reputation 
management, because formal and punishing responses to security breaches 
necessarily admit their existence.
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The final factor of the security administration stage is reputation management (model 
component 8). If breaches or even foiled attacks become known, it is predicted that 
users will behave more securely (Adams & Sasse, 1999; Adams et al., 1997, and see 
perceived risks in the environment stage). However, there is currently a tendency to 
cover up security incidents rather than publicise them. There are two main reasons for 
this:
1. it could become negative publicity and harm the organisation’s reputation, and so 
negatively effect sales or production; and
2. it can spread knowledge of vulnerabilities that can then be exploited by greater 
numbers of attackers, and so can increase the organisation’s level of risk.
Because the feedback from security is delayed and unrewarding (i.e. nothing happens), 
and the feedback from production is so immediate and reinforcing (see Brostoff & 
Sasse, 2001), it is difficult to justify an intervention that can so clearly harm production. 
Until it can be shown that publicising security breaches protects more business than it 
spoils, then it is unlikely that breaches will be publicised. However, this cannot be 
shown until breaches are publicised.
11.2.3 Environment stage
The environment stage represents the social, work, and perceptual context in which 
password design and use occurs.
Perceived resource sensitivity (model component 9) relates to users’ perceptions of the 
sensitivity of the information or other resources being protected by the security system. 
Security procedures protecting information perceived of as sensitive were complied 
with (for example by designing strong passwords) and security procedures protecting 
unimportant information were subverted (Adams, 1996; Adams & Sasse, 1999). This 
finding applies to information only, though attackers may wish to access computing 
facilities rather than the information associated with them. The finding is therefore 
extended in the model to include more general resources, in the assumption that its 
psychological validity remains intact.
Perceived risks (model component 10) are a function of the visibility of attacks against 
the system, and sanctions enacted by the organisation against the user. It has 
previously been found that users who believed that the system (and the information it 
protected) were vulnerable make more effort to implement strong password design 
(Adams, 1996; Adams & Sasse, 1999). However, if the threat against the system was 
perceived to be small, strong password design was believed to be unnecessary and 
laborious, and so was not adopted. The perceived risks were larger if system breaches
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were public knowledge and if physical security was perceived to be low. In contrast, 
the existence of highly visible and tight security (and little publicising of security 
breaches) gave the perception of safety. In addition, some users feared punishment 
from the organisation if a breach should occur, and took steps to protect themselves by 
complying with security policies - this was observed in Study 8 focus groups (sections 
10.4.2 and 10.5).
The next factor is support (model component 11). This consists of three facets, which 
together reduce the negative consequences of experiencing a password problem, 
either by reducing the likelihood of a problem (tools) or by maintaining productivity after 
a problem has occurred (colleagues, help desks). They mediate the motivation for and 
so the effort put into managing and designing passwords. For example, Study 7 focus 
group members felt it would be a better use of their time to call the helpdesk than 
systematically manage their passwords (section 10.4.1, and 10.5). In other cases, it 
might not matter if you forget your own password if a colleague offers his to carry out 
your work with. Finally, it is less necessary to pay attention to your passwords if you 
have them recorded somewhere in a password safe, diary, e.g. a prompt.
Working practices (model component 12) corresponds to the compatibility between 
security systems and the amount of information sharing between colleagues. Adams 
et al. (1997) found that users who commonly had to share information as part of their 
work subverted security systems that enforced separate passwords. The security 
systems were seen as obstacles to task completion. Users subverted incompatible 
security systems by altering the design of their passwords so as to make them more 
usable (less costly) with the consequence that they were weaker as passwords. 
However, if security systems were compatible with work practices then users would 
conform to the principles of strong password design.
Business cycles (model component 13) reflects longer-term temporal components of 
work which may interact with password use. For example, some systems may only be 
accessed at the end of the financial year. Furthermore regular patterns of system use 
may be interrupted; for example through vacation or business trips, or other kinds of 
leave. All these examples could combine with password expiry policies to create 
helpdesk use. However, even the interruptions have predictable temporal features. 
None of these regularities appear to have been taken into account in the design of 
password systems.
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Mechanism Security Adm inistration Environment Design Input Activator Schem ata Output
Structures
Encryption algorithm -j 
Attributes Values
Cryptographic
strength
Strong
Speed V.Fast
No. of chars, used Up to 8
Resistance to 
social engineering
V.SIight
Resistance to 
disclosure (of 
password)
V.SIight
Password file 
Attributes
2
Values
Availability E asy/W ide
Resistance to 
dictionary attack
Slight
Resistance to 
other attacks
V.SIight
Configuration options 3 
Attributes Values
Required content Inflexible
Etc. Inflexible
Perform ance 4
Attributes Perceived
Values
Correct
acceptance
?V.Higb
Incorrect rejection ?N/A
Incorrect ?V.Low
acceptance
Correct rejection ?V.H igh
Daily use
M aintenance
Assistance
?N/A
?N/A
?V.Low
Allocation of function 5
(to users)
Resistance to dictionary 
attack
Password management 
(to mechanism)
Enforcing security 
policies:
Strong password 
content
Compartmentalisation of 
passwords
Password expiry
No. Of strikes
-  V
Policy
Strong password 
content
Compartmentalisation of 
passwords
Password expiry
No. Of strikes
Disciplinary
procedures
Reputation
m anagem ent
Perceived 9
resource
sensitivity
Support 11
Tools
Helpdesks
Colleagues
Working 12
MemoratoCty 14 
Design
Backup/ 
Prompt 
strategy
Password 15
design
strategy
Make the 
same where 
possible, 
else
Make
similar
Append/ 
insert digits
Iterate digits
Password 16
management
strategy
Change
password
when
prompted
Prompt'!?
New or 1 f
changed
passwords
Inter- 28 
ruptions
Specific 21 
Activators
Current
intention
Present
context
Related
schemata
General 22 
Activators
(shared 
elements) 
Similarity to 
other
passwords
Affective
charge
Recency
Frequency 
of use
: --  1 J:
(0
E
0)
■C
o
CO
Successful 27
password
use
Forgetting 26
Confusion 24
Unintended
action
Other slips
Error of
intention
(mistake)
Figure 36-Small Scale model o f the corporate password problem
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11.2.4 Design stage
The factors of the environment stage feed forward to the design stage as a set of 
restrictions on design and a predisposition toward either upholding system security or 
reducing the personal costs of password ownership. The design stage conceptualises 
the transformation of password restrictions and behaviour predispositions into a plan 
for performing the password use and ownership tasks. This factor has been termed 
memorabiiity design (model component 14), because the most important task in 
password ownership and use is knowing what the password is at the time it is required 
by the computer. Passwords may be stored internally in the users memory (and 
recalled during login) or externalised (and copied out during logins). The weighting and 
detail of these routes to password storage and retrieval will have direct consequences 
on the security of the system. A predisposition to uphold system security will tend to 
weight password design strategy (model component 15) toward producing stronger 
password content, and expending mental effort to remember the password. In this 
context the prompt strategy will increase the users mental effort to reduce the ease of 
password cracking by an attacker, e.g. by making the physical prompt an obscure one; 
or not using a physical prompt at all.
A predisposition to reduce costs of password use will weight memorability design, 
password design and password management strategies towards easy remembering of 
passwords, or perhaps even a complete reliance upon prompts. This will ensure that 
the password is available when required, but at much less mental cost to the user.
This is associated with a password management strategy (model component 16) where 
passwords are changed only if the system requires them to be, and requires the user to 
do so. This avoids the monolithic effort of changing all the passwords at once, but 
replaces it with delayed but larger negative consequences. It may be worth 
investigating this further as an individual difference in delayed gratification.
The output of the design stage is a completed memorability design (model component 
14), with its associated key parts, the prompts (if any) and the new or changed 
password itself.
11.2.5 Input stage
The input stage contains the actual password and prompts produced in the previous 
stage. The prompt properties (model component 17) part of this stage is only relevant 
if password use fails, and the prompt must be referred to. The prompt has structural 
and semantic properties. For instance, the prompt may consist of, "The password is: 
password", or it may consist of a knot in a handkerchief. The usefulness of the prompt
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rests in the context of its use, and its activation of related schemata (increasing the 
activation of the password itself), which combine to form the residual risk it will not 
work. Many users will set this residual risk to zero by making the prompt identical to 
the password itself.
Password properties (model component 18) refers to the number of 
characters/complexity of the password, the meaning of the password if it has one, its 
personal significance, etc. One of the most important properties is whether the 
password is new or changed (model component 19).
All these properties are processed in the next stage, along with interruptions (model 
component 20). These have been identified as a significant source of human error 
(see 3.3.5). There are many compelling and frequent sources of interruption in large 
organisations-telephones, colleagues, e-mail alerts, etc. They can occur at any point 
during password construction or use.
11.2.6 Activator stage
This stage draws out some of the properties outlined in previous stage that have been 
previously identified as of psychological interest in human performance. It is where the 
findings from this thesis tie into an existing psychological framework -schema based 
control as illustrated in section 3.3.5. The properties in the previous stage are 
converted into activation, which is used in the schema stage. Each password schema 
gains activation through general activators (model component 22) and specific 
activators (model component 21). For example the newness of a password identified 
in the previous stages contributes activation through the general activators recency and 
frequency of use; the password’s personal significance is converted into activation 
through the general activator affective charge, and so on. Specific activators have less 
to do with the password properties, and more to do the context and intention of the 
user.
11.2.7 Schema stage
Passwords are represented as schemata in the user’s mind. The password schemata 
compete to gain enough activation to be triggered as behaviour at the keyboard. The 
password schemata gain activation by the stimulation of general and specific activators 
in the previous stage. It is possible for the wrong password schema to be triggered.
The result of the competition to be triggered is dealt with in the next stage.
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11.2.8 Output stage
Depending on which schema was triggered in the previous stage, a different outcome 
may result. The correct password may be used correctly, or there may be several 
different kinds of errors committed (see section 3.3.5).
11.3 Benefits
This model explains novel findings about password system performance using existing 
psychological theories. Password expiry (see section 7.3.2) and password confusion 
(see section 8.3.1) have been found to be large causes of password problems, and 
more significant than the password literature suggests. Their magnitude in this PhD is 
explained by the model as the result of competition between rival schemata. The model 
also explains why strong passwords can be difficult to remember in lab studies but 
comparatively memorable in real world studies (see section 4.1.2) - activation gained 
through higher frequency and recency of use of the passwords in the real world studies 
make them easier to recall.
The model ties together attributes of the password mechanism itself, with the 
administrative response to these attributes, to the users’ adaptations to the 
administrative response, and explains the resulting performance. The model can be 
used to assess the relevance of proposed interventions by linking their modes of action 
to the known causes of password system performance.
11.4 Summary & Conclusions
A model is presented that summarises the previous findings of this thesis about the 
causes of password system performance in BT and UCL, and by so doing bring us 
closer to answering Research Question C. The model builds upon the models of 
Adams, Sasse & Lunt (1997), Adams and Sasse (1999), and Reason (1990).
The model shows that the properties of password mechanisms lead to a security 
administration response to compensate for these properties by applying password 
security policies, and allocation of security tasks to users rather than weak password 
mechanisms. This results in users making particular design choices about their 
passwords and password backup strategies. These all conspire with the schema 
based control of human performance to produce password problems.
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11.5 Contributions
11.5.1 Substantive
A new model is presented that ties problems with password system performance to 
existing psychological explanations and explains novel findings from previous chapters. 
This model can be used to as a starting point for further research that can be used to 
create generalised theories of password system performance. The model may also be 
used as a starting place for reasoning about potential interventions (see section 9.4).
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The purpose of this chapter is to present and reflect upon the conclusions of the 
research conducted in this thesis, and to propose future research topics and directions. 
To date, little empirical work has been carried out in the area of the usability of 
password authentication. This thesis has undertaken exploratory research in both the 
field and the lab, and has presented a body of empirical evidence that represents a 
contribution to our understanding of the performance of password authentication in 
large organisations. This chapter will start with a restatement of the research problem. 
There will then be a section summarising the paths that organisations choosing an 
authentication mechanism can take as a result of this PhD. This will be followed by an 
overview of the contributions made in the thesis in pursuing its four research questions:
Research Question A) Substantive contributions presenting quantitative measures
of password system performance, and the effect of different 
security policies upon it.
Research Question B) Methodological contributions made during the research that
enabled the measurements above.
Research Question C) Substantive contributions of models of password system
performance and organisational security system 
performance.
Research Question D) A substantive contribution of the proposing of interventions
for improving password system performance based on a new 
theoretical appreciation, with the start of validation for some 
of these interventions.
Then there will be a section critically examining the research contained in the thesis. 
The chapter will close with proposals for further work.
12.1 The problem restated
The research on which this thesis is based was sponsored to address the pressing 
business problem of unacceptable numbers of password related requests at internal- 
facing computer helpdesks in BT. BT originally specified the research problem as 
users choosing unmemorable password content, and forgetting it. As research 
progressed, it became clear that the problem of password helpdesk use was deeper, 
and that treating it as an issue of memorable password content would result in a poor 
solution. Different questions needed to be asked.
The research became Improving password system effectiveness” in large
organisations such as BT and UCL, and was based on the Long and Dowell applied
science conception of Human Computer Interaction (e.g. Dowell & Long, 1998 see
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section 2.2.1). Restated in the terms of this conception, the PhD aims to generate 
knowledge to help:
1. Reduce the costs of password authentication systems to stakeholders, and to 
improve the quality with which password systems carry out the authentication 
task, and to
2. Start model building that may eventually enable the findings of this research to 
be generalised and validated, so that they may be re-used for other classes and 
scales of work system in the domain of information security.
These aims were argued to require answers to the following research questions:
a) What is the performance of password systems?
b) How can password system performance be measured?
c) What causes password system performance to be good or bad?, and ultimately
d) What interventions could improve the performance?
12.2 How to choose an authentication mechanism
Organisations wishing to implement authentication mechanisms can take two paths as 
a result of this thesis
1. Focus on the device - a classic HCI perspective, or
2. Take the wider view embodied in the new Elevation model of Chapter 12.
For the first path, the organisation should predict the pattern of device use. High- 
frequency use makes the traditional password mechanism appropriate. Strong 
password content can be used, particularly with extended enrolment that increases the 
amount of practice with and depth of thought about the password. Mnemonic 
techniques may be possible. With low-frequency use, enhanced password 
mechanisms will give better availability while maintaining confidentiality and integrity. 
Alternative paradigms such as tokens or biometrics could be considered.
For the second path, the organisation should consider how authentication fits into the 
culture and working practices that are local to the new site of authentication. Tying in 
authentication to existing organisational infrastructures, such as personnel department 
should also be considered. The existing authentication load on the intended users, the 
burden imposed by password recovery and distribution systems, and the interaction of 
existing password mechanisms with the incumbent mechanism must also be 
considered. Additional support may be provided to users, or security functions 
allocated to infrastructure rather than users. Motivational techniques could also be 
considered. By taking a wider view, it is possible to avoid or ameliorate additional risks
that are brought by installing a new mechanism. There is a better chance that overall 
system security can be improved, rather than local improvements that produce impacts 
in other parts of the system.
12.3 Contributions of the thesis
12.3.1 Research Question C: Allocation of function
One of the primary contributions of this thesis is the documenting of harm done to 
security by the seemingly overzealous application of standard and respected computer 
security techniques. Evidence has been collected that the following increase the use of 
helpdesks:
1. Password expiry (in Chapter 7 it was the single most frequently reported 
technical and organisational cause of password resets in the data; and greater 
proportions of problems occurred just after password expiry as frequency of 
expiry increases; in Chapter 8, problem logins were on average closer in time to 
password changing than successful logins).
2. A bar on writing down passwords (in Chapter 7 evidence was presented that it 
increases forgetting problems).
3. Minimum password strength requirements (in Chapter 7 evidence was 
presented that this policy requires greater frequency of password use for 
passwords to become automatically recalled; in Chapter 8 a trend was detected 
for greater numbers of resets to be associated with added password 
complexity).
4. Compartmentalisation of passwords between systems (i.e. different password 
required on different systems; in Chapter 8 using the wrong password was 
found to be the second biggest login problem in the data) and historical 
compartmentalisation within systems (i.e. different passwords are required after 
each expiry; in Chapter 8 - expired passwords being used in place of current 
passwords was the largest single source of login problems recorded).
5. Three strikes policies (in Chapter 8 data it was found that there were a large 
proportion of users requiring more than three attempts to login when there are 
no three strikes policies).
While it may be privately acknowledged that these risks exist - they have not before
been demonstrated emprically. This demonstration also forms part of the answer to
one of our research problems - what is causing poor password system performance.
Complex security functions in the organisation were allocated to users rather than to
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technology or infrastructure (particularly in the case of creating strong passwords to 
resist dictionary attack). Security technologies and techniques were applied where 
they were inappropriate - passwords and associated password security policies 
enforced on systems that are infrequently used. This is a novel position in a discourse 
about password performance that tends to blame the user for not knowing how to 
remember or choose passwords, or for not trying hard enough.
12.3.2 Research Question A: Password system performance
On the route to the contribution above, it was necessary to measure and document the 
performance of password systems:
1. 11 errors in password use were recorded by a total of 3 (out of 6) 
participants, a 3% login error rate (Chapter 6), with 7 of 11 of these 
errors being typos. No helpdesk uses were recorded.
2. 37% of login failures observed (in Study 4) were due to entering the most 
recently expired password, with another 15% entering a different 
password than the one required - making approximately 50% of failed 
logins due to confusion between passwords.
3. Approximately 30% of login failures observed (in Study 4) were due to 
other slips, lapses, and mistakes by the user.
4. Approximately 60% of causes of password helpdesk use (in Studies 2 
and 3) are forgetting, followed by approximately 30% caused by technical 
or organisational problems, with about 10% caused by users’ slips, 
lapses, and mistakes (combined n=174, Chapter 7).
5. Types of errors are different according to how frequently the password is 
used. For heavily used passwords (>30 times/month) the proportion of 
helpdesk use caused by forgetting drops to about 20%, while 
technical/organisational problems jump to 70%. For lightly used 
passwords (< 1 time a month), technical/organisational problems account 
for only 10% of helpdesk uses, with the remainder caused by forgetting 
(Chapter 7, Figure 17)
6. Three separate password authentication systems at BT had password helpdesk 
use rates of 3.6,1.2, 0.9 resets per user per year (Chapter 8). Assuming 
similar patterns of use the UCL-CS based password system in Study 5 would 
have 0.7 resets per user per year (Chapter 8).
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Password system performance data of this kind has not previously been available to 
researchers and practictioners, and so forms a substantive contribution. These 
findings can be used to assist practitioners in planning of authentication systems and 
support services such as help desks, and can aid researchers in the planning of 
studies - they will have a better idea of what password system performance to expect 
(findings 1, 6 above), under what conditions (finding 5 above), and the relative 
proportions of different kinds of problems (findings 2, 3, 4). Moreover, these findings 
act as a starting point from which to make comparisons. If practitioners or researchers 
measure password systems as having substantially different performance then this 
indicates important operational and research issues that should be given attention.
12.3.3 Research Question B: Measuring password system 
performance
In the course of collecting the data which led to the contributions above, different 
methodologies were investigated. These investigations resulted in knowledge about 
benefits and drawbacks of these methodologies in this field of research, which together 
form a methodological contribution.
Measurement is the cornerstone of research, without it there is no data to analyse.
The methodological findings of this thesis will enable researchers to collect data about 
passwords more easily, and to collect data of a better quality that allows deeper 
insights.
System logs
Chapter 6 found that standard UNIX password system logs are not appropriate for 
tracking the password use of individual users. These logs give ambiguous data that 
allow little insight into the psychological causes of password problems, and so are not 
appropriate for password system research (section 6.4.2).
If it is not possible to alter the logging system, Chapter 8 shows that by shifting focus to 
a different kind of system log it is possible to gain valuable insights at a wider scale. It 
is possible to estimate password system performance using helpdesk logs, and to 
identify problem systems without having to alter security policy, or change the way 
authentication mechanisms operate or record login events - which may breach security 
policy. This is useful in environments where the researcher has little control.
If however it is possible to make changes then authentication mechanism logs become
much more useful. Chapter 4 suggests the measurement of intervals between
enrolment and first login generates data that can help assess the ecological validity of
laboratory studies, which is very difficult to do at present.
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Study 5 (Chapter 8) shows that recording every login success and failure produces 
data that allows researchers to start reasoning about the setting of password policies 
such as three strikes. Chapter 8 also illustrates an authentication logging system 
specifically constructed to support password research, which allowed direct inspection 
of password error types and their real world frequencies through comparing actual 
passwords with the contents of login attempts. This allowed a more ecologically valid 
and informative analysis of login problems than had previously been available from the 
prevailing methodology - lab studies of password memorability. The utility of this 
methodology was shown by finding an unexpected result - that password confusion is a 
very frequent cause of password problems (section 8.3.1). This result could have 
profound implications for research about password system performance - the literature 
has focussed on password forgetting, with an effort towards making more memorable 
passwords. However, password confusion must be tackled by reducing the power of 
distractor passwords, by reducing their number (fewer to be distracted by) and/or 
reducing their memorablity (each one is less distracting) - a strategy opposite to the 
one currently being pursued by researchers and practitioners. The novel system 
logging method initiated in this thesis may therefore result in changing the direction of 
research in password system performance.
The logging system above collects password content data which causes a vulnerability 
- the data can be used by attackers to impersonate authorised users. It is likely that 
there will be few circumstances when such logging systems are deployed. Chapter 8 
has demonstrated logs that recorded less sensitive information such as password 
enrolment, use intervals, login failures and helpdesk uses would still improve our 
understanding of password system performance and its parameters, and aid in the 
design of and extrapolation from lab studies.
Diaries
This PhD formed the first trial for diaries in password research.
• Overall there was a good correspondence between diary reports and system logs
• Diarists over-reported password use by an average of 2 uses per person per day 
in the study
• The data did not show participants altering their behaviour to avoid making 
diary entries
Some difficulties were experienced, and recommendations were made for their study, 
amelioration and avoidance (section 6.6.1).
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These findings about diaries will enable researchers to have more confidence in the 
accuracy of results in password diary studies. This is important because password 
diaries offer a uniquely accurate view across the many different password systems a 
user is part of that is not practicable using other techniques.
With the recommendations for enhanced diaries researchers will be able to plan and 
implement studies which can collect better quality data with a larger sample of users. 
This will allow greater confidence in the accuracy of results (for example by checking 
timestamps against diary entries), and (by using the installed base of PDAs in large 
commercial organisations) will make it more easy to achieve sample sizes that enable 
conclusions to be made with known levels of certainty about the populations from 
which the samples were drawn.
12.3.4 Research Question D: Interventions for improved 
password system performance
It was possible to propose interventions for improving password system performance 
based on a new theoretical appreciation of it. Validation was begun for a subset of 
these interventions. This subset was selected because of its focus on “redesigning” 
users. The interventions were combined into a package that consisted of training 
embedded in a paper-based tool to support the following:
• Password selection for strength and memorability of content
• Selection of password hints
• Manual password synchronisation
• Writing down passwords
The tool was presented to some of its potential users at BT in two series of focus 
groups. Despite describing many of the problems that the tool was designed to solve, 
and in several cases employing some of the techniques proposed in the tool, the 
relatively powerful users from the research arm of the organisation made many 
negative comments about it. Though some of these were practical critiques, the chief 
criticisms were that the tool was the wrong approach-changes should be made to the 
authentication systems not people who have to use them. These users predicted that 
they would prefer to use the helpdesk than make the effort of using the tool, and they 
would avoid the tool even under significant risk of punishment. The less powerful users 
from the operational branch of the company made far fewer criticisms, which could be 
addressed by moving the tool from paper to electronic media. It would appear then 
that if used the tool would work, but that the tool would not be used by a significant
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proportion of its intended user population, who would object to it on a political or 
cultural level.
12.4 Critical review of own work
This section will present some criticisms of the research presented in this thesis.
12.4.1 Other Human Factors based models of Security
There are four models of human factors in security that have not been considered 
during this research and which may be viewed as competitors or a serious omission:
1. Spruit (1998),
2. McCauley-Bell et al. (2000),
3. McCauley-Bell (2002), and
4. GAO-98-68 Information Security Management (GAO, 1998).
None of these models were published when the current research was started, all of 
them emerged while it was being conducted.
12.4.2 Social and cultural factors
In Chapter 10 it was found that relevant and otherwise promising interventions would 
not improve password system performance due to management, cultural and social 
obstacles (section 10.5). Social and cultural issues have not otherwise been studied in 
this thesis. Section 5.1.1 identified this as an aspect of the HCI discipline’s necessarily 
limited worldview - industrial politics and sociology does not come under the domain 
knowledge of HCI, and so it is not treated in the model presented in Chapter 11. 
However, it is predicted that some of the interventions proposed in this thesis will avoid 
cultural/ social objections similar to those observed in users in Study 8, as the 
interventions require changes to infrastructure - exactly the changes proposed by the 
objecting users. While the wider context of interventions has not been considered 
throughout this work, at least some of the interventions proposed in this thesis remain 
potentially effective from the user’s point of view. However, there are secondary and 
tertiary stakeholders, and their political and cultural stand will alter the effectiveness of 
any intervention. Managerial, social and cultural factors must be considered in future 
research and attempts to improve system in practitice. A model with a wider scope 
than Chapter 11 ’s is needed.
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12.4.3 Unexploited indices of usability and performance
This thesis has focused on performance metrics which are various kinds of errors in the 
use of passwords, and to a much lesser extent has assessed the time taken to 
complete tasks. However, the discipline of HCI recognises many other performance 
metrics including learnability, cognitive workload, physiological stress (galvanic skin 
resistance, blood volume pulse, etc.), users’ satisfaction, and fun. By focusing on a 
limited set of metrics, it is possible to arrive at a view of the problem which is less full 
than could be achieved with the wider set. For example, analysis of the merits of rival 
authentication technologies might lead to quite different conclusions if user experience 
type metrics were considered. If it were found that some authentication mechanisms 
lead people to want to use them for the sheer pleasure of it then there could be 
significant implications for solving the password problem. However, most of the 
implications and contributions of this thesis would still stand: installing a more 
intrinsically pleasurable authentication technology would likely be as costly as fixing the 
existing password mechanisms due to the extensive changes required to infrastructure.
12.4.4 Psychology of risk and motivation
While much of this thesis is both directly and indirectly to do with the management of 
risk, there has been no direct treatment in this thesis of the individual’s psychology of 
risk. A full account of the human factors of computer security cannot avoid this topic, 
which is a component of the wider question of what motivates users to behave securely 
(Weirich & Sasse, 2001). Given ideally usable security systems, users must still have 
the motivation to use them (Weirich & Sasse, 2001), and if they do not use them there 
will be no security. The previous statement shows how intimately related usability and 
motivation are to security. However, people cannot be motivated to use ideally usable 
security systems that do not exist. While not directly addressing the issue of 
motivation, this thesis has nevertheless pointed out its importance. In Chapter 10 
interventions were assessed and found to offer the promise of improved password 
system performance. However, at the same time it was demonstrated that these 
interventions would not succeed because a significant group of stakeholders would not 
be motivated to use them in part because they felt less personally at risk. Further 
research may focus on manipulating stakeholders perceptions of risk to provide 
interventions to motivate them to behave more securely; though at the probable 
expense of an increase in stakeholder costs.
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12.4.5 Legal aspects, national and international standards
This thesis has not considered the legal aspects of password authentication, nor the 
role that national and international standards and certification play in security 
architecture. It may be the case that companies are bound to enforce password 
policies that this thesis has found to be counter-productive because laws or standards 
require them to. However, this would still not invalidate the contributions made by this 
thesis, which could be used to inform and reform counter-productive laws, guidance 
and certification.
12.4.6 Ethical and legal issues
Participants in Studies 4 and 5 were unaware that their coursework system account 
details or their system use trails would be subject to examination for the purposes of 
this research. Their consent was expressly not sought, as it was predicted that 
participants might alter their behaviour, particularly in the choice of passwords. This 
was seen as a substantial risk, because the validity of these studies hinged on 
measurements being taken of real users performing real work in real circumstances.
There are three related issues about these participants’ knowledge and consent. The 
first is that participants passwords were available to this researcher, without 
participants being warned that this would be the case. Not knowing that the passwords 
were available to this researcher, the participants may have selected their password to 
be the same as used on other systems, thus unwittingly revealing information that the 
researcher could use for identity theft. The second issue is that participants’ consent 
was not sought for the examination of their passwords for research purposes. The 
third issue is that participants’ consent was not sought for examination of their system 
use trails for research purposes.
UCL’s Information Systems conditions of use policy states that all student’s data may 
be inspected for security purposes, and that systems and their contents may be 
examined to see if they are secure (UCL, 2004). It is common practice for systems 
administrators to examine passwords in very similar ways to those used here-for 
example in password strength audits. The researcher had already been acting as the 
system administrator for the coursework system, and so was already trusted with the 
participants’ account details, and could be reasonably expected by participants to 
perform password strength audits. Moreover, the researcher was routinely asked by 
the participants to remind them of their forgotten passwords (rather than asking to be 
supplied with new ones), implying a belief that the researcher already knew the 
passwords. This addresses the first issue.
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Users of the coursework system may have expected that sensitive information like their 
passwords would be used only for the purposes of administering the system - for 
example supplying users with forgotten account details, or performing security audits. 
These audits are not designed to benefit the user, though they may do inadvertently by 
preventing their account from being the point at which security is breached. Rather, 
these audits are designed to benefit the organisation by improving its knowledge of its 
users behaviour, and enabling it to improve its password systems’ performance. 
Similarly, this research is designed to improve knowledge of users’ behaviours to 
improve password system performance, though the inadvertent benefit to users whose 
account data has been examined is likely to be less. In both cases the sensitive 
information is used for very similar purposes. Participants had already agreed to uses 
of their data very similar to the additional uses to which it was put. This partially 
addresses the second and third issues.
The researcher now knows that UCL’s data protection policies required that informed 
consent should have been sought for research use of the participants’ data. This policy 
was not knowingly breached. Future research must seek this consent from 
participants. The standard technique for obtaining consent is to ask users to agree to 
the conditions of use / privacy policy during registration. This would not be feasible on 
a coursework system where use of the system is compulsory. An opt-in facility for 
research should be provided instead, with an explanation of the purpose and use of 
data collection.
12.4.7 Establishing causality
Throughout this thesis assertions have been made about the effect of security policies, 
but the evidence presented for these assertions has not met the traditional level of 
proof required by HCI and its parent disciplines: demonstration through the controlled 
manipulations of a laboratory experiment. The evidence presented has been 
descriptive and correlational, and furthermore has in some cases been based on user 
reports rather than direct observation, and in some cases reports of what users 
might/would do rather than what they have done. Despite falling short of science’s gold 
standard of proof, it is the author’s claim that this evidence is persuasive and useful. It 
represents a significant contribution to the amount and detail of evidence previously 
available. It identifies issues of importance in the real-world that could be investigated 
under more controlled and laboratory conditions, whereas starting with a programme of 
laboratory studies could not guarantee the same level of real-world relevance. Being 
applied and field based research it by definition cannot meet the exacting standards of 
pure and laboratory research. It was not possible to manipulate conditions in the field:
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in many cases this would have required amending security policies, either to make 
them more lax-which BT's security departments would be unwilling to do-or by making 
them harsher, and thereby reducing productivity which would not be ethical and would 
not be acceptable to line managers.
12.4.8 Sampling issues
Many of the contributions of this thesis were based on survey data collected at BT. It 
was unfortunately not possible to follow standard sampling procedures in the collection 
of this data, as it was not possible to get the relevant information about the composition 
and whereabouts of BT of users. Consequently, it is not possible to confidently assess 
the generality of the findings from the survey respondents to the rest of the 
organisation. However, sociodemographic information was collected in the surveys, 
which shows that 43% of the respondents were management grade, and a further 18% 
were senior management. The author presumes that even if the sample was not 
representative, this is a sample of users that is powerful within the organisation, and 
whose password problems the organisation would want to address. They are therefore 
a valid and useful sample to study.
12.4.9 Analysis of residual risks
This thesis does not address whether risk of loss of availability due to the 
organisation’s password practices outweighs the changed risks to confidentiality and 
integrity of relaxing these practices. It could not, because this would involve deep risk 
analysis, which would not be practical in a PhD and would be too commercially 
sensitive to be released to the researcher had it been done by the organisation.
This thesis also does not address the cost of interventions, or the effect of interventions 
on password costs. It would be difficult to make reasonable generalisations. The most 
accurate costings would involve trialling the interventions, which would not be feasible 
in a PhD. Less accurate costings would involve the recruitment of specialists within BT 
to make estimates-however the author has not been able to access them. Specialists 
from outside the organisation may not give as accurate estimates, but would be easier 
to contact. In the author's opinion however, determining the size of intervention effects 
must rely on further empirical work rather than specialists’ estimations.
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12.5 Further directions
12.5.1 Password design for recall with competition
This thesis has shown the large extent to which confusions and interference between 
passwords can effect password system performance. However, studies of password 
design have focused almost exclusively on their memorability in isolation from other 
passwords. Their resistance to confusion has been completely ignored. The next 
stage in research about password design should address this, as it is implicated in two 
of the causes of poor password system performance: the proliferation of passwords, 
and their forced expiry. This will likely require experimental designs where participants 
recall several passwords concurrently instead of just one, or are forced to learn and 
forget passwords in quick succession. By pursuing this route it may be possible to 
generate guidelines for the optimum number of passwords to be used at any one time, 
and algorithms for their selection.
12.5.2 Security and system administrators
Further research is required with systems administrators and security personnel about 
their selection of security technologies and their configurations. In particular, the roles 
of national and international standards should be explored, and attitudes and reasoning 
about the deployment of relatively new technologies such as bcrypt passwords. Are 
there any issues which prevent otherwise beneficial technologies being employed?
How do systems administrators decide that a technology has become mature or safe 
enough to use? Anecdotal evidence suggests that otherwise desirable changes are 
not adopted in case the changes are used to target scapegoating activities at the 
systems administrators.
12.5.3 The costs & effects of interventions
Further work is needed to make it possible to predict costs of interventions, both in 
terms of purchase/implementation costs, and also to the three sources of password 
costs. This will require more validation activities to be carried out on the interventions 
proposed in as real circumstances as possible. Laboratory conditions may have to 
suffice because of the difficulty of performing these interventions in a company without 
high-level management support. Further work should include evaluating the effects of 
these interventions on the categories described by the two new models.
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12.5.4 Sampling and surveys
If possible, work should be done to improve the surveys conducted in this thesis. The 
surveys could be rerun using better sampling. This will require much more aid from the 
hostBT than was available during the time of this PhD. Information regarding the 
numbers, types, and locations of different kinds of stakeholders within the hostBT will 
have to be made available to researchers. Moreover, researchers will have to be given 
enough access to these stakeholders to conduct the survey, and will then require 
suitable inducements to answer the survey questions-all of which may be difficult to 
achieve for stakeholders at the extremes of corporate class.
All of the participants in the diary studies reported in this thesis described the 
burdensome nature of making entries for every use of a password. The use of 
advanced sampling techniques in conjunction with electronic password diaries 
implemented on personal digital assistants (PDAs) could greatly reduce this burden, by 
recording a much smaller sample of each individual’s password events and building a 
bigger picture using statistical techniques. Techniques such as these would benefit 
from the probably large installed base of PDAs in organisations that are large enough 
to face particularly difficult password problems.
Feeding into the enhanced surveys should be studies about the performance of 
different types of question for uncovering the number of passwords owned and used by 
stakeholders. In particular, the role and effectiveness of prompts about the different 
systems that passwords might be attached to.
12.5.5 A wider focus
This thesis has been explicitly placed in an Ergonomics/HCI viewpoint - focusing on 
issues such as allocation of function, time and errors, and purposefully ignoring cultural 
and social factors that have been the preserve of the Information Systems discipline 
viewpoint (section 4.1). Despite this, the work reported in this thesis has inexorably 
lead to the conclusion that motivation, managerial, social and cultural factors must be 
addressed (Chapter 10). Research is already beginning on the first of these issues 
(e.g. Weirich & Sasse, 2001), and work on the latter issues is ongoing in the 
Information Systems community (reviewed in Dhillon & Backhouse, 2001). However, 
there may be difficulty bridging the theoretical chasm between the disciplines so that 
the sociological work can be operationalised in ways that Computer Scientists and 
Ergonomists can understand. Attempts should be made in this area, and a preliminary 
attempt is made here.
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This section presents a model describing security and human error on a large-scale, 
showing at a high level what an organisation needs to do to be secure. It is a view that 
extends to parts and concerns of the organisation beyond the security system. By 
taking this wide view the model allows reasoning about the causes of password 
problems, such as the findings described in Chapters 9 and 11, and security problems 
more generally.
The first part of this section describes the model in overview, and then in detail. The 
benefits of the model are then briefly discussed. A start on validation of the model is 
then made, by peer review. A revised version of the model is then presented based 
upon the comments received during the peer review procedure.
Overview of model
Instead of modelling an individual information system, the model describes security 
from the perspective of a (commercial) organisation (though the model should apply 
equally to UCL as to BT). For security breaches to occur, active failures must combine 
with latent failures (Figure 37), which are built-in weaknesses in the organisation that 
predispose it towards active failures and disaster. Latent failures can be found at all 
levels of the organisation, which are modelled as (Figure 37): decision makers 
(strategy makers, the board/ executives), line management (departments that enact 
particular parts of strategy), preconditions (prerequisites lying between line 
management and productive activities), productive activities (actions by users), and 
defences (to protect the organisation from attack).
Violations-the intentional breaking of security policies are categorised as being part of 
the group of not-secure acts. The other not-secure acts are due to human error and 
comprise: slips and lapses (unintended actions), and mistakes (intended actions with 
unintended consequences). Not-secure acts are also known as active failures-the 
easily observable actions made by users that tend to compromise security.
The most benefit is to be gained by tackling latent rather than active failures. In the 
same way that it is better to drain the swamp instead of killing mosquitoes one by one, 
it is better to rid the organisation of latent failures, which are the breeding grounds for 
active failures (Reason, 1990).
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>re a c h
Active failure Latent failure
1.Defences
Inadequate Defences
2.Productive Activities
Not-secure Acts
3.Preconditions
Psychological Precursors 
Of Not-secure Acts
4.Line Management
Line Management 
Deficiencies
5. Decision Makers
Fallible Decisions
Figure 37 - Overview of large scale model
Detail of model
Reason's GEMS (see section 3.3.5), combined with Basic Elements of Production, is a 
comprehensive model for ensuring safety in organisations. The research reported in 
this thesis demonstrates that the model can be applied to reasoning about security 
design for organisations. It is a model that is informed by a detailed understanding of 
both individual and organisational characteristics that direct user behaviour. The model 
(Figure 38) is described in two sections: firstly, failures at the system (organisational) 
level - which are the more serious of the two kinds of failures, and secondly, failures at 
the individual (user) level.
Latent failures, and Basic Elements of Production
For a security breach (disaster, or accident) to occur, not-secure acts must combine 
with latent failures and or unusual environmental conditions (see Figure 37). On their 
own, not-secure acts are necessary, but not sufficient to cause system disasters. A
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consequence of this is that the model assumes that security breaches are due to 
people inside the organisation, even if they are initiated by external agencies such as 
crackers, natural disasters, etc.
Latent failures can be thought of as something like resident pathogens. They are 
weaknesses built into the system, which predispose the system to disasters. Using an 
example of having your workstation cracked while you surf the web, the not-secure act 
of “surfing on company time” combines with the latent failure in the system of “un­
patched Windows” to produce a disaster-getting your PC cracked and used as a 
“zombie” to launch denial of service attacks.
Latent failures act by promoting not-secure acts (Figure 38, model components 2.1 to 
2.3) and weakening the system's defences (model component 1). As with pathogen- 
related diseases, the catastrophic breakdown of complex, opaque socio-technical 
systems require the breaching of defences by combinations of resident pathogens and 
sometimes bizarre local triggering events. Other things being equal, the system is 
likely to have more resident pathogens if it is more complex, interactive, tightly coupled, 
and opaque. However, while simpler systems are usually less interactive, less 
centralized, and more transparent, they tend to have fewer built-in defences. As a 
result, relatively few pathogens can wreak greater havoc in simpler systems than in 
more advanced ones.
Having the concept of a latent failure as something that predisposes a system to 
security breaches necessitates some definition of one. A system or organisation is 
described in the model in the following way (Figure 38):
Decision-makers (model component 5) direct the organisation at a strategic level 
(CEOs, VPs, etc.), and
Line management (model component 4) implement the strategies of decision makers. 
This implementation creates the
Preconditions (model components: 3.1 usable and secure equipment of the right kind, 
3.2 a skilled and motivated workforce, 3.3 appropriate attitudes and motivators, 3.7 
appropriate work schedules, 3.5 appropriate system administration and maintenance 
programs, 3.6 environmental conditions, 3.4 codes of practice and policies, etc.) for
Productive activities (model component 2) which are the activities the organisation and 
its users carry out to attain its payoff, e.g. telephone service provision, degree level 
education.
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1. Defenses
Safeguards against forseeable hazards
When productive activities involve exposure to natural or intrinsic security 
hazards, both individuals and machines should be supplied with safeguards 
sufficient to prevent fbrseealble injuries to confidentiality, integrity, availability, etc.
1.1 firewall
1.2 antivirus
1.3 intrusion detection
1.4 backup
1.5 UPS
1.6 alarms
1.7 VPN
1.8 guards
1.9 CCTV
1.10 air conditioning
1.11 sprinkler systems
1.12 PKI
1.13 etc.
3. Preconditions
Productive activities
Integration of human and technological elements,
WHERE ACTIVE FAILURES OCCUR,
Actual performances of humans and technology: the precise
synchronisation of technological and human activities in order to
deliver the right product at the right time.
mistakes
violations
4. Line management
IT, maintenance, training... etc
Usable & secure hardware & software, a skilled & motivated workforce, etc. 
Prerequisites for successful production that lie between line managers and 
productive activities. Qualities possessed by both technology and people:
3.1 hardware and software of the right kind:
3.1.1 usable
3.1.2 secure
3.2 a skilled & knowledgeable workforce
3.3 an appropriate set of attitudes & motivators
3.4 codes of practice that are clear guidance regarding <
&/or efficient) & undesirable (r
3.5 patching /maintenance /auditing |
3.6 environmental conditions 1
3.7 appropriate work schedules 
to name but a few.
Departmental specialists who implement the strategies of the 
decision makers in particular spheres of operation such as:
5. Decision makers
Corporate management 
The architects and high level managers of the systems. They set the goals 
for the system as a whole and direct, at a strategic level, the means by 
which the goals should be met. A large part of this is j 
resources such as:
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
IT
maintenance 
training 
sales
money 
equipment 
people (talent and 
time
to maximise both pri
Figure 38 - Detailed view of large scale model
Defences (model component 1) protect the organisation, such as: 1.5 uninterruptible 
power supplies, 1.1 firewalls, 1.7 virtual private networking, 1.4 data backups, 1.11 
sprinkler systems, etc.
The causes of a breach can be traced to failures at all levels listed in this model. To 
indicate this, the model’s levels have been relabeled appropriately (Figure 37).
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It should be noted that latent failures tend to happen in cascades, with latent failures 
higher up in the model (e.g. decision makers) causing several latent failures in the level 
below it, and so on (Reason, 1990).
This cascade effect is the basis of the assertion that removing latent errors in higher 
parts of the system is more beneficial than removing errors further downstream 
(because these downstream errors are then prevented). This cascade effect should be 
noted in a cost / benefit analysis as it has important implications for the prioritisation of 
possible interventions.
Active failures and GEMS
The model posits three kinds of human error (see section 3.3.5). Active failure, or 
active errors occur at the level of users in the system. There are three active failure 
and types:
• Slips (attentional failures), and lapses (memory failures) both of which are 
(model component 2.1) unintended actions that lead to a bad result, these two 
are sufficiently similar to be treated as one category. The third is
• Mistakes (model component 2.2, which are rule-based or knowledge-based 
mistakes) intended actions that lead to an unintended result.
Together with the traditional focus of computer security,
• Violations (model component 2.3) - another intended action, but one where 
security policy is broken intentionally,
these form the class of unsafe acts which in the domain of information security we re­
label as not-secure acts.
Slips and lapses
These active failures are described in section 3.3.5 and the Appendix 1. The key 
property of these not-secure acts is that they are unintended. The user attempts a 
secure act, but it is executed incorrectly. For example, entering the most recently 
expired password when meaning to enter the new password that replaced it (e.g. one 
explanation for the prevalence of expired passwords -  see Table 34 in section 8.3.1).
Mistakes
This stage of model contains another class of active failure known as mistakes. A 
mistake is an intended action which has unintentionally bad consequences. The user
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is able to successfully execute the action that he planned to, but his act was not-secure 
because his plan was faulty in some way. For example, entering the expired password 
believing it to be the new password (e.g. another explanation for the prevalence of 
expired passwords in Table 34 in section 8.3.1). In this section two ways will be 
considered in which actions are planned/problems are solved, and the different kinds of 
errors that these planning mechanisms produce.
The first of the two attentional control mode methods of planning actions (see section
3.3.5) is by using heuristics. Actions are planned by using a series of if then rules, 
such as: //sending confidential e-mail then use PGP. These rules can be wrong in two 
ways: they can be good rules which are applied in the wrong situation (the if part is 
wrong), or they can be bad rules (the then part is wrong). Appendix 1 lists some of the 
ways that good rules can be misapplied, and that rules can be considered to be bad.
The second of the two attentional control mode methods of planning actions is by 
problem solving from first principles. These knowledge-based errors are described in 
more detail in Appendix 1.
Violations
Although violations have traditionally been the focus of computer security, there is 
evidence that they cause less damage than is caused by human errors (see end of 
section 3.3.5). A short taxonomy is presented in Appendix 1.
Although violations are intentional breaches of security policy, they are not always 
malicious. Routine violations are accepted as normal behaviour by people inside the 
organisation. They can occur when users believe the official policy to be inefficient, 
and where a shortcut exists. The intention is not to harm the organisation, but rather to 
support its goals by doing work more efficiently. An example might be leaving a 
workstation without locking the screen - many users do it because they trust their 
colleagues and believe it is unnecessary, not because they want hackers to have 
access to sensitive information. In fact, they may believe that it is necessary not to 
leave it locked as there may be social repercussions for being security conscious - 
colleagues may think that you distrust them or that you are otherwise being 
disrespectful (Weirich & Sasse, 2001).
Exceptional violations occur under unusual circumstances, where an action is 
perceived to be for the greater good of the organisation. The solution to an emergency 
might be to pursue a course of action which is against security policy. For example, 
when much needed information is in a soft document that has been quarantined by 
antivirus software so that it cannot be accessed, an operator disables the anti-virus
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software and opens the document to save the day. A special case of exceptional 
violation is when a user is tricked into unknowingly harming the organisation through 
social engineering.
All intentionally malign security breaches by users are classed as sabotage, whether or 
not the user was tricked into them by social engineering. Included in this category are 
breaches where harm is not intended per se, but the advantage of the breach accrues 
to the individual at the organisation’s expense. An example of this might be the salami 
attack, where the individual aims to make himself rich by skimming off the fractions of 
pence from interest calculations, rather than aiming to impoverish the bank (which does 
not even notice the attack).
Preconditions
Stage 3 of the model lists some of the preconditions for successful productive activity, 
such as codes of practice giving clear guidance about behaviours that are desirable 
and undesirable (model component 3.4). If these preconditions are not met, then latent 
failures have been introduced into the organisation and productive activity is likely to 
result in active failures and perhaps disaster.
Examples of this from previous chapters include:
• Disclosure policies (section 3.2.8) /not informing users that it is all right to write 
down passwords given suitable precautions. This predisposes users to try and 
remember their passwords, which causes them to forget them more frequently. 
When this happens, productive activity must stop until the password is 
reinstated by the helpdesk.
• Password expiry and compartmentalisation of passwords (section 3.2.8) both 
make the password management task more difficult, because it is allocated to 
users who are poorly equipped to deal with it rather than infrastructure. By 
spending more effort in managing their passwords, users are less able to 
perform productive activities. Moreover, the complex password management 
task is more likely to go wrong, requiring helpdesk support before productive 
activities can continue.
It is easy to construct hypothetical examples using this stage of the model. If users are 
not knowledgeable, then they may not know that threats exist or what to do about 
them, which predisposes the system towards security breaches and so is a latent 
failure. If users are overworked, then they are more likely to suffer slips and lapses or 
make mistakes, etc.
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Line Management
Line management (model component 4) interpret the strategy set down by decision 
makers. They are responsible for ensuring that the preconditions exist for productive 
activity. Deficiencies or bad decisions made by these specialists result in the lack of a 
necessary precondition. If line management do not liaise appropriately, then there can 
be conflicting priorities and interests, which predispose the system to disaster. For 
example, a line manager in purchasing may keep costs of a new IT system down by 
not purchasing its optional single-sign-on module, despite the resulting additional 
password resets being charged to another line manager’s account. Line management 
in turn depends upon decision makers.
Decision makers
If decision makers (model component 5) do not allocate appropriate resources to line 
management, then line management will not be able to put in place the necessary 
preconditions for productive activity. For example, funding may not be available for the 
deployment of single sign on technologies. Management also set the goals of the 
organisation, which may produce latent failures. For example, the goal of cutting costs 
may mean that line managers are encouraged to complete projects under-budget, 
which may cause a line manager not to purchase the optional single-sign-on module 
(see previous section).
The higher up in the model the latent failure occurs, the more dangerous it is because 
its consequences are wider reaching. Single bad decisions by decision makers can 
cascade to several latent failures lower down the organisation.
Benefits
The new model has several benefits, which are listed below. The first set of benefits 
relate to the modelling of the context of users in security systems:
1. It guides security practitioners and researchers to consider the wider context 
around security technologies - it reminds us that there is more to security than 
software and mathematics; there are people too, and their interactions with the 
above and each other. This helps practitioners and researchers expand their 
focus to consider a wider set of critical factors, and so makes their solutions 
more comprehensive. This gives greater chance of preventing security 
breaches than by merely blaming users for not complying.
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2. Non-technical and social aspects such as organisational procedures and 
training are an essential part of the model, not an ancillary to it (cf. Dobson, 
1993). This ensures that solutions based on the model integrate well into the 
enterprise, and help to build a "human firewall".
3. The model gives the context for lower-level models such as BLP (e.g. Bell & 
LaPadula, 1973). This helps the practitioner engineer the context, so it 
supports rather than subverts interventions or designs based on lower-level 
models.
In particular, the model focuses explicitly on organisations:
4. It situates the user in the context of the organisation, rather than treating the 
user as a single unity devoid of context (Dobson, 1993). This enables the 
practitioner/ researcher to better cope with the security problems of large 
distributed organisations.
5. The model contains an enterprise description, which LaPadula (1993) has 
identified as a desirable property. The model helps researchers and 
practitioners to identify relevant components of the enterprise/organisation 
which he or she might otherwise be unable to identify. It therefore better helps 
researchers and practitioners to understand and investigate breaches / security 
incidents
6. The model points to the importance of line management, which has been left 
out in rival approaches such as Spruit (1998) (see section 12.4.1). This gives 
the researcher/practitioner an extra route through which to intervene, thus 
giving greater flexibility.
The model has benefits related to its flexibility in application:
7. The model avoids premature formalisation (cf. Dobson, 1993). This can allow 
the model to be rapidly tailored to suit the organisation’s individual needs.
8. The model can form the basis of tools to help incident investigators and security 
auditors in ways that purely technical models cannot. It can therefore help the 
practitioners to intervene in a wider variety of situations than purely technical 
models can.
And finally:
9. The model points to the area of security that is weakest, and where therefore 
the largest gains can be made. This gives the practitioner a way to make more 
powerful, efficient and effective interventions than those aimed at other areas.
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Validation Method
The new model is too large to be validated within the confines of a PhD by 
conventional means such as experiments. Instead, a start on validation was made 
using peer review.
The new model was outlined in Brostoff (2002), together with examples of its 
application, and sent to two experts for review. The experts were Mary Ellen Zurko and 
Dieter Gollmann.
Mary Ellen Zurko, currently Lotus Next Generation Security Architect in IBM Software 
Group, was principle author of a paper that helped to start the recent movement for 
usable security (e.g. Zurko & Simon, 1996). She has been a prominent member of the 
ACM’s New Security Paradigms Workshop for many years, serving on the Program 
committee and Steering committee, both as member and chair. Much of her extensive 
career in software engineering has been on computer supported collaborative work 
(CSCW). For the previous 5 years she has been developing and researching security 
for Lotus Notes, CSCW software designed for corporate wide use. This has given her 
insight into the security issues facing organisations like BT, and the integration and 
performance of software in such a diverse environment. For the 15 years before this 
she has been developing user interfaces for and performing user-tests of security 
software.
Dieter Gollmann is one of the editors-in-chief of the International Journal of Information 
Security, is serving on the program committees of the major European conferences on 
computer security (ESORICS), and cryptography (EUROCRYPT), has authored a 
computer security text book (Gollmann, 1999), and is a visiting Professor at Royal 
Holloway, University of London while working at Microsoft Research, Cambridge UK.
His current interests are “best described as foundations of security”.
Validation Results
The results are presented in two parts, overview and then detail. Within each part, the 
benefits of the model identified by expert reviewers are given first, and then their 
criticisms.
Overview
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The expert reviewers identified a number of benefits of the new large scale model, 
which are summarised in Table 53. The quotes that give rise to these summaries are 
given in the next section (Detailed results - Benefits). The author agrees with these 
benefits of the large scale model, and they will not be discussed further.
The expert reviewers made a number of criticisms of the new large scale model, which 
are summarised in Table 54. The quotes that give rise to these criticisms are given in
Table 53 - Summary of the large scale model’s benefits identified by expert
reviewers.
Benefit
type
Summary Quote#
Scope 1. Gives an comprehensive view of the system 1,2
Usefulness 2. Helps to find powerful & comprehensive interventions 3,4
Integration 3. Human factors are well integrated with more traditional 
security concerns
5,6,7,8
Validity 4. Human error components relating to violations are well done 9
Novelty 5. It allows interesting tools and products 10
Relevance 6. It is complementary to other models 11
Table 54 - Summary of expert reviewers’ criticisms of the large scale model.
Criticism
type
Summary Criticism#
Usefulness The model is not useful because particular critical aspects of 
security are not treated in it.
1,2
Practicality Various issues prevent the model being deployed in practice. 3,4,5,6,7,8,9
Validity The model does not point to the area of security that can be 
improved the most, as is claimed
10
Relevance The model contains irrelevant details 11
Clarity The "Products” aspect of the model is not clear 12
the section Detailed results - Criticisms. The author does not agree with the majority of 
these criticisms. Arguments against these criticisms will also be given in Detailed 
results - Criticisms.
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Detailed results - Benefits
This section will first give quotes where the expert reviewers’ have identified benefits of 
the large scale model. These benefits are not contested by the author, and so are not 
discussed further.
Benefit 1 Gives a comprehensive view of the system
1. The Macro strengths of the model are that it encourages a full systems 
view of security and serious consideration of the implications of decisions 
at all levels.
2. It gives a good overall view____________________________________
Benefit 2 Helps to find powerful and comprehensive interventions
3. it's good to provide a model that shows where the most impactful fixes 
would come from
4. On attacking latent vs. active failures (end of 2.1): Generally in security, it's 
good to pay attention to all aspects. You both want a system that is set up 
to be secure, and attention paid to making the human component secure 
as well (with both usability and consideration of morale issues). It's true 
you can't get rid of attempted external active failures, but you want to do 
what you can to minimize both latent and active failures. It's a belt and 
suspenders kind of approach.__________________________________
Benefit 3 Human factors are well integrated with more traditional security 
concerns
5. It is nice to have a model that gives a place to slot usability failures.
6. I think it's quite useful to integrate human error into such a security model, 
and you do so quite well.
7. It does quite well in fleshing out and emphasizing usability, social, and 
organisational aspects,
8. I think the biggest win of this model is the emphasis it gives to social and 
usability issues. It can be cited when trying to ensure that they are properly 
considered.
Benefit 4 Human error components relating to violations are well done
9. The description of routine violations is good.
Benefit 5 It allows interesting tools and products
10. [about latent failure profile, based on proactive security review suggested 
in Expert Pack] it would be interesting to see such a bar chart generated.
Benefit 6 It is complementary to other models
11. ...the proposed model is complementary to existing security models.
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Detailed results - Criticisms
A summary of each of the expert reviewers’ criticisms of the large scale model is given 
below, preceded by a reference number matched in Table 54. Underneath each 
summary will be the quote(s) from which the summary is made, followed by discussion 
of the criticism’s merit.
Criticism 1 The model cannot cope with active adversaries.
12. I think there's less attention to the implications of having an active 
adversary (the aspect that makes security different from most other 
disciplines).________________________________________________
This is a particularly serious charge. The active adversary notion is applied to human 
beings who are attacking the organisation (rather than the malware they are 
employing), who use intelligence, knowledge and skill to switch attacks when their 
current attack is not working. A significant proportion of attackers may be said to be 
active adversaries, therefore were this criticism true it would mean the model is useful 
in relatively few circumstances. This criticism shows that the model may not have been 
understood, which also severly limits it’s utility.
The model does help against active adversaries, in three ways:
1. It posits that users actively subvert security systems in order to advance the 
organisation’s agenda (e.g. they make routine and exceptional violations -  see 
p.232). The model proposes that this is due to latent failures in the organisaiton, 
and that removing these will lessen the risk and impact of these violations.
2. It explicitly promotes knowledgeable and well motivated employees (in the 
preconditions layer of the model). This has been proposed as one of the primary 
safeguards against active adversaries (e.g. Schneier, 2000).
3. The most part of the model is about detecting vulnerabilities in the system, and 
plugging them - the security technique prevention (see section 2.1.2 on page 23). 
Adversaries of any kind must exploit vulnerabilities to breach security. If there are 
no vulnerabilities, then the attacker does not have anything to exploit and so cannot 
be successful. If the vulnerabilities exist but are too expensive or risky to attack, 
the security bar has been raised, and the adversary’s options have been reduced. 
The model therefore protects against any kind of adversary. The only conditions
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under which the model could not assist against active adversaries is if prevention 
does not work.
In addition, the model specifies that there be procedures and mechanisms in place that 
promote security, for example the Defences and the Preconditions levels of the model. 
Detection and response, the two other main techniques of security, are not explicitly 
specified in the current version of the model they can be easily accommodated, and 
should be in future revisions.
Criticism 2 The model misses a necessary component of security - compliance 
testing.
4. One aspect that seems less well covered by your model is checking for 
compliance. This includes tiger and penetration teams, running tools like 
SATAN, running audits of physical security compliance, etc. I suppose not 
considering these would be a line management deficiency. Perhaps is a 
precondition/motivator - 3.3____________________________________
While the model does not explicitly use the words "compliance testing", it does imply 
that this is necessary. Layer 3 of the model, preconditions, asks that there be 
appropriate auditing programmes (stage 3.5 of the model). Compliance testing is a 
type of auditing programme. Since compliance testing is an important part of computer 
security and its implicit treatment in the model was not effective, it needs to be made 
explicit in the model.
Criticism 3 The model’s recommendations to proceduralise work are not 
practicable.
5. workable procedures and relevant training are not possible (to the extent 
you suggest) for all jobs. And it's not just the higher in the organisation that 
works against proceduralization. It's also the size of the organisation. In 
small orgs, everyone is expected to show greater initiative and diversity of 
skills.”
The model was used to assert that to avoid knowledge based errors leading to security 
breaches, work should be proceduralised as much as possible so that processing of 
work occurs at the rule based or skill based level, thus avoiding the knowledge based 
level and its potential errors. Where it is not practical to proceduralise work (as in the 
reviewer’s example of a small company), then this strategy will not work. However, 
there are likely to be many situations where it is possible and practicable to 
proceduralise work, or parts of work, particularly in large organisations such as BT & 
UCL at which the current research is aimed. Moreover, the greater contribution of the
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model is to identify the existence of errors, rather than their solutions. 
Procuduralisation is only one strategy to combat knowledge based errors, and others 
may be possible.
Criticism 4 The model cannot help people who are constrained to intervene at a 
lower level than management.
6. doesn’t help someone “Figure out what they can fix, based on what they 
have responsibility for. While the greatest improvements may come from 
organisational fixes, they may not be within the scope of the decision 
maker. You do allude to that issue a couple of time (for instance, at the 
end of 2.2.1), but I’m not sure how it would be integrated into a concrete 
use of the model."
This is partially correct. The model points out that it is better to intervene at the level of 
management if it is possible. However, the model contains levels below management 
at which interventions can be made. The model can point to aspects of safeguards (for 
example) that may be improved on a technical level to better to prevent and respond to 
active failures, for example increasing the number of times passwords are confirmed 
during password changing, to prevent forgetting or confusion with the expired 
password. However, most security related interventions require at least management 
oversight.
Criticism 5 The model would be hard to operationalise for novices.
7. It's probably pretty hard for a non-security expert to translate from the 
abstractions of the model into concrete possibilities. It may be that you're 
just targeting intensive use by experts at this time, but that's not clear
8. There are so many issues, it's hard for the non-expert to know what to 
emphasize._________________________________________________
The model is not intended for novices to operationalise. It is intended that the model 
be operationalised by experts, who would create tools from the model that could be 
used by novices. A checklist is derived from the model and given in Brostoff (2002) as 
an example.
Criticism 6 The model has not been used on real data, so we don't yet know if its 
possible to get the real world data that the model requires..
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9. I think it would be very useful to the model to use it on a real case; not just 
docu-dramas based on snippets of real cases. I know how hard that can 
be, but I think it could offer useful insight into what kind of information is 
available, and what kind isn't, in reality. If the information isn't available for 
some aspects of the model, then what would that imply?______________
Organisations are often unwilling to release details of their security breaches to 
outsiders because of the risk of damage to their reputations-therefore it is difficult to get 
real world data with which to test the model.
However, internal security departments necessarily have access to confidential and 
sensitive information. Moreover, in some circumstances there is protection in law to 
encourage sharing of sensitive information about vulnerabilities (Poulsen, 2004). The 
model is aleady used as the basis for regular safety audits in a process of continuous 
improvement (Groeneweg, 2002). This requires both management and employee 
commitment to the idea that investigating safety is good for the company even though 
safety breaches bring bad publicity. Safety and security have similar properties, and so 
a similar auditing process for security should be possible.
Criticism 7 If assumptions of trusted hardware and software are necessary, then the
model’s useless.
10. if this model can't be usefully used without trustworthy hw and sw, then it 
can't be usefully used, and it must be purely theoretical________________
This criticism rests on how terms are defined. "Trusted" is often used as a technical 
term in computer science, with a meaning similar to “logically or mathematically 
verifiable”. The model requires that the system uses hardware and software "of the 
right kind", which is defined as hardware and software which is “usable” and “secure”. 
The model assumes that there is hardware and software of the right kind available, 
which is a realistic assumption to make. However, the model does not make the 
assumption that trusted hardware and software is available. This is a far less realistic 
assumption, as the construction of trusted hardware and software is very difficult and 
expensive and its use is constrained, putting it beyond the reach of many 
organisations.
The explanation of the model did however use the term "trusted", although it was 
meant to mean "of the right kind". To avoid further confusion, future versions will 
employ less confusing terminology.
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Criticism 8 It is difficult to see how this model would be used in practice.
11. There are a lot of issues with figuring out how to slot this into a 
corporations natural processes, which I think I’ve touched on.__________
It is proposed that the model is used as the basis for tools which would be "used in 
practice” rather than the model itself. Examples of these tools, such as a checklist for 
use in incident investigation have been given in Brostoff (2002). Moreover, tools and 
processes based on Reason’s original (1990) model have been used in the 
petrochemicals industry (Groeneweg, 2002).
Criticism 9 Needs a catchy name.
12. need a catchy name__________________________________________
This is justified.
Criticism 10 The model does not point to the area of security that can be improved 
the most, as is claimed.
13. I'm still not convinced this points to the areas of security where the largest 
gains can (in practice) be made. None of your examples hone in on that 
aspect; they seem to work hard instead to cover lots/all areas___________
It would be difficult to test this assertion empirically. However, there is evidence that 
the human component of computer security leads to the most security breaches (Spruit 
& Looijen, 1996), and to the majority of the cost of security breaches (NIST, 1992). 
Taking this view, the assertion that humans are the weakest link and so the area that 
has the most ground to make up is correct.
Criticism 11 The model contains irrelevant details: about the environment.
14. Around page 46, it looks more like safety and less like security.
15. What environmental conditions could make a security breach more likely?
Ones that make the system higher risk, like a high profile site or 
organisation, political, social, or cultural issues, well funded competition, 
etc_______________________________________________________
Human error is a large part of computer security (section 3.3.5). If the environment can 
cause human error, as this PhD’s results demonstrate, then those aspects of the 
environment which can cause human error definitely are relevant to computer security.
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Expert One described aspects of the environment which would tend to make the 
organisation more likely to be attacked as being relevant. The model also describes 
aspects of the environment which make the organisation more vulnerable to attacks, 
therefore they are relevant.
Criticism 12 The “Products” aspect of the model is not clear.
16. Looking back to table 4, I can’t figure out the relationship between 1.
Defences and the Products box._________________________________
This criticism probably refers to the products box in Figure 38, and the input and output 
lines connected to it. Product is used in its abstract sense in the model, meaning the 
output of work performed by the organisation. This may not have clearly emerged from 
the model’s presentation.
As well as this, the model assumes that there are feedback loops from all levels of the 
model leading back to senior management. For convenience, these have been shown 
on the diagram in Figure 38 as a single loop, perhaps suggesting that feedback from 
the defences has something directly to do with products. This is not the case, and 
could be made more clear in future versions of the model.
Revised model
Stages 1 and 3 of the new model were revised in the light of criticisms made by the 
expert reviewers. This revised model is presented below in Figure 39.
The description of stage 1 was revised to counter the misapprehension that the model 
cannot help in situations where there is an active adversary. The new description 
makes more plain the principles that the defences are designed to uphold. These 
principles are the general principles of computer security, which are effective against 
active adversaries.
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1. D e fe n s e s
Safeguards against forseeable hazards
When productive activities involve exposure to natural or intrinsic security 
hazards, both individuals and machines should be supplied with 
safeguards sufficient to prevent, detect, and react to forseealble injuries 
to confidentiality, integrity, availability, etc.
insurance
firewall
antivirus
intrusion detection 
forensic qulity logging system 
backup 
UPS 
alarms 
VPN
2. P ro d u c tiv e  a c tiv it ie s
Integration of human and technological elements,
WHERE ACTIVE FAILURES OCCUR,
Actual performances of humans and technology: the precise 
synchronisation of technological and human activities in order to 
deliver the right product at the right time.
3 . P re c o n d itio n s
Usable & secure hardware & software, a skilled & motivated workforce, etc. 
Prerequisites for successful production that lie between line managers and 
productive activities. Qualities possessed by both technology and people:
3.1 hardware and software of the right kind (not necessarily trusted):
3.1.1 usable
3.1.2 secure
3.1.3 configured appropriately
2 a skilled & knowledgeable workforce
3 an appropriate set of attitudes & motivators
4 codes of practice and procedures (where possible) which are 
clear guidance regarding desirable (secure SJor efficient) & undesirable 
(not-secure & not efficient) performance
3.5 appropriate:
3.5.1 patching
3.5.2 maintenance
3.5.3 auditing programs
3.5.4 compliance testing
3.5.5 penetration testing
3.6 environmental conditions that 
permit efficient & secure operations
3.7 appropriate work schedules 
to name but a few.
slips & lapses
4 . L in e  m a n a g e m e n t
IT, maintenance, training... etc.
Departmental specialists who implement the strategies of the 
decision makers in particular spheres of operation such as:
5. D ec is io n  m a k e rs
Corporate management 
The architects and high level managers of the systems. They set the goals 
for the system as a whole and direct, at a strategic level, the means by 
which the goals should be met. A large part of this is allocating finite
resources such as:
money 
equipment
people (talent and expertise)
time
4.1 IT
4.2 maintenance
4.3 training
4.4 sales
4.5 finance
4.6. procurement
4.7 security
4.8
4.9
safety
4.10
4.11 S T
4.12 law
and so on.
1
to maximise both productivity and security
In i
Figure 39 - The revised "Elevation"model
Section 3 of the model has had several amendments. The first of these addresses the 
criticism that the model is not useful if it relies upon trusted computer systems. The 
first revision emphasises that what is required is hardware and software of the right 
kind, rather than having properties and behaviour that are known and verifiable.
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The second revision of stage 3 is the addition of item 3.1.3 "configured appropriately". 
This item is a particularly important intersection of the previous two items: hardware 
and software will not be secure if they are configured inappropriately, and they are less 
likely to be configured appropriately if they are unusable.
The final revision of stage 3 addresses the criticism that the model neglects an 
important area of security "compliance testing". Compliance testing is a form of 
auditing, and auditing one of the items that is already specified in the model. The 
revision makes clear that "compliance testing" is one of the preconditions of a secure 
organisation.
Wider view summary
A new model of security in the organisation has been presented that addresses the 
organisation's greatest vulnerability - human beings (Figure 39). This model may be 
used as a starting point for reasoning about the human factor in security in BT and UCL 
(i.e. answering Research Question C - What are the causes of good or bad password 
system performance?, and Research Question D - What interventions can be made to 
improve the performance of password systems'?).
The new model has as its foundation the five levels of Reason’s (1990) Basic Elements 
Of Production, which also contains a model of individual human error (see section
3.3.5). Each of the levels can serve as a source of errors or failures that can result in a 
security breach. For a breach to occur it is necessary for iatent failures to combine with 
users’ active failures such as slips, lapses and mistakes (Figure 37). Failures higher 
up in the system (with decision makers or line managers) are more important, because 
these higher-level latent failures produce a cascade of failures in levels below them, 
increasing the numbers and types of vulnerabilities in the system and so increasing its 
risk. By comparison, the elimination of active failures is seen as a much less fruitful 
goal.
The model may lead to more general models that can be used in other large 
organisations. Some confidence in the model has been achieved through a process of 
expert review. Many of the criticisms were due to misapprehensions of the model and 
the model was revised to address the criticisms. However, this review has shown that 
the model has difficulties in being understood, particularly in the key area of security 
against active adversaries. Further work is needed to address these difficulties.
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12.5.6 Construction of investigation, auditing and design tools
The new models presented in this and the previous chapter may be used as the basis 
of auditing tools that can be part of an ongoing process of examining and improving 
security in the organisation. These may also form the basis of tools for incident 
investigation, which will help to prevent repetitions of the incident and may improve 
security more generally. The new models were based on Reason’s models of human 
error. Tools already exist in the industrial safety sector that are based on these 
models: the Tripod series (Reason, 1997). These tools could be investigated for their 
applicability to security problems, and be adapted if necessary. The Tripod series are 
quite complex tools. It may be possible to use our new models to construct simpler 
and quicker tools such as checklists. This could also be investigated. Finally, the new 
models should be investigated as a basis for security design tools and methodologies.
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Appendix 1 Error types
Table 55 - Active failure components - Slips and Lapses
Slips & Lapses [skiII-based errors]
Errors in automated control of human action
Manual error (typo, 
etc.)
Omission
Repetition
Interference errors/ 
Blends
Mis-ordering
Reversals
Branching errors / 
Strong habit intrusions
Perceptual confusions
Error due to bad physical execution of an intended and good 
plan: -
typos while entering passwords, over or under-shooting with 
the mouse, etc.
Omission of an essential step in a sequence -
omitting to click Options and select the “Encrypt message 
contents and attachments" check box before sending a mail
Repetition of a step in a sequence -
clicking the encrypt button twice, so that a sensitive message 
is encrypted, then unencrypted again, before it is sent
The blending of two separate actions together, steps in each 
sequence crossover into the other sequence -
putting your password in the subject line of an e-mail, and 
typing “Hi how is it going” as your password
Execution of all the steps in a sequence, but in the wrong 
order -
typing the password where the user-id should go then 
entering the user-id as the password
All the steps in a sequence are executed, in reverse order -
typing the password where the user-id should go then 
entering the user-id as the password
Starting with one action sequence, and ending with another -
meaning to enter your web-password, but typing your email 
password instead
Objects that are in the expected place, or look similar or 
perform a similar operation are taken to be the target object, 
and actions meant for the target object are misapplied to them
typing your email password into something you have 
mistaken for your email programme
Reduced intentionality Forgetting what you wanted to do
meaning to digitally sign a contract to ensure its integrity 
before sending it, but then forgetting to
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Table 56 -  Active failure components -  Mistakes #1 (Rule based)
Errors of heuristic control of human action, if... then...
Misapplications of good rules
First exceptions An user is likely to misapply a good rule the first time that he meets
a situation that is an exception to that rule. -
if you only read an e-mail, then you cannot be infected by it
Informational Only a limited number of diagnostic signs are adequately processed
overload by the user, who then incorrectly determines which if applies -
Only looking at the first part of a double extension to a file 
attachment.jpg. bat
Rule strength Frequently used rules are stronger than infrequently used rules -
Typing your user name and password into XLOCK, only it requires 
a carriage return and your password
General rules By their nature, general rules are more generally applicable than
specific rules, so general rules may be tried first.
See Rule strength example above.
Redundancy The user may focus on cues in the situation which are not
diagnostic, particularly if they have been diagnostic in the past..
Looking at the letters .jpg in the name of an e-mail attachment, but 
not looking at the letters .exe
Rigidity A tendency to repeat the same tried and tested solution when
another one would be more appropriate.
Writing sensitive documents in French to keep them confidential, 
instead of encrypting them
Application of bad rules
Encoding
deficiencies
Action
deficiencies
Wrong rules
Misunderstanding how things work. - 
Deleted files have been safely destroyed.
Will not achieve its purpose -
Typing the same user name and password combination again, 
when it has not worked the first time
Inelegant rules Achieves its purpose of the expense of causing other problems -
Managing your passwords by getting the helpdesk to reset them all 
for you
Inadvisable rules Achieve their purpose but many lead to an accident with continuous 
use
Remembering your passwords by writing them on a sticky stuck to 
your screen
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Table 57 -  Active failure components -  Mistakes #2 (Knowledge based)
Mistakes #2 Iknowledge-based errors]
Problem solving from first principles, used to control human action if faced with a novel 
situation that can not be accommodated by skill or rule, or policies, etc
Selectivity and Out of 
sight, out of mind
Workspace limitations
Confirmation bias
Overconfidence 
Biased reviewing
Illusory correlation 
Halo effects
Problems with causality
Problems with 
complexity (subdivided 
below)
Problems with delayed 
feed-back
Insufficient consideration 
of processes in time
Difficulties with
exponential
developments
Thinking in causal series 
not causal nets
Thematic vagabonding
Encysting
=> The problem space is inefficiently sampled by the 
user's conscious processing resources
The portion of the problem filling the user's conscious 
processing resources is small compared to the entire 
problem
Rapidly favouring one explanation then becoming loath to 
part with it
Ignoring contradictory evidence
The "check-off illusion", confirming comprehensiveness by 
counting the factors considered instead of exploring their 
adequacy of consideration
Poor detection of co-variation
An aversion to discrepant orderings
Underestimating the irregularities of the future and planning 
for fewer contingencies than will occur
When there is delayed feedback, users lose synchrony with 
the current situation and lag behind actual events
Being more interested in the way things are now than in 
considering how they have developed previously
Having no intuitive feeling for exponential growth, 
underestimating the rate of change
Being sensitive to the main effects upon the immediate 
goal, but being unaware of their side-effects on the 
remainder of the system
Flitting from issue to issue quickly, treating each one 
superficially
Topics are lingered over and small details attended to 
lovingly while other more important issues are disregarded.
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Table 58 -  Active failure components - Violations
Violations
Intended breaches of security policy.
=> A Violation that is accepted as normal behaviour 
A Violation that is necessary due to unusual circumstances, 
and is for the good of the organisation
A Violation that harms the organisation intentionally
Routine violation 
Exceptional violation
Sabotage
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Appendix 2 Password Diary Interview Schedule
Participant I.D.__________
How many people work under you?:
Interview schedule:
1. What is your opinion about password systems, what's wrong and how could 
they be improved?
2. What problems do you have when using them, and when do they occur? 
<Go to separate sheets. Attach them to this document when completed>
Sex: Age:
Do you use computers?:
Occupation: 
Industry sector:
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PASSWORD
TYPE OF PWD/PIN
Password chosen 
by:
Self/Other?
Shared?
Number
Characters
Symbols
How long?
Same UserlD as 
pwds?
Same as PWDs?
How often changed 
(per year)?
Change forced?
Automated PWD 
entry by system?
When you do it, is it 
Automatic/Consciou 
s
Did you choose your 
UserlD?
Restrictions on 
PWD
Exact size
Min Size
Max Size
Num Only
Num Inc
Letters Inc
Symb Inc
No Names
No WORDS
No Last
No Similar to Last
No Previous
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PASSWORD
TYPE OF PWD/PIN
Password chosen 
by: Self / Other ?
Shared?
Number
Characters
Symbols
How long?
Same UserlD as 
pwds?
Same as PWDs?
How often changed 
(per year)?
Change forced?
Automated PWD 
entry by system?
When you do it, is it 
Automatic/Consciou 
s
Did you choose your 
UserlD?
Restrictions on
PWD
Exact size
Min Size
Max Size
Num Only
Num Inc
Letters Inc
Symb Inc
No Names
No WORDS
No Last
No Similar to Last
No Previous
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9. continued. What is the purpose of these constraints?
How did you choose your passwords?There are many strategies that could be used to 
design a password. Please look at the following password design strategies, and 
annotate those you have used with the I.D. of the password you designed with them. 
<hand flash cards to participant
11. There are some other ways of choosing passwords (in the table below), what 
do you like and dislike about these?
+ A word (including 
names of people, 
places, and things).
A word that has 
been unaltered
Based on the name 
of someone you 
know
Based on the name 
of a famous person 
or group
Based on the name 
of a food
Based on the name 
of a car
Based on the name 
of something you 
own
Based on the name 
of a thing you want
+ A phrase
Based on a phrase 
Coke, speech, 
conversation, story, 
quote)
Based on 
something of 
personal
importance to you
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The first letter of 
each word of the 
phrase
Parts of a phrase 
joined together.
+ A number
Based on a 
number
Based on a 
birthday
Based on a 
number-plate
+ Based on 
something in the 
past
Based on a way 
you felt
Based on 
something that 
happened to you or 
someone else
Based on a famous 
event
Based on an 
experience (a 
smell, a sound, a 
feeling, a sight, or 
a taste)
+ Based on 
something in the 
future
Something that will 
happen
Something you or 
someone else will 
have to do
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Something that you 
hope will happen
+ Based on a place
Based on where 
something is
Based on a route
Based on a 
position or 
orientation
Based on a scene
+ Based on some 
security algorithm
Swapping digits for 
letters
Adding symbols
Doing it backwards
In another 
language
using the shift key
mis-spelling
mixing things 
together
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Altered in some 
other way
+ Related to 
another of your 
passwords
Based on a 
sequence that you 
can remember
the same password 
but containing a 
different number 
each time: tom1, 
tom2, tom3..
Based on a 
different sequence 
(please describe)
12. How have you shared your passwords with other people, and why did you do it?
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Is there anything else you’d like to say?
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Appendix 3 Password Diary
Example front page of diary, showing participant and diary serial code
A0001
The first double page spread in the diary, showing instructions on the diary's use.
Instructions
Please fill in this diary for seven days, beginning 
the day after you received it. After seven days, 
start filling in the next diary. Carry on tiffing in a 
new diary every seven days until you have no 
more diaries to till in. If you fill up a diary in less 
than 7 days, continue in the next diary. When 
they are ail complete, post them back to me in the 
envelope I have provided.
KEEP THE DIARY WITH YOU, AND FILL IT IN 
EVERY TIME YOU USE A PASSWORD, Even if 
you tried to use a password but couldn't for some 
reason, you should till in the diary . At the latest, fill 
it in at die end of the day (if you leave it too long, 
you may have forgotten exactly what you did!).
Check the Memory Aid section to see that your 
passwords are all there and have been entered 
co rrectly Please amend any incorrect entries, and 
add any that are missing.
Instructions Continued 
Using your diary
Every time vou use one of your passwords, try to 
use one, or want to use one but can t. make an 
entry in the diary. To make an entry: t  Write the 
date; 2 Find the Item i.D. ‘ in the list for the password 
you've just used: 3 Write die Item I D.: 4 Write down die 
time the password was used, 5 Write a cross if you had a 
problem when you hied to use the password; 6 Write 
down what went wrong.
FREQUENCY OF USE
(ta—gUMC.
M n M a n jrM
c p i - nes 
CP2- Badly* tt.1 'Ida WI-fiBSlMhat wffct M e n q t I • BISSOU-(U$«tn
p c i- mw
pcs-nvn(ts»i
M nw y
CPI-DBS
OPi- Badly*
tt.1-lata
HB1- BBS
C U -H U illM
PCI-MW
The example above shows that on the 21st Sep­
tember 1997 you used your BIDS password 
(' OL1 ’) at 1 pm, and it didn't work because you 
tried to use last years password.
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The next double page spread in the diary, showing the memory aid section. Each diary 
had to such double page spreads. The next double page spread in the diary, showing 
the memory aid section. Each diary had two such double page spreads.
MEMORY AID
Check & amend existing passwords, add new passwords
An example password use table. Specimen item ids are shown down the right-hand 
side of the table, which would be personalised for each participant. The bulk of each 
diary would be made of these tables.
FREQUENCY OF USE
Date:
Mini*Memory Aid 
CP1 - RBS
Item
I.D.
Time Puta c im s  |x) trare 
rfyooVe 
had a 
probtem
What went wrong? CP2 - Barclays 
DL1 - labs 
HB1 - RBS 
OLt - BIDS 
OL2 * DMS Watson 
PC1 - NW 
PC2 - N Wiliest ore 
PC3 - ts 
PH1 - Mercury 
WWW1 - Prestel
i
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The inside back cover of the diary, showing one of the two password sharing tables, 
and the notes page.
SHARING
Date:_______
Notes:
tiem
ID
Why did you share it? How did you share it?
The back cover of the diary, showing instructions for the diary's return.
This booklet is part of an 
experiment carried out in 
University College London.
H you find this, please return 
i1 to Sacha Brostoff, in the 
Computer Science Depart­
ment. University College 
London, Gower Street, Lon­
don. WC1E6BT.
0171 419 3462 
s.brostoff@cs.ucl.ac.uk
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Appendix 4 Study 2 Questionnaire
B T ft Password
f Questionnaire ■■■■■
Security Futures and Advanced Communications Engineering are collaborating in an 
effort to make computer security more usable and appropriate to the needs of BT people. 
We have commissioned a researcher at University College London, Sacha Brostoff, to 
study password based security. He has particularly been instructed to investigate 
password memorability, and the problem of forgetting passwords. To understand the 
scope and nature of the problem, Sacha will be conducting a survey, which he is pilot 
testing with this document. The survey takes approximately 10 mirnite to complete. If  
you have any comments about the survey questionnaire, please do not hesitate to make 
them where appropriate, in the space provided at the end or by email. Your help is 
greatly appreciated.
THIS SURVEY IS ANONYMOUS
Your answers will not be linked to you as an individual or used in anyway other than to 
support our analysis. If  however you are willing to take part in follow up research then 
please give your name and a contact number or e-mail on the tear-off slip at the back of 
the questionnaire, or by e-mail (to s.brostoff@cs.ucl.ac.uk) and Sacha may contact you at 
a later date.
The questionnaire can be returned in the envelope provided, or by following the 
instructions at the end of the questionnaire.
Thank you for taking time to help us with our work.
Charles Brennan, 
Senior Professional, ACE
We’d like to find out about the possible causes of passwords needing to be reset The 
better we are able to understand what causes this need, the more probable it is that 
something can be done to reduce their burden.
1. Think of the BT work-related password you have last asked to be 
reset. What is the name of the system which you used the password for? 
Please write its name in the space below.
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2. Please describe in the space below why it needed to be reset. If 
you think you know why this happened, please give details below. If you 
run out of space, please use additional sheets.*
We want to know if perceptions of security arc associated with passwords needing to be 
reset Please answer the following questions about the BT work-related password that 
you most recently requested to be reset.
3. In your opinion, how sensitive is the information system for which 
this password was reset. Consider the information stored in the system, 
the functions performed by it and what these could be used for by 
somebody who knew your password? Please circle the most appropriate 
number.
Extremely Un-sensitive Extremely sensitive
*1 *2 *3 *4 *5 *6 *7
4. In your opinion, how bad would it be if somebody broke into this
system?
Wouldn't matter Extremely Bad
*1 *2 *3 *4 *5 *6 *7
5. How likely is it that somebody would try to break into this
system?
Extremely Unlikely Extremely likely
*1 *2 *3 *4 *5 *6 *7
We want to know whether it is particular properties of passwords that cause the need for 
passwords to be reset. Please answer the following questions about the BT work-related 
password that you most recently requested to be reset.
6. Normally when using this password, is it you that enters it into
the system ? For example, some e-mail programs store and enter your 
password for you, or your secretary may operate the system on your 
behalf. Please circle most appropriate answer:
*1 enter the password *The password is entered for me
7. Normally, when you enter this password into the system (or try 
to), do you have to consciously try and remember the password, or does 
it come to you without thinking? Please circle most appropriate answer: 
♦Consciously ‘Without thinking
8. How often do you change this password? Please write your answer 
in the spaces provided.
*1 change this password ______ times per ________ .
x.hrostoff@cs.ucl.ac.uk [2]
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9. How often do you use this password? Think about the period 
leading up to this password needing to be reset. Please answer in the 
spaces provided below:
*1 use the password _____ times per_______.
10. How long have you used this password? Please answer in the space 
provided below:★
11. In what pattern is this password used? Please tick the most 
appropriate answer.
*□ About a constant amount, which doesn't change much 
*□ Periods of intense use followed by periods of little use 
♦O A generally increasing amount 
*□ A generally decreasing amount
12. is the last BT work-related password you asked to be reset the
same as any passwords you currently own? Please circle the most
appropriate answer.
*yes *no
13. If the answer to the last question was yes, please write below how
many of your other current passwords are the same as this password?
*______  are the same as this password.
14. Is this password the same as any other passwords you've owned in 
the past, and can no longer use? Please circle the most appropriate 
answer.
♦yes *no
We are investigating whether it is the general task of using passwords that cause the need 
for passwords to be reset. Please answer the following questions about the passwords 
that you use at work and away from work.
15. How many password systems have you used or passwords have you 
taken ownership of in the last year? Hot just your BT passwords. 
People usually are unaware of quite how many passwords they have. It 
may help to work through the sorts of things that passwords are used 
for. Please look at the list of applications below, and next to each 
item on the list write down how many of this type of application you 
have passwords for.
If you use the same password for different applications, please count 
each of these applications separately.
♦Resource Management systems (Whereabouts, expenses, etc.)
♦Email systems (Outlook Exchange, talk21, etc.)
*Web sites (The Financial Times online, etc.)
♦PC/Workstation (Windows, screensaver, etc.)
♦Network/Server/Dialup (BTRA,Windows networking,ISP, etc.) 
♦Library/Reference (Blades, etc.)
"■Others
s.hrostoff@cs.ucl.ac.uk
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16. Normally, when you enter these passwords into the relevant 
systems, do you have to consciously try and remember the password or 
look it up, or does it come to you without thinking? The same password 
categories as in the question above are repeated below. Next to these 
categories, please write down how many of these applications you can 
remember without thinking,
♦Resource Management systems (Whereabouts, expenses, etc.) ____
♦Email systems (Outlook Exchange, talk21, etc.) ____
*Web sites (The Financial Times online, etc.) ____
♦PC/Workstation (Windows, screensaver, etc.) ____
♦Network/Server/Dialup (BTRA,Windows networking,ISP, etc.) ____
♦Library/Reference (Blades, etc.) ____
♦Others ____
17. Did you choose the BT work-related password you last requested to 
be reset yourself, or was it generated by the system (or by someone or 
something else) for you. Please circle the most appropriate answer.
♦I chose it #It was chosen for me.
18. If you chose the password yourself - did you choose it using the 
same method that you use for choosing other passwords? Please circle the 
most appropriate answer.
♦Yes ♦No
19. Roughly what proportion of your BT passwords are chosen using this 
method? Please write your answer below as a percentage.
20. It may be that the way passwords are chosen contributes to them 
needing to be reset. Please describe in a general way how you chose 
this password. If this question is too sensitive, or if you didn't 
choose your last password to be reset, please ignore this question.
21. How do you manage all your passwords? Please write the answer 
below.
s.hrosloff@cs.ncl.ac.uk [4]
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22. What caused the password management system you described above to 
break down for the BT work-related password you last requested to have 
reset?
To better understand the data collected in this survey, it would be necessary to collect 
similar data from people who have a different pattern of password resetting. To do this, it 
is necessary to match the second group of survey respondents as closely as possible to the 
group of survey respondents answering this questionnaire. To do this, we need to know a 
little about our respondents.
23. What is your age? Please circle the most appropriate answer. 
*16-25 *26-35 *36-45 *46-55 *56-65 *66+
24. What is your gender? Please circle the most appropriate answer.
♦Female *Male
25. For how many years have you been using computers?
*____ years.
26. What grade are you in BT? Please write your answer in the space
provided below
27. If you have any comments about this questionnaire (that you 
haven't already made on this document) please make them below.
Thank you for filling in this questionnaire.
Details for returning:
By post to: "Password" c/o Charles Brennan at
 
or
By BTNet fax to: Charles Brennan at
.............................................
If you have any questions or comments, please email them to Sacha Brostoff at: 
s.brostoff@cs.ucl.ac.uk
s.hrostoff@cs.ucl .ac.uk [5]
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TEAR OFF SLIP
Complete the sections for your name and contact details only if you are 
willing for Sacha to contact you for more information. Alternatively, 
e-mail your contact details to the address at the bottom of the slip.
To ensure the anonymity of your questionnaire responses, this slip may 
be detached and returned separately from the rest of the questionnaire.
I  AM W ILLING TO BE CONTACTED FOR MORE INFORMATION.
Name:
Email:
Phone:
THANK YOU - your time and effort so far are greatly appreciated. Please return the slip 
in the envelope provided, or using the instructions overleaf.
s.hrostoff@cs.ucl .ac.uk [6]
285
. u»<\ Feedback from experts
Appendix 5 Feedback from experts
From expertl, Mary Ellen Zurko, a computer system architect and programmer at IBM, 
who publishes human factors work in the computer security field.
Hi Sacha, Thanks for inviting me to read and respond to your model work. 
You definately need a catchy name for it.
The Macro strengths of the model are that it encourages a full systems view of 
security and serious consideration of the implications of decisions 
at all levels. The downsides of this are that it doesn't obviously 
help someone Figure out what they can fix, based on what they 
have responsibility for. While the greatest improvements may 
come from organisational fixes, they may not be within the scope 
of the decision maker. So, it's good to provide a model that shows 
where the most impactful fixes would come from, but it will also 
need to be applied in situations where the most impactful fix (say, 
more money for anything) is simply not currently possible. You do 
allude to that issue a couple of time (for instance, at the end of 
2.2.1), but I’m not sure how it would be integrated into a concrete 
use of the model.
I think it's quite useful to integrate human error into such a security model, and 
you do so quite well. I think there's less attention to the 
implications of having an active adversary (the aspect that makes 
security different from most other disciplines). For example, in
3.1, I'm not sure that that aspect isn't lost in a straight translation 
of a safety model. For instance, in the middle bullit in the Usability 
issues section, it's hard to think about "secure actions". The 
context matters so much. What does it mean to be transparent 
about the range of insecure actions the equipment allows?
On attacking latent vs. active failures (end of 2.1): Generally in security, it's 
good to pay attention to all aspects. You both want a system that 
is set up to be secure, and attention paid to making the human 
component secure as well (with both usability and consideration 
of morale issues). It's true you can't get rid of attempted external 
active failures, but you want to do what you can to minimize both 
latent and active failures. It's a belt and suspenders kind of 
approach.
It's not clear to me how surfing on company time can be an not-secure act, 
any more than reading email on company time is inately an 
insecure act. Many folks actually use the web in their work, and 
you just cant be sure any link is benign.
The page and picture refemeces are off; fyi.
The description of routine violations is good.
2.2.2.4, page 8, SSO part of pwd authn mechs - well, it has been since 
Kerberos. You're closer to the core of the issue when you say 
"interoperation" as well. Kerberos is set up so that anyone who 
uses it can in fact have a SSO experience; if everything else uses 
Kerberos, and if the right cross domain trust is set up.
workable procedures and relevant training are not possible (to the extent you 
suggest) for all jobs. And it's not just the higher in the 
organisation that works against proceduralization. It's also the 
size of the organisation. In small orgs, everyone is expected to 
show greater initiative and diversity of skills.
One aspect that seems less well covered by your model is checking for 
compliance. This includes tiger and penetration teams, running 
tools like SATAN, running audits of physical security compliance, 
etc. I suppose not considering these would be a line management
_________ deficiency. Perhaps is a precondition/motivator - 3.3. _________
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Which maybe points to another aspect of the model that might make it difficult 
to use. It's probably pretty hard for a non-security expert to 
translate from the abstractions of the model into concrete 
possibilities. It may be that you're just targeting intensive use by 
experts at this time, but that's not clear. Maybe that’s what you 
get at in section 4.2, 2nd bullet.
On a related note, section 3.1, Communications section, channels not 
regularly used - not regularly actively checked?
I didn't understand Illusory correlation and Halo effects in Table 3 (though I 
think you had better explanations for them somewhere else in the 
text).
I think it would be very useful to the model to use it on a real case; not just 
docu-dramas based on snippets of real cases. I know how hard 
that can be, but I think it could offer useful insight into what kind 
of information is available, and what kind isn't, in reality. If the 
information isn't available for some aspects of the model, then 
what would that imply?
2nd to last paragrah in 3.1 - it would be interesting to see such a bar chart 
generated. I'm not convinced it’s easily possible. And then there's 
the question about how truthfully any of the questions might be 
answered. Particularly if there is concern about liability issues.
The example in section 3.3.3 seems particularly weak, for a couple of 
reasons. First, availability aspects that generally fall under 
security have some sort of maliciousness as their cause (or 
they're found via error, but could be exploited by a malicious 
user). DDoS, buffer overflows that crash the system. It's hard to 
see how an adversary could make that happen. The other aspect 
that's questionable is to say that the organisation should not have 
opted to only support supported configurations. That's the kind of 
overall decision made all the time by organisations, and telling 
them they can't save resources that way can be a non-starter.
"Facts of the case" is a confusing section on the roll ups (table 5, etc.), 
because some of the facts are made up.
Section 4.1, Advantages, bullit 7, I'm still not convinced this points to the 
areas of security where the largest gains can (in practice) be 
made. None of your examples hone in on that aspect; they seem 
to work hard instead to cover lots/all areas.
2nd to last bullet - not obvious to me how this is achieved, since it doesn't 
seem to have been argued via an example anywhere.
Last bullet - 1 don't think that really helps a lot. Only if the model can speak to 
the needs of decision makers can it help. Every discipline can find 
experts who say that discipline should be given more resources.
4.2, 1st bullet; if this model can't be usefully used without trustworthy hw and 
sw, then it cant be usefully used, and it must be purely 
theoretical. That would be pretty depressing to me.
5 References, the Baker reference; actually, I don't think that paper was 
presented at NSPW '96. Dixie wrote it up for the NISSC panel 
based on several papers presented, and Marv brilliantly put it into 
the proceedings.
While I think section 6.1 is a good section to have, I think it's not well thought 
out yet. It's unfair to criticise other models about details of 
technology that weren't a concern when they were written, such 
as addressing BLP and multiple system authentication. It reminds 
me a bit of Pancho's NSPW '99 paper; if you shift the ground on a 
security model or mechanism, of course you can criticise it. It 
would be fair to say that the existing models don’t cover broad 
areas of concerns, which is why another model might be useful.
Also, you seem to include only the most abstract security models, which are 
least likely to overlap with your concerns. Gasseris Building A 
Secure Computer System includes the user as part of its overall 
model, as I'm sure any consulting company's model would. And 
McGraw's latest book probably does as well. What about Toward 
a Secure System Engineering Methodology in NSPW '98? The 
presentation at that time was pretty comprehensive, though I 
don't remember if DARPA restrictions made it hard for them to 
update the paper.
Section 6.3, Check question 1, Was the breach forseeable? : wow; how can 
anyone answer that question? If the answer is yes, that means I
_________ was stupid.__________________________________________
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It is nice to have a model that gives a place to slot usability failures.
Around page 46, it looks more like safety and less like security.
What environmental conditions could make a security breach more likely?
Ones that make the system higher risk, like a high profile site or 
organisation, political, social, or cultural issues, well funded 
competition, etc.
Sales, Marketing, Publicity, page 48: what about followup concerns like 
reputation, fixing the holes, etc.
6.4 evaluation questions
1 .1 think I've sprinkled some of that about above. It gives a good overall view, 
short shrift to issues that arise from active adversaries, not a lot of 
help when the scope for change is constrained, and not a lot of 
help prioritizing (which is important).
2. It seems closest in spirit to other overall system models, like Gasser's and
Saydjari's work. It does quite well in fleshing out and emphasizing 
usability, social, and organizaitonal aspects, perhaps to the 
detriment of technical security aspects.
3. There are a lot of issues with figuring out how to slot this into a corporations
natural processes, which I think I've touched on. And there are so 
many issues, it's hard for the non-expert to know what to 
emphasize. It’s hard to imagine a really comprehensive breach 
analysis of any breach that didn't make it to the cover of the 
NYTimes.
4. I think the biggest win of this model is the emphasis it gives to social and
usability issues. It can be cited when trying to ensure that they 
are properly considered.
5. and 6. See above
Looking back to table 4, I can't Figure out the relationship between 1.
Defences and the Products box. As a product person, I look on it 
as my responsibility to try to produce products that can provide 
security in configurations customers find desirable. So, while I 
fully agree that, for example, as in 3.2, all corporations should 
have a skilled and knowledgeable workforce, I would consider 
myself lazy if I made that a full precondition of anything I shipped, 
since I am well aware that that isn't always the case, and with 
changing times it's hard to keep it a constant.
Trying to Figure out how I might use Tables 1 - 4 ,1 find myself wondering how 
I could use them to argue that foisting a security decision onto the 
user is a bad idea ("Do you want to run these potentially 
dangerous Word macros?"). That's the kind of usabilty problem I 
deal with regularly, and where I can possibly have some impact. 
Perhaps that is the Gulf of evaluation, but I would like to argue we 
shouldn’t be bothering the user with stuff like that at all (we 
should make it safe/secure), rather than providing the poor user 
with even more feedback.
From expert 2, Dieter Gollmann, a hci and security researcher at Microsoft.
I had a quick look through Sacha's expert pack. One of the problems with 
security is that it is quite a multi-faceted area and I am definitely 
not an expert on the management side of security.
The statement 'In recent years, the security research community ...' at the 
start of the introduction is only true for some sectors of this 
community. (I am happy to take credit for changing Bruce 
Schneier's outlook on this matter...) At Royal Holloway, students 
have been told for (at least) a decade that security is a people 
problem and that security problems are not solved by technology 
alone.
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In terms of terminology, the differentiation between active failures, latent 
failures, and violations reminds a lot of work in the dependability 
community that uses terms like error, flaw, failure, etc. This 
framework has been promoted by IFIP WG 10.4 (Jean-Claude 
Laprie et al.) and, as with Reason's work, much of their 
background is in safety-critical systems.
In my understanding, Sacha's model is concerned with operational violations 
of given security policies but less with the security policies 
themselves. For example, in section 3.3.1 it is taken for granted 
that encryption should be used. (Security policy happens to be an 
overloaded term used in different contexts in the security 
community. My favourite reference on this subject is D.F. Steme, 
On the Buzzword "Security Policy", Proceedings of the 1991 
IEEE Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, pages 
219-230.) Research into the reasons why security policies are not 
effective and into changing this situation is valuable indeed, but it 
is different from research into the 'security policies' enforced 
within an IT system. In this sense, the proposed model is 
complementary to existing security models.=20 
The security models listed in appendix 6 do not seem to be relevant to 
Sacha's work. BLP, Biba, and Clark-Wilson are more concerned 
with security policies enforced within an IT system than with the 
type of security policies members of an organisation are asked to 
adhere to. It would be a mistake (by their proponents or their 
_________ critics) to treat them as universal security models._____________
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Appendix 6 The Password Manager (PM)
Become your own (Password) Manager!
From ISE Password Control 
 
Please h a ve  your EIN a n d  PIN ready.
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Become your own (password) manager
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introduction and General Instructions
Use this document as a password management manual
•  Group the computer systems you use according to how often their passwords must be changpd.
• Each time you Change a password, write a letter "C" in the relevant column so that you know 
which version the password is ‘up to’.
• Each time you S ig i in  with a system, write a letter "S" in the relevant column so that you know 
which systems still think you’re alive.
General password tips
• To make things easier to remember, try making all the passwords in a group the same, but make each 
group different.
• Remember to choose a password of appropriate strength for the sensitivity of the different groups. Each 
group has instructions about howto do this.
•  Book a quiet time in your diary for changing your passwords, so you don’t have to do it in a rush
• Try to remember each group’s password 10 minutes to half an hour after you’ve changed it. This will 
make the password stronger in your memory, and act as a Sign in with the computer system.
Confidential- keep locked awav
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instructions for Passwords changed monthly
Use
STRONG passwords 
with this group
1. Use tte first letters of each word in a line from a favourite song or poem. If  it's a well known line 
(such as the first line or the chorus) its easier to crack, so try to use a different line, or miss out the 
first word, or use a rare poem or song that few people know. This strategy makes a password that 
looks random, so that the hacker is forced to try all possible combinations. As an example, the 
second line from "Yesterday", by the Beatles.. Now it lodes as though they're here to stay becomes
M
2. How change some of the letters for numbers or symbols. Do not choose the first or last letter far this, 
but letters from the middle of the password. then might become nil@tthts. Some systems 
require passwords of this format, since it makes them harder to crack.
• For a top strength and memorable password
> If  it’s a well known line (such as the first line or the chorus) its easier to crack, so try to use a 
different line, or miss out the first word, or use a song that’s not at no. 1 right now.
> Make the password 8 characters long, as this is a requirement on some systems.
The grey part of the table »
... opposite contains systems which are interconnected, so that changing the password on one of the systems 
will update the passwords of some of the other systems. If  you change the password on the wrong system 
then the password updating progams will get confused and you will require a password reset However 
the systems have been arranged in the table to make password changing easy.
• There is a white arrow in the great part of the table, pointing down.
• change the password of a system next to the top of the arrow
• all the systems below it in the gey section will be updated automatically
• systems above it will not be updated.
• Always change the password at the start of the arrow, and the others will be updated for you.
On systems with linked password changing (such as NC access and CSS), you must Sign in separately with 
each of the linked systems - it is not enough to just change the password on one of the systems.
Sign in with your systems once a month
• Many BT computer accounts will automatically be suspended if you don’t Sign in with them every
month, by logging in.
• Most systems with monthly password changing require monthly sign-ins.
• You can indicate which systems you use are like this, by placing a tick in the "Sign in Required" column
next to the system's name.
Page 4 Confidential- keep locked away
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Passwords changed monthly
Computers used for very sensitive information. Use a top strength password. Never use these with the
Internet -  they will be stolen by hackers and used to commit crime in your name.
EL
System Name
Change a password 
& all the ones 
below it on the 
arrow will be 
changed for you.
Date (fill in below) Pas sword Hint 
(use pencil)
Write down C or S below each time you 
(C) Change the password /  Sign into the system (S)
SMART
Page 5 Confidential- keep locked away
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Passwords changed monthly, continued
Sig
n-
in 
Re
qu
ire
d System Name Date (till in below) Password Hint 
(use pencil)
Write dowi 
(C ) Change the
1 C or S bdow each time you 
password /  Sign into the system (S)
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Passwords changed monthly, continued
Sig
n-
in 
Re
qu
ire
d System Name Date (1511 in below) Password Hint 
(use pencil)
Write dowi 
(C) Change the
i C or S below each time you 
password /  Sign in to the system (5)
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instructions for Passwords changed Quarterly
Use
MEDIUM strength passwords
with this group
1. Put three or more words together. This strategy uses the vast number of combinations of 
dictionary words in order to create a combination that is difficult to guess. Leave out the spaces 
between the words, and use only one case to make it easier to remember. Making the combination of 
words funny and unexpected also aids memorability. As an example Hit a boss becomes $$$$&$&
2. Now change some of the letters for numbers or symbols. Do not choose the first or last letter for this, 
but letters from the middle of the password, hitaboss then might become hit@6o$s. Some systems 
require passwords of this format, since it makes them harder to crack.
The grey part of the table »
... opposite contains systems which are interconnected, so that changing the password on one of the systems 
will update the passwords of some of the other systems. If  you change the password on the wrong system 
then the password updating progams will get confused and you will require a password reset However 
the systems have been arranged in the table to make password changing easy.
• There is a white arrow in the great part of the table, pointing down.
• change the password of a system next to the top of the arrow
• all the systems below it in the grey section will be updated automatically
• systems above it will not be updated.
• Always change the password at the start of the arrow, and the others will be updated for you.
On systems with linked password changing (such as NC access and CSS), you must Sign in separately with 
each of the linked systems - it is not enough to just change the password on one of the systems.
Sign in with your systems once a month
• Many BT computer accounts will automatically be suspended if you don’t Sign in with them every 
month, by logging in.
• Most systems with quarterly password changing require monthly sign-ins.
You can indicate which systems you use are like this, by placing a tick in the “Sign in Required" column 
next to the system's name.
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Passwords changed Quarterly
Computers used for q u ite  sen sitive information. Use a medium strength password Try not to use these with 
the Internet.
t r System Name Date (fill in below) Password Hint
Sig
n-
in 
Re
qu
ire (use pencil)
Write dowi 
(C) Change the;
i C or S belo1 
password /Sij
w each time you 
jn into the system
’ :
—j ■■iTii. i--.,i ... ■ •.
;
L:__ '
•
’Hi'S
^ __
M 1
✓ NT DOMAIN
✓ OUTLOOK
✓ LAN
✓ E Gatekeeper
✓ CAMMS
□
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Passwords changed Quarterly, continued
Sig
n-
in 
Re
qu
ire
d System Name Date (fill in below) Pas sword Hint 
(use pencil)
Write dowi 
(Q  Change the
i  C or S beloi
password/Si^
w each time you 
pi into the system (S)
-a
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Passwords changed Quarterly, continued
Sig
n-i
n 
Re
qu
ire
d System Name Date (fill in below) Password Pint 
(use pencil)
Write dowi 
(Q  Change the
l  C or S below each time you 
password /  Sign into 1he system (S)
Pape i 1 Confidential- keen locked awav
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instructions for Passwords changed Annuatiy 
Use
WEAK passwords 
with this group
1. Pick as single, lower-case word that you can remember. Examples would be password, chocolate,
meMim
2. How change some of the letters for numbers or symbols. Do not choose the first or last letter for this, 
but letters from the middle of the password, password then might become pa$$wqr.d. Some systems 
require passwords of this format, since it makes them harder to crack.
Writing down passwords in this group is OK
• you do not have to write a hint
• you can write down the password ilsdf
• as long as it is not the same as a password in a more sensitive group
• do not use the same passwords as systems with strong or medium strength passwords
Sign in with your systems once a QUARTER
• Many BT computer accounts with annual password changing will automatically be suspended if you 
don’t Sign in with them every quarter, by logging in.
You can indicate which systems you use are like this, by placing a tick in the "Sign in Required" column 
next to the system's name.
Page 12 Confidential- keep locked away
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Passwords changed Annually
Computers used for not very sensitive information. Use a password that’s easy to remember.
11
System Name Date (fill in below)
Write down C or S bdow each time you 
(C) Change the password /  Sign into the system (S)
Password 
(use pencil)
CDS
MCSS3
FPQ
"Q
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Instructions for Passwords never changed -  important ones
STRONG passwords 
with this group
1. Use the first letters of each word in a line from a favourite song or poem. If it's a well known line 
(such as the first line or the chorus) its easier to crack; so try to use a different line, or miss out the 
first word, or use a rare poem or song that few people know. This strategy makes a password that 
looks random, so that the hacker is forced to try all possible combinations. As an example, the 
second line from "Yesterday", by the Beatles.. Now it locks as though they're here to step becomes 
WMiM-
2. How change some of the letters for numbers or symbols. Do not choose the first or last letter for this, 
but letters from the middle of the password. then might become nil@tthts. Some systems
require passwords of this format, since it makes them harder to crack.
Page 14 Confidential- keep locked away
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passwords never changed -  important ones
Computers used for sensitive information. Use a different strong password than ones that have to be changed 
every month.
Sig
n-
in 
Re
qu
ire
d System Name Date (1311 in below) Password Hint 
(use pencil)
Write dowi 
(C) Change the
i C or S beloi
password /Sig
w each time you 
*ninto the system (S)
c
r'd.pt' Confidential- keep locked
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instructions for Passwords never changed -  Mickey Mouse ones
Use
WEAK passwords 
with this group
1. Pick as single, lower-case word that you can remember. Examples would be password, chocolate,
2. How change some of the letters for numbers or symbols. Do not choose the first or last letter for this, 
but letters from the middle of the password, password then might become pa$$word. Some systems 
require passwords of this format, since it makes them harder to crack.
Writing down passwords in this group is OK
• you do not have to write a hint
• you can write down the password itself
•  as long as it is not the same as a password in a more sensitive group
• do not use the same passwords as systems with strong or medium strength passwords
nfidenlial- keep locked away
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asswords never changed -  Mickey Mouse ones
omputers used foriminiyoitaanitduii^. Use 4 'Mickey Mouse' strengthpas sword
1
§vt
System Name Date (fill in below) Password 
(use pencil)
Vftite dow] 
(C) Change the]
aCorS
password
below each time 
/S&iintothe sys
you
temCS)
.  } i■A£gt i. i Confideritial- keep heked away 
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Different things passwords might be used for
One of the most difficult parts of dealing with passwords is remembering precisely how many of them you 
have! It is so difficult to do that people are often surprised that they have so many passwords. To help you 
remember which systems you have passwords for, look at the list below of different things passwords might 
be used for.
Look at each item in turn, and try to remember if you have any passwords for something like that. Then go 
on to the next item, and so on
• "On/Off Button" passwords
on PCs
• calendar software • customer s ervic e s o ftware* Network / Novell / LAN
passwords • jobs databases/scheduling 
software passwords • purchasing system software
• Dial-up software passwords
• digital libraries passwords • financial system software
• Email account passwords
• invoicing system passwords • web based computer systems
• Internet Service Provider 
passwords • account managing software
• security device passwords
• Customer details databases
• bulletin board passwords
Page 1P Confidential- keep locked away
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Form for sharing passwords
I
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[form goes here]
I
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j Become yoor own (password) manager
Form for getting a password reset PIN
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[form goes here]
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Notes
[for your notes]
Contact details
In association
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